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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
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Dissertation Director: Ernest Sosa 
 
How do agents with limited cognitive capacities flourish in informationally 
impoverished or unexpected circumstances? Aristotle argued that human 
flourishing emerged from knowing about the world and our place within it. If he 
is right, then the virtuous processes that produce knowledge, best explain 
flourishing. Influenced by Aristotle, virtue epistemology defends an analysis of 
knowledge where beliefs are evaluated for their truth and the intellectual virtue or 
competences relied on in their creation. However, human flourishing may emerge 
from how degrees of ignorance are managed in an uncertain world. Perhaps 
decision-making in the shadow of knowledge best explains human wellbeing—a 
Bayesian approach? In this dissertation I argue that a hybrid of virtue and 
Bayesian epistemologies explains human flourishing—what I term homeostatic 
epistemology.  
Homeostatic epistemology supposes that an agent has a rational credence p 
when p is the product of reliable processes aligned with the norms of probability 
 iii 
theory; whereas an agent knows that p when a rational credence p is the product of 
reliable processes such that: 1) p meets some relevant threshold for belief (such 
that the agent acts as though p were true and indeed p is true), 2) p coheres with a 
satisficing set of relevant beliefs and, 3) the relevant set of beliefs is coordinated 
appropriately to meet the integrated aims of the agent.  
Homeostatic epistemology recognizes that justificatory relationships 
between beliefs are constantly changing to combat uncertainties and to take 
advantage of predictable circumstances. Contrary to holism, justification is built 
up and broken down across limited sets like the anabolic and catabolic processes 
that maintain homeostasis in the cells, organs and systems of the body. It is the 
coordination of choristic sets of reliably produced beliefs that create the greatest 
flourishing given the limitations inherent in the situated agent.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
To count as a belief a state has to be part of a system of states in which processes of 
integration and updating function to keep the subject’s mental contents in epistemic 
equilibrium to some degree or other (Weiskopf, 2008). 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Living creatures exist along a continuum from bare survival to optimized 
success. Humans survive, satisfice, flourish or optimize depending on their 
actions at each decision-point. To flourish is to function near optimally, rather 
than just ‘getting by’, but optimal functioning depends on useful and reliable 
information, and, ideally, knowledge.1 Aristotle was the first western philosopher 
to explicitly connect human flourishing and knowledge in the Nicomachean 
Ethics:  
Will not the knowledge of [our desires], then, have a great influence on life? Shall 
we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is 
right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of 
the sciences or capacities it is the object. (Book.1, §2).2 
Aristotle’s point is that the quest for knowledge is intertwined with the 
quest to satisfy our desires to achieve eudaimonia.3 This dissertation is a study of 
the competencies that produce knowledge in the service of human flourishing—an 
examination of virtue epistemology. If Aristotle is right, then it is the virtuous 
processes that produce knowledge that best explain flourishing. However, it is not 
clear that Aristotle is right. Human flourishing may emerge from how degrees of 
ignorance are managed in an uncertain world. Perhaps decision-making in the 
                                                
1 While knowledge might include abstract ideas about wellbeing, such as the importance of agency, caring for others, 
mindfulness, eating a balanced diet, daily exercise, wealth (up to a point), routine, self-discipline, and so forth, it mostly 
refers to simple facts, such as what others are feeling, what the weather is going to be like, and where one might have left 
their keys. Humans are particularly interested in answers that are tailored to their wants, and in needs that are relevant to 
their circumstances and objectives. Having attained this knowledge, they then want to put it into practice. 
2 http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/nicomachean/book1.html  
3 Eudaimonia is typically translated as “happiness” or “human flourishing” or “wellbeing,” and it is an explicitly rational 
satisfaction with life (Hursthouse, 2013). 
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shadow of knowledge best explains human wellbeing—a Bayesian approach? In 
this dissertation I argue that both virtue and Bayesian approaches explain human 
flourishing. Epistemic success is achieved by the deployment of competent 
processes that produce knowledge and rational credences. What emerges from a 
hybrid Bayesian Virtue epistemology is a new approach to knowledge and 
justification I term, homeostatic epistemology. 
A paradox of knowledge is that humans think that they know a great deal—
in part, because their lives are filled with success—yet we have ample evidence 
that we know much less than we think (Kahneman, 2011). A recent headline, 
“British public wrong about nearly everything” (Page, 2013), illustrates this point 
particularly well. A survey by the Royal Statistical Society (RSS) and King’s 
College, London (conducted in July 2013) showed that British public opinion is 
deeply confused about a number of issues, including teen pregnancy rates, benefit 
fraud, and levels of foreign aid and crime. For example, most people think the 
crime rate is stable or increasing, when in fact it has been declining for decades. 
Similarly, the public think that that £24 of every £100 of benefits is fraudulently 
claimed, even though official estimates suggest that only 70 pence in every £100 
is distributed falsely. As the executive director of the RSS concludes, “our data 
poses real challenges for policymakers. How can you develop good policy when 
public perceptions can be so out of kilter with the evidence?” (Shah, 2013). 
Public outcry against the RSS survey results shows the tremendous scope 
for confusion and consternation when attempting to interpret statistics and 
uncover what is really going on. Some members of the public (Page, 2013) 
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criticized the statistical methods, such as the data or sample size (e.g., one 
respondent claimed that the public somehow knew a fundamental truth about 
benefits fraud that the establishment could not access), while a commentator with 
a statistical background said that the results were skewed because the research 
included pensions—a category with a zero fraud rate. Some attacked the 
conclusions, arguing that generalized statistics are irrelevant to the ‘lived 
empirical experiences’ of each person. In the midst of the furore, a casual 
observer might reflect on this question: the British public probably knows 
something, but what precisely do they know, and, more pointedly, when does their 
ignorance matter?4 To phrase this slightly differently: What can be known and is 
knowledge critical to flourishing? 
So, what can be known? Socrates considered the barriers to knowledge to be 
so great that he doubted that any certain knowledge was achievable (The Apology 
20e-23c). There are too many reasons why we might be wrong, he argued, for us 
to be confident that we are right, beyond all doubt, about anything. If Socrates is 
right, then human flourishing must be dependent on how degrees of ignorance are 
managed in an uncertain world—the view espoused by Bayesian epistemology. 
Bayesian epistemology and decision-theory avoid the problem of knowledge by 
studying rational degrees of belief, given limited evidence and cognition. 
Bayesians point out that, given the boundless ignorance in our day-to-day lives, 
                                                
4 Having knowledge is important to flourishing, but is all knowledge equally important? For example, if the British people 
are ignorant on national issues such as immigration, welfare, foreign aid, and so on, then false beliefs drive their vote. This 
means that policies commensurate with these false beliefs will be pursued by politicians seeking office, regardless of 
objective benefits to the public. On the other hand, the British people may know how to improve their benefit payments 
through loopholes and manipulation of the system, which vastly improves their weekly income and helps them and their 
families live better lives. Clearly, when it comes to flourishing, some knowledge seems less important than other 
knowledge. Philosophers (Pritchard & Turri, 2012) have argued that accumulating true beliefs independently of their 
prudential value is of little value. I explore the value of knowledge in Chapter 3. 
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certainty cannot be a prerequisite for action or success. Still, does this mean that 
the knowledge baby should be thrown out with the exacting bath water? Weighing 
up Aristotelian and Socratian approaches, the central question of this dissertation 
is: How do cognitively limited agents flourish with limited capacities in 
informationally impoverished circumstances? Homeostatic epistemology is the 
thesis that agents flourish by aligning their confidence with available evidence 
and relevant circumstances, and that a hybrid of virtue and Bayesian 
epistemologies (BE) justifies this belief alignment. 
Both Bayesian and virtue epistemologies contend that competent processes 
require reliability (consistent true belief formation) and cohesiveness (beliefs 
mutually support one another). The problem with reliability is that, in isolation, it 
struggles to explain reflective knowledge. BVE offers an iterative reliability to 
justify reflective knowledge. However, BVE cannot resolve a central problem of 
cohesiveness, namely, that increasing the number and cohesion of beliefs may 
paradoxically make them more likely to be false.   
I argue that this paradox arises because coherence is typically evaluated 
holistically (across all beliefs), rather than within limited sets or partitions. I argue 
that limited coherence resolves traditional concerns and raises the need for 
another kind of justification, coordination (integration across sets of beliefs).  
Homeostatic justification is a reliabilist account of foundational, cohering and 
coordinated beliefs. 
In this chapter, I lay the groundwork for the chapters to come. In §1.2, I 
introduce the biological concept of homeostasis and apply it to epistemic 
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processes and outcomes. I also lay down the central commitments of homeostatic 
epistemology. In §1.3, I argue that naturalized epistemology qua cooperative 
naturalism is the most promising framework with which to approach the study of 
knowledge and decision theory. Cooperative naturalism is the thesis that 
philosophical findings can shed light on empirical science and that, conversely, 
empirical science can influence disputes in traditional philosophy. In §1.4, I 
introduce reliabilism, which is promising because knowledge can be objectively 
evaluated through empirical research on cognition and performance success in the 
world. In §1.5, I define reliabilist justification grounded in empirical research on 
memory systems. I go on to articulate two prominent and contemporary variants 
of reliabilism: virtue epistemology and Bayesian epistemology. In §1.6, I discuss 
virtue epistemology, which defines knowledge as reliable beliefs brought about 
by the internally driven competencies of the agent. In §1.7, I explain how 
Bayesian epistemology circumvents the problem of knowledge by focusing on 
credences constrained by probabilistic laws, and that a hybrid of virtue and 
Bayesian epistemologies is the foundation for answering how both knowledge and 
justified beliefs (which fall short of knowledge) are valuable to human 
flourishing. In §1.8, I conclude this chapter by highlighting some of the problems 
associated with a hybrid account, outlining how these problems will be addressed 
in subsequent chapters, and justifying the emergence of homeostatic 
epistemology. 
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1.2 HOMEOSTATIC EPISTEMOLOGY 
The integrating power of the nervous system has in fact in the higher animal, more 
than in the lower, constructed from a mere collection of organs and segments a 
functional unity, an individual of more perfected solidarity. (Sherrington, 1906, p. 
353) 
Homeostasis refers to self-regulating physiological processes that maintain 
the stability of the body's internal systems, including metabolism, blood pressure, 
and body temperature.5 Homeostasis is a coordinated response to ensure internal 
stability (Denton, McKinley, & Wessinger, 1996), and it has two key features: 1) 
an optimum state for an organism (e.g., a 37 degree core internal temperature), 
and 2) processes that enable the organism to strive for and maintain this optimal 
point (e.g., sweating, shivering). The optimum state can vary depending on 
context. For example, seasonal differences alter the optimum temperature.  
Homeostatic processes are both reactive and predictive (Moore-Ede, 1986; 
Mrosovsky, 1990; Wingfield & Ramenofsky, 1999). For example, rats build a 
nest in response to sudden cooling in their environment (Richter, 1943), but they 
also predict colder temperatures with circadian timing systems (Gallistel, 1990) 
and secrete insulin when they perceive food sources. Homeostatic processes are 
also not confined to local physiological function, but instead are orchestrated by 
the central nervous system and/or placenta. For example, the hormone CRH6 
                                                
5 Since the late 1980s, another term—‘allostasis’—has entered the lexicon regarding body regulation. Allostasis refers to 
the body’s capacity to anticipate needs, while homeostasis is defined as being purely reactionary. Processes described by 
advocates of allostasis include lactation and migration, both of which involve a complex array of physiological changes 
(including gene expressions) to ensure wellbeing (McEwen & Wingfield, 2010). Allostatic processes have shifting 
equilibrium points (rather than one ideal) and they differ between individuals, as opposed to being bound by species-
specific parameters. Critics of the term argue that it mischaracterises homeostasis and offers no explanatory benefits (Day, 
2005; Romero, Dickens, & Cyr, 2009). Cannon’s original concept of homeostasis allowed for both anticipatory functions 
and wide-ranging parameters on many physiological systems, and for this reason I use the term homeostasis to refer to both 
allostatic and homeostatic processes. The differences between the two terms are not pertinent to this thesis, and a broader 
use of ‘homeostasis’ is consistent with the literature (Nelson & Drazen, 2000). For further discussion on this topic, see 
(Ganzel, Morris, & Wethington, 2010; LeDoux, 2012; McEwen & Wingfield, 2010; Romero, et al., 2009; Schulkin, 2003). 
6 Corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) is a peptide hormone and neurotransmitter that manages the internal response to 
stress including the release of adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) and cortisol. The release of ACTH and cortisol set off 
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coordinates a range of processes that dictate normal or preterm birth (in the case 
of severe maternal stress) (Schulkin, 2003).  
The objective of homeostasis is to maintain equilibrium against changing 
internal and external conditions. Consider an underdressed shift-worker stepping 
outside at night to watch snow tumble silently onto an empty street. Temperature 
receptors on her skin transmit information to the hypothalamus, alerting her to the 
sudden change in temperature. The hypothalamus then directs effectors (sweat 
glands and muscles) to increase heat within the body to ensure a core temperature 
of 37 degrees Celsius. If the worker is unable to internally regulate her 
temperature or alter her environment (e.g., by seeking shelter or a jacket because 
the security door shuts and she has left her keys inside), the body goes into 
survival mode, withdrawing heat from the extremities (vasoconstriction) in order 
to keep core organs functioning. The longer the body remains in sub-optimal 
conditions, the more severe the deficits to functioning, including confusion, 
memory loss, exhaustion, difficulty moving, severe shivering, slurring of speech, 
and eventually cardiac arrest. However, when the worker manages to slide open a 
window and return once more to her warm office, the body quickly senses the 
shift and begins returning the blood supply to normal operations, and normal 
cognitive operations resume. A creature flourishes when physiological processes 
are in equilibrium, but they can survive within a broad range of conditions. 
Drawing from homeostatic processes, homeostatic epistemology refers to 
the processes that maintain rational beliefs across changing internal and external 
                                                                                                                                
many systems including immune responses, the regulation of inflammation, carbohydrate metabolism, protein catabolism, 
blood electrolyte levels, and behaviour (Rogers, 2012). 
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information environments. For example, take a tourist observing a hand gesture 
upon arriving in a foreign country. This gesture connotes a friendly welcome at 
home, yet it is accompanied by oddly distracted body language in this instance. 
What should the tourist believe? The tourist must evaluate his belief about the 
gesture alongside other beliefs about the culture, circumstances, and the 
individual he is observing. Responding too warmly might provoke suspicion in a 
customs officer or exhausting provocation from a manipulative trader. 
Withholding emotion, however, might result in a missed opportunity for an 
exquisite local meal or a lost opportunity to help someone in genuine distress. We 
flourish when we pick the right degree of belief, given our information and our 
goals, and when we act in correspondence with that belief.  
Historical precedent for homeostatic epistemology can be found in the work 
of Charles Sherrington, who described the brain as “an enchanted loom where 
millions of flashing shuttles weave” (Levine, 2007; Sherrington, 1906). Born out 
of the surge of knowledge in metabolic neurochemistry at the turn of the 20th 
century, the ‘enchanted loom’ metaphor describes the interlacing of electrical and 
chemical neural components to produce mental activity. Sherrington supposed 
that the mind consists of many systems coordinating a single tapestry, rather than 
a central or single soul directing the weaving process. His use of the word 
‘shuttle’— an object that moves backwards and forwards across the threads—may 
be an attempt to convey the importance of oscillating anabolic and catabolic 
processes to cell life and, by extension, the influence of balancing forces in the 
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mind more generally. Nerve cells, for example, were intriguingly both 
independent and interactive through the action of hormones.7 
Sherrington had two key ideas that are pertinent to homeostatic 
epistemology: 1) the compatibility of independent and interacting processes, and 
2) anabolic and catabolic processes at multiple levels of biological function. 
Translated into epistemic notions these ideas become: 1) sets of beliefs are 
justified by lower level processes and goals and by the coordination of processes 
to achieve higher level goals; and 2) the justification of a belief varies by its 
relationship with other beliefs. Greater coherence is built up (anabolic) by the 
number of beliefs and their logical relationships. However, justification reaches 
an equilibrium point to achieve an epistemic goal, a point of maximal fittedness 
between beliefs after which time more beliefs do not increase justification. At 
times justification increases by breaking down (catabolic) large sets of beliefs into 
smaller partitions relevant to more specific goals.  
Agents flourish when they strive for goals that are attuned to ecological 
context, and when they adapt their thoughts, behavior, and goals in challenging 
contexts. For example, a paleontologist in the field succeeds not only when she 
relies on her knowledge of paintbrushes, dental picks, and plaster to remove 
fossils, but also when she adapts techniques in challenging circumstances (for 
example, using toilet paper to cast a crocodile skull when atypical flooding 
inundates a fossil site, rendering plaster as useless as mud). Similar fossil rescues 
                                                
7 The effect of glands such as the adrenal and pituitary on the nervous system reduced the brain’s pre-eminence as the 
controlling organ of the body’s state. Sets of processes worked in functional solidary to maintain the wellbeing of the body. 
Though inspired by Sherrington, I do not wish to engage in a philosophical discussion about whether the mind has a central 
processor (or soul) or whether the mind consists of encapsulated modules (Fodor, 1983). 
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by untrained enthusiasts in either normal or aberrant circumstances could result in 
irreparable damage to the fossil record. Agents flourish when they detect the 
limits of their own capacities to achieve appropriate aims, and knowledge occurs 
when circumstances and capacities align to produce optimal outcomes for the 
agent.8  
The Socratic standard for certain knowledge is too austere to make sense of 
success. Instead, knowledge ought to be contextualized in terms of the agent’s 
goals and conditions. Additionally, and contrary to traditional epistemic claims, 
human flourishing does not always require knowledge, and beliefs forged through 
processes that are ‘good enough’ can yield satisfactory outcomes9. Take losing 
one’s keys as an example: When we realize that our keys are not in our bag or in 
the little wicker basket on the bookshelf, we do not have to know where they are 
to start being productive in our search for them. A set of hunches are good enough 
most of the time—perhaps the keys are still in the front door? Could I have left 
them on the kitchen bench when I brought home the shopping? Could they be in 
the jacket I wore recently? Even when we are in a hurry, our rational credences in 
probable hypotheses help narrow the scope of where our keys may be. These 
rational credences are justified with Bayesian apparatus.  
                                                
8 How is knowledge obtained? How does a palaeontologist gain knowledge and capacities? Traditional epistemologies 
differentiate between innate, rational knowledge and empirically grounded knowledge that one has learned. Plato thought 
that humans were innately endowed with abstract knowledge, such as arithmetic axioms or geometric forms (e.g., the 
concept of a triangle). Descartes argued that innate intellectual powers, rather than the senses, could discern the truth. In 
this dissertation, I follow in the Western analytic empiricist tradition of Aristotle, Locke, Hume, and Berkeley to study 
learned knowledge. Humans learn through experiences in the world. Higher level knowledge must somehow be scaffolded 
from perceptual, memorial, and testimonial sources. Knowledge arises from the operation of contextually appropriate, 
reliable processes, which produce specific cognitive outcomes. Key mechanisms for belief revision include causal 
Bayesian processes, which are the subject of Chapter 2. 
9 Of course, it that it might be that overall human flourishing does always require quite a lot of knowledge, even though 
there are items that aid human flourishing, such as finding your keys that do not require knowledge (E. Sosa, personal 
communication, August 5, 2013)  
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I address a number of arguments that can be made against Bayesianism: 1) 
that Bayesian models can be made to fit almost any data, 2) that Bayesian 
psychology is incomplete, and 3) that Bayesian norms are impossibly high. In 
§1.7, I argue that Bayesian norms are the only guide we have to rational decision-
making, but reliable human processes are shaped by Bayesian norms, as well as 
other factors such as causal reasoning. Bayesian processes require reliability 
(consistent true belief formation) and cohesiveness (where beliefs mutually 
support one another).  
Reliabilism best accounts for low-level, mechanistic, cognitive processes, 
such as the habituation and association characteristic of animal knowledge, but 
how can low-level processes that produce animal knowledge explain the 
production of high-level reflective knowledge? In Chapter 2, I argue that iterative 
and hierarchical mechanisms (e.g., causal Bayes nets) can account for reliably 
produced, high-level reflective knowledge. However, Bayesian processes are 
underdefined, and an additional measure, such as coherence, is needed to bolster 
Bayesian reliabilism. 
Cohesiveness between beliefs involves logical consistency, which ought to 
help Bayesians objectively assign prior probabilities to hypotheses. The problem 
with cohesiveness, however, is that adding more logically consistent beliefs to a 
set of beliefs paradoxically makes the set more likely to be false—a threat to 
epistemic holism. In Chapter 3, I respond to this with the thesis that coherence is 
valuable between limited sets of beliefs, which I term chorism.10  
                                                
10 chorism from the greek chórisma(χώρισµα) meaning 'partition' 
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Chorism refers to the view that epistemic justification is not about a single 
justified true belief (atomism), nor an integrated holistic web of beliefs (holism), 
but instead is about the value of a subset of mutually supporting beliefs that are 
relevant to an agent’s success. It is the coordination of choristic sets of cohesive 
beliefs that create the greatest flourishing, given the limitations inherent in the 
situated agent. Choristic sets of belief explains instances of knowledge where the 
agent may hold inconsistent beliefs and also explains how competently produced 
beliefs that fall short of knowledge are, nonetheless, vital components of a 
thriving agent responding to a complex and intractable world. 
Homeostatic epistemology argues that instead of a holistic web of belief, the 
mind is choristic, consisting of coordinated partitions of mutually supporting 
credences and beliefs. Organisms achieve knowledge through the combined 
action of integrative and disintegrative cognitive processes, mirroring the anabolic 
and catabolic forces in the body. Epistemic homeostasis occurs when epistemic 
objects are coordinated to produce the greatest flourishing. Reflective knowledge 
represents the highest form of flourishing eudaimonia. 
1.3 NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY 
As to this last, Natural Science in its progress can provide a frame of reference for 
Natural Theology. . . . Natural Science is a branch of knowledge by general consent 
not primarily based on the a priori. It derives essentially from details. It amasses 
them and lives on and by them. Its generalizations so built up are even when arrived 
at constantly being controlled by fresh details. In that way its generalizations do 
from time to time suffer change. Natural Theology is interested in this as a 
background and context for its own text. (Sherrington, 1941) 
Charles Sherrington argued that because mind and body emerged from the 
same physical substrate, insights formed by the mind are constructed and directed 
  13 
 
by the same processes that affect the external world. As a result, natural science is 
a constant process of renegotiation between scientists and philosophers, and this 
dissertation approaches epistemological questions using both philosophical 
considerations and empirical results. I treat epistemology as a naturalized project 
(Devitt, 1997 §5.8; Kornblith, 1985; Quine, 1969) because our best explanations 
for how we know are informed by methods and findings from successful scientific 
practice.11  
Naturalized epistemology seeks empirically grounded explanations for 
epistemic concepts such as justification, evidence, and normative practice. 
Naturalized epistemologists use initial intuitions to contemplate epistemic issues, 
but they do not take them for granted.12 Thus, an inferential principle or process is 
validated based on how it performs in the world. Basic truths become known via 
perceptual or sensory processes; the concept ‘perpendicularity,’ for example, is 
established by postnatal exposure to both vertical and horizontal properties 
(Blakemore & Cooper, 1970). Investigating our cognitive architecture and 
environments will shed light on how experience creates abstract ideas, and on 
how valuable these ideas are in terms of our success.  
Naturalized epistemology is unaffected by the diversity of intuitions 
regarding epistemic concepts because they do not take intuitions as decisive 
                                                
11 I am also a realist about truth embracing a correspondence theory (Devitt, 1997 §6.6; Putnam, 
1978, pp. 99-103). The correspondence theory argues that the best explanation for an individual’s 
capacity to meet their needs and desires is that there is a faithful correspondence between what is 
believed and what actually is. That is, “an organism’s belief that is true is conducive to the 
fulfilment of its desires, and one that is false is conducive to their frustration” (Devitt, 1997, p. 
99). True beliefs lead to the fulfilment of anticipated experiences.   
12 Bealer (1987, 1993, 1998) argues that naturalized epistemology cannot avoid the a priori because it depends on 
inferential principles that are derived through rational intuition. Kornblith (2002) responds that internally generated 
principles are justified by naturalists due to their reliability not because they arose via the intellect. I assume Kornblith’s 
view is the right approach.  
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evidence for the sufficiency of epistemic theories13. The object of epistemology is 
not the study of epistemic concepts, but rather the success of thinking creatures in 
the world.  
One way to conceive the relationship between traditional and naturalistic 
epistemological projects is to assert a supervenience relationship (Kim, 1988). 
That is, we can suppose that epistemic properties supervene on non-epistemic, 
naturalistic conditions. If it turns out that humans abide by Bayesian hypothesis 
testing in a range of conditions, then the normative rules established in probability 
theory become normative guidelines and supervene on the agent in situ. Similarly, 
if it turns out that humans behave differently depending on how they assent to 
propositions (i.e. whether they ‘suspect’, ‘believe’ or ‘know’ that p), then 
epistemic principles regarding degrees of belief and knowledge will supervene on 
their appropriate or ideal use. Bayesian principles formalize justification in 
scenarios in which people assent to propositions that they “know well” or they 
“really know” rather than just “knowing”; or that they “are pretty sure about,” 
“don’t know” or “doubt completely.” Bayesian principles also make sense of why 
testimony expressed with degrees of confidence offers evidential support.  
Supposing that the descriptive naturalistic project (e.g. modeling, 
simulation, experimentation, cross-cultural analysis) is helpful in specifying how 
we come to the views we have, it may be unclear how epistemic concepts, 
                                                
13 Traditional epistemic methods (both naturalist and rationalist) have been empirically challenged with philosophical 
experiments (Knobe & Nichols, 2008). Methods under scrutiny include: linguistic or conceptual analysis, intuitive strength, 
clarity, and so forth. For example, experimental philosophers have found intuitions of knowledge on Gettier cases vary 
depending on cultural, educational and linguistic background.  (Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2008). Still, one does not need 
to experiment to find conflicting intuitions. Highly trained western, analytic philosophers use these methods and disagree 
on the answers (see philosophical disagreements regarding Gettier cases such as, Hetherington, 1999; Klein, 1976; Turri, 
2012)—suggesting that the methods themselves do not produce objectively likely results. If some of these varied responses 
are objectively correct, and some are objectively incorrect, then it is unclear what sort of defensible theory of traditional 
epistemic methods could explain such divergence (Weinberg, et al., 2008). 
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particularly normative epistemic concepts about justification or knowledge remain 
relevant to epistemic inquiry.  What do the reflective intuitions of the ‘armchair 
epistemologist’ inform? Cooperative naturalism attempts to save the armchair. 
Cooperative naturalism (Feldman, 2012) supposes that problems and 
solutions identified in traditional epistemology ought to inform and shape 
empirical and mathematical work in cognitive science and, conversely that 
epistemologists ought to consider empirical experiments and rigorous models by 
cognitive scientists (psychologists, anthropologists, neuroscientists, and so on) 
rather than depend exclusively on their naïve conceptions of human functioning. 
This is not a new view. In the science-to-philosophy direction, Ewing (1934) 
argued that “it would… fall to the studies of cognition to specify just which 
processes reliably engender true belief and how, thus giving substance and 
strength to our overall theory of knowledge” (p.64). In the philosophy-to-science 
direction, cognitive scientists use philosophical arguments about cognitive 
architecture (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) to evaluate empirical models (Bowers & 
Davis, 2012). 14  I take on the cooperative naturalist position. Traditional 
philosophical methods are particularly helpful for the normative project, but  they 
can perform clarificatory work for the descriptive project too. 
1.4 RELIABILISM  
Skeptical arguments show that there are no necessary deductive or inductive 
relationships between our beliefs and their evidential grounds or even their 
probability (Greco, 2000). In order to avoid skepticism, a different view of what 
                                                
14 Other non-empirical philosophies influence cognitive science including research into pure mathematics, modeling and 
logic. 
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constitutes good evidence must be found. Good evidence for a positive 
epistemology might be the reliable connection between what we believe about the 
world, and the way the world behaves (which is consistent with these beliefs), 
such that “the grounds for our beliefs are reliable indications of their truth” 
(Greco, 2000, p. 4).  Reliabilism supposes that a subject knows a proposition p 
when a) p is true, b) the subject believes p and c) the belief that p is the result of a 
reliable process. A key benefit of reliabilism is that beliefs formed reliably have 
epistemic value, regardless of whether an agent can justify or infer reasons for 
their reliability. Reliable beliefs, like the readings from a thermometer or 
thermostat, are externally verifiable. 
Cognitive agents are more complex than thermometers, however. Agents 
have higher-order reliability based on the reliability of sub-systems. In complex 
agents, the degree of reliability of the process gives the degree to which a belief 
generated by it is justified (Sosa, 1993). The most discussed variant of reliabilism 
is process (or paradigm) reliabilism: 
Process reliabilism: “S’s belief in p is justified iff it is caused (or causally sustained) 
by a reliable cognitive process, or a history of reliable processes” (Goldman, 1994). 
Take the capacity to recognize faces as an example. There are many 
processes involved with face recognition, ranging from low-level perceptual 
processes regarding the contours, textures and features of the physical face; to 
memory processes that trigger a sense of familiarity; and high-level recognition 
processes that identify the face as being that of a particular person. Individuals 
vary in how reliably they recognize faces based on how reliably each of these 
processes operate. When these processes are disjointed, people can fail to 
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recognize faces they know (prosopagnosia) or they may recognize faces, but 
nonetheless believe that person to be an imposter (Capgras delusion). 
Prosopagnosics show no explicit face recognition, although implicit tests—such 
as skin conductance response—may reveal that they do retain recognition at a 
lower level (Young, 2008). Individuals suffering from Capgras delusion have no 
difficulty recognizing faces, but they may claim that their spouse or loved ones 
are imposters because they lack appropriate feelings of familiarity (Gerrans, 
1999). The reliability of facial recognition is tied to the reliability of each of the 
processes underlying it and the degree to which each process functions15. 
A significant issue for reliabilists is a lack of sophistication about how 
cognitive processes actually operate. For example, Feldman (1985) uses the 
process type ‘inferring’ to discuss the implications of categorizing all instances of 
inference under the same justificatory process, because, as he rightly points out, 
some inferences are more justified than others. He uses the granularity of 
inference to argue that reliabilism fails to capture the nuance of ordinary 
reasoning. However, treating ‘inference’ as a single process shows naivety given 
the complexity of cognitive processes.  
There are many cognitive processes involved in creating true beliefs. To 
discuss the success or failure of reliabilism, one must understand the basic 
principles by which humans come to know the world—i.e. through experiences 
and the retention of those experiences. The systems responsible for the retention 
                                                
15 One of the biggest problems for process reliabilism is that a reliable belief may be produced by a multiple processes, 
each with varying degrees of reliability such that there is not a one-to-one relationship between the reliability of process 
and the reliability of belief (Conee & Feldman, 1998). This has become known as the Generality Problem. Because some 
commentators (Bishop, 2010) have argued that the generality problem exists for all theories of justification (not just 
reliabilism), I have not attempted to resolve it here. 
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of experience are the systems of memory, and they are discussed in the section 
below. 
1.5 SYSTEMS OF MEMORY 
Please assume… that there is in our souls a block of wax, in one case larger, in 
another smaller, in one case the wax is purer, in another more impure and harder, in 
some cases softer, and in some of proper quality… Let us, then, say that this is the 
gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that whenever we wish to remember 
anything we see or hear or think of in our own minds, we hold this wax under the 
perceptions and thoughts and imprint them upon it, just as we make impressions 
from seal rings; and whatever is imprinted we remember and know as long as its 
image lasts, but whatever is rubbed out or cannot be imprinted we forget and do not 
know (Plato, 2012) 
Memory is a consequence of the fundamental plasticity of the brain 
(Eichenbaum, 2008). Memory is neither a localized storehouse nor a globally 
distributed network of information. Instead, memory ought to be considered a 
fundamental property of brain systems responding to experience. A memory 
system is any biological process that retains an impression from experience over 
time. Anything learnt by an organism that affects subsequent thoughts or behavior 
is a product of a memory system. Memory is both reconstructive and creative, 
using a range of processes or mechanisms to store, retrieve, calibrate, recognize, 
construct and respond to previously encountered information. The number and 
function of memory systems is still only partially understood.  
The generally accepted anatomical divisions of memory include: perceptual 
memory (striatum cerebellum), working memory (hippocampus), procedural 
memory (brainstem and spinal motor outputs), emotional memory (hypothalamus 
autonomic and endocrine outputs) and declarative memory (semantic and episodic 
recollection) interacting with the amygdala and cortical association areas 
(Eichenbaum, 2008, p. 5). Processes that drive memory include: habituation, 
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muscle memory, association, recognition, recollection, and reconstruction, as well 
as processes traditionally linked to the intellect such as hypothetical reasoning and 
inference (deductive, inductive and abductive) (Tarricone, 2011). Although, 
memory systems can work independently, they usually work in concert; 
generating beliefs, feelings and reactions in the agent. The justification of a belief 
depends on understanding the range of processes involved in its generation. There 
are two broad categories of memory I focus on in this section—implicit and 
explicit16. 
1.5.1 IMPLICIT MEMORY 
Implicit memory systems are grouped as those that operate beneath the level 
of conscious awareness or reflection, regardless of their underlying 
representational structure (Schacter, 1987). These systems are also referred to as 
‘non-declarative’ because their content cannot be declared or verbalized. Implicit 
memories are learnt without necessarily any planning or intentionally attempting 
to acquire information or abilities. That is, an organism’s learning environment 
can be used to predict the formation of regularities in behavior without 
explanatory recourse to mental states. While mental states can reflect upon 
implicit processes, those mental operations are explicit, not implicit. There are 
four major categories of implicit memory: habituation, association, skills and 
implicit knowledge. Of these, this research only focuses on implicit propositional 
knowledge.  
                                                
16 There are also numerous minor memory systems defined by the part of the body involved in retention or the body system 
it services. For example, trans-saccadic memory is the process of retaining information across a saccade—fast, micro-eye 
movements that build up a 3-D representation of a visual scene (Henderson, 1997). The enteric nervous system shows non-
pathological adaptive changes in response to altered digestive activity (Furness, Clerc, & Kunze, 2000).  
  20 
 
1.5.1.1 HABITUATION 
The most basic sort of implicit memory is habituation or sensitization, 
where an organism’s systems adapt to environmental stimuli but not as a result of 
motor fatigue or sensory adaptation. For example, plants adjust the angle of their 
leaves in response to the quality of light, a sea slug retracts its body upon being 
prodded, or a person becomes oblivious to background noise after a period of time 
in a noisy location. Habituation is a short-term response to immediate causal 
influences in an organism’s experience constrained by biological parameters. 
Visual illusions—such as seeing a red afterimage on a white wall after staring at a 
green square—are the product of the habituation of neurons, which cease firing 
after prolonged stimulus and then leave a ‘shadow’ when attention shifts to a 
neutral background. 
1.5.1.2 ASSOCIATION 
Association enables an organism to make inductive decisions for the future 
based on a situation’s similarity or contiguity with prior experience. James Mill 
(1878) gives the following example:  
When, looking at a river, we pronounce its name, we are properly said to exemplify 
contiguity; the river and the name by frequent association are so united that each 
recalls the other. But mark the steps of the recall. What is strictly present to our view 
is the impression made by the river while we gaze on it. It is necessary that this 
impression should, by virtue of similarity of identity, re-instate the previous 
impression of the river, to which the previous impression of the name was 
contiguous (p.121).  
 When responses to stimuli are retained within an organism, affecting 
subsequent reactions to similar provocation, an association is said to have formed. 
Stimuli are associated via temporal proximity (contiguity), syntactic or semantic 
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similarity and affective resonance, and associations are strengthened via repetition 
and positive or negative reinforcement (Palmer, 2010).17 Theories of association 
in the explanation of memory go back at least as far as Plato. In the Phaedo (Meno 
82E), Socrates describes recollection as the process of one thing putting you in 
mind of another 18 . Aristotle similarly argues that recollection involves a 
succession of associated ideas (DM 451b10-452a7).  
Associationist theories of memory were explored and refined by numerous 
enlightenment philosophers, including John Locke (1689b), David Hume (1739b), 
and John Stuart Mill (1882). Hume thought that association was the fundamental 
cognitive act that turned experience into ideas, through which we establish beliefs 
about abstract notions of identity and causation. 
The nature of experience is this. We remember to have had frequent instances of the 
existence of one species of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of 
another species of objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular 
order of contiguity and succession with regard to them (Hume, 1739a).  
The empiricists considered how various factors influence the strength of 
associations formed. Three types of influences were postulated: vivacity (or 
distinctness), duration (study time) and frequency (repetitions) (Price, Laird, & 
Wright, 1936). Theories were also posited about what would influence the 
retrieval of associations. It was hypothesized that the degree of resemblance to the 
stimulus and the recency of the learning event would impact association, as would 
the absence of interference or being in an altered state of mind19. Contiguously 
                                                
17 James Mill (1878) also included contrast as a law of association, as in habitual pairs of concepts: light and dark, heat and 
cold, up and down, life and death. He notes that these pairs are always presented because individual concepts are defined 
relationally contrasted to the other. 
18 Note that the use of ‘recollect’ does not mean the same in Plato’s usage as in modern western considerations. Plato uses 
the Greek verb anamimneskesthai, which more accurately means ‘to be reminded’ (Sorabji, 2004, p. 35). 
19 Interference refers to the “the coexistence of fewer alternative associates to the cue” (Bower, 2000, p. 4). Temporary 
diversities of state included intoxication, delirium, depression and so on. 
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presented words or words with similar meanings (semantic associates) are also 
associated, meaning that if one is recalled, associated words are also brought to 
mind (Polyn, Kahana, & Norman, 2009).  
Perhaps the most famous experimental example of association is Pavlov’s 
(1927) dog. In this case, the dog learnt the association between the dinner bell and 
subsequent food, such that he would salivate merely upon hearing the bell. More 
technically, a conditioned stimulus (e.g., a sound) predicts the future arrival of the 
unconditioned stimulus (e.g., food), triggering a future-directed response (e.g., 
salivation). In operant conditioning, an organism’s behavior predicts a certain 
outcome (reward). Unlike habituation, associations are formed, maintained, and 
altered throughout an organism’s life via plastic neural pathways and adaptive 
biological systems. While associations can be formed in a single instance—
contrary to Behaviorist rhetoric (Gallistel, 1990)—competence at various skills 
increases through repetition. 
1.5.1.3 PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE 
Amongst philosophers, skills or capacities like riding a bicycle, catching a 
ball, or touch typing are referred to as ‘procedural knowledge’, ‘habit memory’ 
and ‘knowledge-how’ (Ryle, 1949). Procedural knowledge can also be referred to 
as embodied memory, such as the muscle memory retained by professional 
athletes (Sutton, 2006). The use of the word ‘knowledge’ is misleading, however, 
because it suggests a degree of representation that may or may not be present 
depending on the skill in question. Traditionally, philosophers also speak of 
procedural memory as ‘dispositional memory.’ Dispositions are a tendency to 
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behave in a particular way in certain circumstances or an ability that lasts within 
an individual. 
1.5.1.4 REPRESENTATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
The most sophisticated implicit memory is representational. Organisms are 
capable of creating, retaining, and utilizing vastly complex models of the world to 
navigate their lives without necessarily having conscious awareness, propositional 
beliefs or higher order thought. Representational implicit memory includes: 
cognitive maps (Tolman, 1948); magnetoreception, which allows birds to orient 
themselves using magnetic fields (Mouritsen & Ritz, 2005); and squirrel caching 
behavior (Kamil & Gould, 2008).  
Some implicit representational memory is propositional, meaning that it can 
be language-like (Fodor, 1975; Fodor, 2008) or map-like (Blumson, 2012) 
exhibiting systematicity and productivity. Implicit propositional beliefs are 
sometimes referred to as ‘tacit knowledge’ (Fodor, 1968a; Lycan, 1988) or 
‘unconscious recollection’ (Ayer, 1956)20. While some implicit beliefs remain 
hidden from conscious reflection or top-down processing, a subset of implicit 
beliefs are ‘background beliefs’ that can be either implicit or explicit depending 
on attention. For example, a background belief that climate change is real might 
influence the occurrent belief that a waterfront property is expensive to maintain.  
Background beliefs work in the ‘background’ of an agent’s cognitive 
architecture, but they can nonetheless become the focus of attention or scrutiny. 
                                                
20 Though there is a good deal of debate whether tacit knowledge is propositional or not (Fantl, 2012), I do not consider the 
issues here. It is sufficient for my purposes that some implicit knowledge is propositional. That is, that some beliefs are not 
immediately available to consciousness 
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Occurrent beliefs are beliefs that are being attended to by an agent, but 
background beliefs can become occurrent beliefs and vice versa, depending on an 
individual’s focus or interest. 
1.5.2 EXPLCIT MEMORY 
In contrast to implicit memory, explicit memory requires organisms to be 
capable of second-order thoughts about first-order mental states and it is 
propositional in a way that implicit memory need not be. Explicit memory is also 
more flexible than some implicit memory because it is responsive to top-down 
influence (rather than simply involving bottom-up reactions to perceptual stimuli).  
Explicit memories are decoupled from perception, and thus are able to be 
considered and utilized for problem solving or reconsidering the world. Explicit 
memory is typically divided into two types: semantic and episodic (Tulving, 
1972)—a distinction that is supported by experimental evidence, brain injury 
impairments and imaging studies.21 For example, an amnesiac patient might know 
that the capital of France is Paris, or how to tie his shoelaces, yet may be unable 
recall any events that lead to this knowledge (Rosenbaum, Murphy, & Rich, 
2012). Similarly, a patient might retain intelligence, language and reasoning 
ability, even with severe anterograde amnesia for information encountered post-
injury (Scoville, 1968).  
  
                                                
21 The neural correlates of episodic encoding and semantic retrieval “are dissociable but interact in specific brain regions” 
(Prince, Tsukiura, & Cabeza, 2007). 
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1.5.2.1 SEMANTIC MEMORY 
Semantic memory is the faculty that processes particular experiences into 
abstracted, more generalized knowledge of the world (e.g., that 5 x 7 = 35) and it 
is the basis of inferential and analogical reasoning. Semantic memory does not 
require the agent to mentally time travel to the occasion of learning, but it does 
mean that they can explicitly use this knowledge. Participants can know details of 
a prior event without ‘putting themselves in the past.’  
Semantic memory also does not require conscious deliberation, as even 
sleep transitions the experience of particulars into generalities, universals and 
abstractions (Reid & Gaskell, 2012). As Payne et.al. (2009) point out, sleep does 
not merely consolidate memories, it also transforms and restructures them so that 
insights, abstracts, inferences and integration can occur (p.333). Empirical 
findings are contrary to Aristotle (Posterior Analytics) who thought the act of 
‘demonstration’ required conscious efforts.  
Philosophers have called semantic memory ‘factual-memory’. Ayer (1956) 
describes it in the excerpt below: 
Suppose that I am set to answer a literary questionnaire, and that I have to rely upon 
my memory. I shall, perhaps, succeed in remembering that such and such a poem 
continues in such and such a way, that So-and-so was the author of such and such a 
book, that a given incident appears in this novel rather than in that. But none of this 
need involve my having any recollection of a past event. I may recall some of the 
occasions on which I read, or was told about, the books in question, but equally I 
may not (136-137).  
Ayer considers semantic memory the height of memory function. He 
supposes that the need to reflect on or entertain memory images reveals that the 
subject matter is less well known that it optimally would be in the circumstances.  
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The phenomenal characteristics of memory, such as imagery, come from 
another explicit memory system—episodic memory. While semantic memory 
retains facts and generalizes from experience; episodic memory maintains 
particulars of past experience—including abstract or conceptual facts about the 
past (e.g. “I’ve had a car for six months”, or “The Iraq war started when my 
grandmother died”) and event specific knowledge (ESK) that includes sights, 
sounds, smells, feelings and thoughts from the remembered event (Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2009). 
1.5.2.2 EPISODIC MEMORY 
Episodic memory draws on many implicit and explicit memory systems. 
The defining feature of episodic memory is that it can accurately identify a 
representation as a memory of a particular past experience.22 As Aristotle says, 
“whenever someone is actively engaged in remembering, he always says in his 
soul in this way that he heard, or perceived or thought this before” (449b22-24). 
Similarly, Locke believed that “…the mind has a power in many cases to revive 
perceptions that it has once had, with attached to them the additional perception 
that it has had them before” (1689a). Episodic memory enables us to reflect on the 
past, untangle the present as well as plan for the future. It is defined by three 
properties: 
1. the retention of information (what, when, where), phenomenology and 
associated thoughts from an event, 
                                                
22 Unlike Hume’s claim that memories have a particular ‘force and liveliness,’ episodic memories range from highly vivid, 
detailed recollections (e.g. flashbulb memory or verbatim trace) to vague feelings of knowing (e.g. remembering the gist of 
a movie plot or experiencing a sense of familiarity when seeing a peer at a conference) (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Jacoby, 
1991; Luminet & Curci, 2008; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) 
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2. the subsequent re-experience of information, phenomenology and thoughts 
upon retrieval and 
3. the correct identification during retrieval of the re-experienced content as 
being of that event. 
The recollection of episodic memories activates brain regions originally 
involved in the learning episode—such as emotions, mental images, smells or the 
'sense of being there'—and the output from these different modalities and 
processes combine to constitute an episodic memory (Johnson, 2006). Analytic 
philosophers have long suggested that some of the same parts of the mind 
activated during perceptual experience are reactivated during episodic memory 
retrieval.23 In the 20th century, the cognitive neuroscience of memory found 
empirical evidence that the same areas of the brain activated during encoding are 
also activated during remembering (Buckner & Wheeler, 2001).24  
Researchers have found that episodic memory is most reliable when an 
agent uses careful attention during encoding to remember as many details as 
possible, and when the subject relearns details against externally verified means 
(e.g. listening to a recording of a concert in the days after the event). Episodic 
memory is least reliable when little attention is placed during encoding and the 
event is not rehearsed subsequent to its occurrence against objective criteria. 
                                                
23 Aristotle surmised that phantasia (faculty of mental imagery or imagination) was active during both perceiving and 
recollecting (Sorabji, 2004). William James (1890) argued that remembering involved the reactivation of the same motor 
and sensory areas of the brain that were triggered in the originating event.   
24 Converging evidence indicate that episodic memory retrieval activates brain regions involved in the processing of 
sensory and emotional experiences (Danker & Anderson, 2010). Evidence to support the reactivation of these regions 
comes from several methodologies, including studies of brain-damaged patients, fMRI experiments, and cognitive 
behavioral studies. However, research on brain-damaged patients is particularly illuminating as it shows that impaired 
perception leads to impaired episodic memory (Greenberg & Rubin, 2003). Retrograde amnesia in a single modality (e.g., 
auditory agnosia—the inability to recognize auditory stimuli) can be attributed to impairments in auditory memory. If the 
deficit is visual (visual agnosia), the memory deficit can be more global, suggesting that autobiographical memory is 
particularly influenced by the quality of mental imagery (Rubin & Greenberg, 1998). However, it is important to recognize 
the limitations of neuropsychological studies. Deficits found in particular patients do not allow researchers to precisely 
identify the cause of the problem. For example, it may be that aphasic patients are able to retrieve relevant sensory 
components, but cannot process or attend to those components. 
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Because episodic memory is essentially a constructive faculty used with 
inconsistent verification, memories are developed, altered and elaborated upon to 
accomplish a variety of goals that may or may not align with remembering the 
truth about the past.  
The point of this brief examination of memory processes is to illustrate the 
great range of cognitive processes that are relevant to evaluating any reliabilist 
account. What justifies an implicit association is quite different from what 
justifies an explicit recollection. For example, implicit processes such as 
association are more akin to the thermometer analogy of basic reliabilism. 
However, explicit, reflective memory needs a reliabilist account that 
acknowledges inferential and intellectual higher-order knowledge-producing  
processes and this can be found in virtue epistemology. 
1.6 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
Virtue epistemology is a variant of reliabilism in which the cognitive 
circumstances and abilities of an agent play a justificatory role.25 In sympathy 
with rationalists, virtue epistemologists argue that there is a significant epistemic 
project to identify intellectual virtues that confer justification upon a true belief to 
make it knowledge. However, virtue epistemologists are not opposed to empirical 
pressure on their theories. The openness of virtue epistemology to developments 
in cognitive psychology (and cognitive science more generally) encourages the 
cooperative naturalism advocated in §1.3.  
                                                
25 Contrast virtue epistemology with pure reliabilism or evidentialism where justification does not depend on agency. 
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Virtue epistemology aims to identify the attributes of agents that justify 
knowledge claims. Like other traditional epistemologies, virtue epistemology 
cites normative standards that must be met in order for an agent’s doxastic state to 
count as knowledge, the most important of which is truth. Other standards include 
reliability, motivation or credibility. Of the many varieties of virtue epistemology 
(e.g. Greco, 2010; Zagzebski, 1996) I focus particularly on Ernie Sosa’s (2007, 
2009a, 2011) account. Unlike other theorists, Sosa specifies a truly iterative 
account of reliabilist justification by dividing it into two levels: animal and 
reflective.  
1.6.1 ANIMAL KNOWLEDGE 
Animal knowledge is based on an animal’s capacity to survive and thrive in 
the environment regardless of higher order beliefs about survival, without any 
reflection or understanding (Sosa, 2007). An agent has animal knowledge if their 
beliefs are accurate, they have skill (i.e., are adroit) at producing accurate beliefs, 
and their beliefs are apt (i.e., accurate due to adroit processes). Knowledge is 
limited to the agent’s domains of competence. Animal beliefs constitutive of 
knowledge are functional—and retain teleological aims such as truth—however, 
they involve no free action by the agent.  
An obvious interpretation of animal knowledge might be to suppose that 
Sosa is referring to implicit memory processes, particularly associationist or 
procedural knowledge-how. However, because Sosa always discusses his theories 
with reference to belief, I interpret his discussion of competencies as metaphors or 
analogies intended to motivate the treatment of doxastic states via reliabilist 
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means, not literal statements about how knowledge is represented. Throughout 
this research I treat animal knowledge as implicit, representational beliefs (see, 
§1.5.1.4) characteristic in humans and perhaps the higher animals26.  
1.6.2 REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
Reflective knowledge is animal knowledge plus an “understanding of its 
place in a wider whole that includes one’s belief and knowledge of it and how 
these come about” (Kornblith, 2009, p. 128). Reflective beliefs constitutive of 
knowledge are functional and judgmental. Reflective knowledge draws on 
internalist ideas about justification (e.g. intuition, intellect and so on) in order to 
bolster and improve the epistemic status brought via animal knowledge alone. A 
reflective belief does more epistemic work than an animal belief “if it coheres 
properly with the believer’s understanding of why it is true (and, for that matter, 
apt, or true because competent), and of how in which it is sustained as reliably 
truth-conducive” (Sosa, 2009a, p. 138). Reflective knowledge encompasses all 
higher order thinking (metacognition), including episodic memory, reflective 
inference, abstract ideas, and counterfactual reasoning.  
To satisfy naturalistic reliabilists, Sosa’s virtue epistemology depends on 
empirically plausible decision-making processes. Indeed, animal and reflective 
knowledge comport with two distinct decision-making systems: (mostly) implicit 
System 1, and explicit System 2 (Evans & Frankish, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; 
Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000).  
                                                
26 Perhaps some animal knowledge, like background beliefs, be brought to explicit consideration with attention and 
reflective processes? 
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System 1. Operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of 
voluntary control. 
 
System 2. Allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, 
including complex computations. The operations of system 2 are often associated 
with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration   
System 1 operates in the background of daily life, going hand-in-hand with 
animal knowledge. Kahneman offers the following list of System 1 capacities 
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 21): 
Detect that one object is more distant than another 
Orient to the source of a sudden sound 
Complete the phrase “bread and…” 
Make a ‘disgust face” when shown a horrible picture 
Detect hostility in a voice 
Answer to 2 + 2 = ? 
Read words on large billboards 
Drive a car on an empty road 
Find a strong move in chess (if you are a chess master) 
Understand simple sentences 
Recognize that a “meek and tidy soul with a passion for detail” resembles an 
occupational stereotype. 
These implicit decisions draw on a range of memory systems. Some are 
non-representational (e.g. orienting to a sudden sound, driving a car on an empty 
road), while others involve background beliefs (e.g. completing the phrase ‘bread 
and ....’). Though we are born “prepared to perceive the world around us, 
recognize objects, orient attention, avoid losses, and fear spiders” (Kahneman, 
2011, p. 21), System 1 grows as we grow. It learns associations, skills and short-
cuts to improve our efficiencies and as we become experts (e.g., at chess), System 
1 is capable of tasks that take a normal person a lot longer to figure out. System 1 
accesses a vast range of information about our culture, our beliefs, and our 
general knowledge automatically and without effort. Many of System 1’s actions 
are involuntarily performed, such as reading a billboard or knowing that 2 + 2 = 4. 
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Other activities (such as chewing) are normally involuntary, but they can be 
brought under voluntary control. Despite these differences, both System 1 and 
System 2 involve attention. Orientating oneself to a loud sound is the reaction of 
System 1 and it is the efforts of System 2 that return us back to our conversation. 
All of System 2’s work is done during conscious attention.  
System 2 requires our attention and it is disrupted when attention is drawn 
away. System 2—the conscious reasoning self—makes choices, decides what to 
think about and what to do and it can construct ordered thoughts (such as a 
sequence of steps). System 2 receives input and suggestions from System 1, but it 
sometimes overrules these suggestions. Here are Kahneman offers the following 
examples of System 2 operations: 
Brace for the starter gun in a race 
Focus attention on the clowns in the circus 
Focus on the voice of a particular person in a crowded and noisy room 
Look for a woman with white hair 
Search memory to identify a surprising sound 
Maintain a faster walking speed than is natural for you 
Monitor the appropriateness of your behavior in a social situation 
Count the occurrences of the letter a in a page of text 
Tell someone your phone number 
Park in a narrow space (for most people except garage attendants) 
Compare two washing machines for overall value 
Fill out a tax form 
Check the validity of a complex logical argument 
In each of these cases, System 2 is engaged and conscious effort is required 
from the agent. System 2 helps us to do things that ‘do not come naturally.’ And 
resolving System 2-type problems require continuous exertion and attention. As a 
result, there are strict limits on how much a person can do with System 2 at any 
one point in time because many effortful activities interfere with one another. As 
Kahneman points out, it is hard to calculate the product of 17 x 24 while making a 
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left turn into dense traffic, but, we can have a conversation with a passenger 
whilst driving on an empty highway. 
Current theories of decision-making suggest that humans do have a division 
between (mostly) implicit animal processes and explicit reflective processes. As 
discussed in §1.4, a significant issue for reliabilists is a lack of sophistication 
about how cognitive processes operate, but reliabilism need not be simple. Sosa’s 
virtue epistemology is not simple. He ambitiously seeks to reconcile the appeal of 
rationalist intuitions with mechanistic, biological processes. Such a reconciliation 
would offer a way of explaining how higher order thoughts and reflections can 
impart justificatory power upon doxastic states satisfying to a reliabilist 
empiricist. To a large extent, both the interest in and the criticisms of Sosa’s 
account arise from evaluating both the value and appropriateness of this ‘higher 
order’ reliabilism.  
There are two types of criticism leveled at Sosa’s virtue epistemology 1) Is 
aptness sufficient for justification? And 2) Is aptness sufficient for knowledge?—
and critics wonder if Sosa incorporates all epistemic theories to the benefit of 
none (Kornblith, 2009)?  One of the answers this dissertation seeks to ascertain 
whether justificatory tools from Bayesian epistemology (and decision-theory) can 
supplement the justification of virtue epistemology. Sosa hopes that aptly apt 
belief can do some philosophical heavy lifting; it may be that Bayesian methods 
can supplement the hydraulics. 
I delve into decision-theory because virtue epistemology is focused on—
perhaps even defined by—justification at the moment of decision. Beliefs are 
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justified by competencies expressed by an agent in a particular performance and 
for an action to be justified, it must be apt. Being apt means that the action is 
accurate due to adroit processe, and adroitness is best understood through the lens 
of decision-theory.  
1.7 BAYESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 
1.7.1 MOTIVATION 
Bayesian epistemology argues that typical beliefs exist (and are performed) 
in degrees, rather than absolutes, represented as credence functions (Christensen, 
2010; Dunn, 2010; Friedman, 2011; Joyce, 2010). A credence function assigns a 
real number between 0 and 1 (inclusive) to every proposition in a set. Thomas 
Bayes argued that our success in the world depends on how well credence 
functions represented in our minds match the statistical likelihoods in the world. 
He famously said: 
If a person has an expectation depending on the happening of an event, the 
probability of the event is to the probability of its failure as his loss if it fails to his 
gain if it happens (Bayes, 1763, p. 4). 
 By aligning ourselves with the uncertainties in the world, we become 
powerful agents to direct ourselves and others. The ideal degree of confidence a 
subject has in a proposition is the degree that is appropriate given the evidence 
and situation the subject is in. Of course, no one is an ideally rational agent, 
capable of truly representing reality, so our goal instead, is to revise and update 
our internal representations in response to confirming and disconfirming 
evidence, forging ahead towards ever more faithful reconstructions of reality. 
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Bayesian epistemology encourages a meek approach with regards to 
evidence and credences. As Hajek and Hartmann (2009) argue, “to rule out 
(probabilistically speaking) a priori some genuine logical possibility would be to 
pretend that one’s evidence was stronger than it really was.” Credences have 
value to an agent, even if they are considerably less than 1, and therefore are not 
spurned. Contrast this with the typical skeptic in traditional epistemology whose 
hunches, suppositions and worries can accelerate the demise of a theory of 
knowledge, regardless of their likelihood. 
Bayesian epistemology has several advantages over traditional 
epistemology in terms of its applicability to actual decision-making. Firstly, 
Bayesian epistemology incorporates decision-theory, which uses subjective 
probabilities to guide rational action and (like virtue epistemology) takes account 
of both our desires and our opinions to dictate what we should do. Traditional 
epistemology, meanwhile, offers no decision theory, only parameters by which to 
judge final results. Secondly, Bayesian epistemology accommodates fine-grained 
mental states, rather than binaries of belief or knowledge. Finally, observations of 
the world rarely deliver certainties and each experience of the world contributes to 
a graduated revision of beliefs. While traditional epistemology requires an 
unforgiving standard for doxastic states, Bayesian epistemology allows beliefs 
with low credences to play an evidential role in evaluating theories and evidence. 
In sum, the usefulness of Bayesian epistemology lies in its capacity to 
accommodate decision-theory, fine-grained mental states and uncertain 
observations of the world. 
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A comprehensive epistemology will not merely specify the conditions in 
which beliefs are justified; it will also offer normative guidance for making 
rational decisions. Bayesian epistemology (incorporating both confirmation 
theory and decision theory) is a comprehensive theory of decision-making that 
links beliefs to the best course of action, and it is the ‘only theory in town’ to do 
so. As such, any epistemology wishing to be comprehensive ought to hitch itself 
to the Bayesian wagon.  
1.7.2 BAYES’ FORMULA AND CONDITIONALIZATION 
While there are many kinds of Bayesian, and many distinctions between 
them, they all depend on Bayes’ formula. Additionally, they depend on 
Kolmogorov’s axiomatization (for more detail see Hajek & Hartmann, 2009, p. 
94). Kolmogorov defines the conditional probability of a given b by the ratio of 
unconditional probabilities:  
P 𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏 =    (!(!∩!)
!(!)
, provided P(b)>0 
If P(a|b) = P(a), then a and b are said to be independent (relative to P). For 
example, if the probability of it raining today, given that I am wearing a blue shirt 
is the same as the probability of it raining today regardless of the color of my 
shirt, then these likelihoods have no causal interactions with each other. Versions 
of Bayes’ theorem can now be proven: 
𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏 =   
𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎)
𝑃𝑃(𝑏𝑏)
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𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏 =   
𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎)
𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎 +   𝑃𝑃(𝑏𝑏|~𝑎𝑎)
 
If there are many hypotheses being considered (h1, h2,…,hn), and evidence e 
then for each j 
𝑃𝑃 ℎ! 𝑒𝑒 =
P e ℎ! P(ℎ!
P e ℎ! P(ℎ!
!
!!!
 
The P(e|hi) terms are called likelihoods, and the P(hi) terms are called priors 
(Kim, 1988). Bayesianism describes the operation between a piece of evidence e 
and the confirmation of a theory or hypothesis h as: 
e confirms h (relative to P) iff P(h|e) > P(h). 
That is, a piece of evidence confirms a hypothesis if and only if the 
probability of the hypothesis given the evidence is greater than the probability of 
the hypothesis in the absence of evidence (regardless of whether the evidence is 
absent or non-existent). 
Bayesianism offers a way of interpreting an agent’s degrees of belief of an 
agent at a given point in time t. However, it also offers a process that explains 
how these degrees of belief change over time. The synchronic thesis claims that 
beliefs are probabilities, while the diachronic thesis explains how these 
probabilities are updated via conditionalization.  
Conditionalization means that an agent’s posterior subjective probability—
after taking account of evidence X, Pnew—is to be set equal to her prior 
conditional probability Pold(·|X) (Greaves & Wallace, 2006). For example, my 
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subjective probability Pnew—that it will rain today after watching the weather 
report X—ought to equal my conditional probability that it will rain today given 
that weather report X. Conditionalization tells us how to operate on evidence (i.e. 
revise our beliefs), whatever likelihood the evidence has. It offers a rational way 
to alter degrees of belief with uncertain evidence. Bayes’ rule works with 
conditionalization to operationalize how any piece of evidence should affect our 
beliefs, based on how likely the outcome is, both with and without the evidence. 
For example, if the weather report is notoriously unreliable, then the impact of 
such a report on my belief that it will rain ought to be less than if the weather 
report was highly reliable. This is true regardless of what the weather report 
predicts.  
Bayes’ rule provides a way of taking multiple lines of evidence into 
consideration when revising beliefs, such as one’s own perception of the weather 
conditions (clouds in the sky outside one’s window, the force of the wind against 
one’s skin), one’s general knowledge of rain patterns in the area given the time of 
year, or the testimony of others. With these tools, Bayesian epistemology gives a 
justification of ideal scientific practice (i.e., solving the problem of induction via 
confirmation theory), and of decision-making. It also helps to resolve issues 
including how to quantify the value of coherence between beliefs—which I 
examine in Chapter 3.  
Bayesian epistemology endeavors to find ideally rational, formal methods 
by which to make decisions using a probability calculus. Confirmation theory 
offers an abstract conception of an ideally rational agent, who reasons in a 
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probabilistically consistent way. A Bayesian agent treats each new problem with 
the same probabilistic apparatus, and when outcomes are uncertain, the agent 
ought to rank the likelihoods in the same way, given the same evidence.  
An agent who violates the laws of probability will select actions that 
guarantee a loss—what is called the Dutch Book argument.27 The basic idea of a 
Dutch book is to imagine a bookmaker encountering an irrational punter. If the 
punter’s betting behaviour violates the axioms of probability, then the bookmaker 
can guarantee a profit over the long term. Inconsistently attributing likelihoods 
makes a person irrational and also ensures they fail to meet their goals. There are 
rational means to estimate likelihoods in the absence of evidence. For example, 
the principle of indifference asserts that if you have a poverty of information and 
several options to consider, then you assign each option equal probability until 
subsequent evidence gives you reason to differentiate between them. 
In its purest form, Bayesian epistemology sets a very high standard for 
humans to meet in order to be ideal, rational agents, and, as a result, it is 
considered by some to be an inappropriate model for epistemology to adopt 
(Goldman, 1978). Humans consistently deviate from standards set by a rationality 
based on self-interest. For example, economic organization and the structure of 
social interactions play a sizable role in individual priorities and decisions. For 
example, humans exhibit greater prosocial behaviors when markets are highly 
integrated and cooperation yields high pay-offs (Henrich et al., 2005).   As such, it 
may be that the complexities of real individuals in diverse circumstances mean 
                                                
27 The dutch book argument stems from Ramsey's (1964) work in “Truth and Probability”. 
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that ‘pure’ Bayesian epistemology may not fully inform an agent-centered 
account of epistemic justification. 
Putting aside the advantages and limitations of the normative Bayesian 
project, does human cognition even approximate Bayesian processes? What 
evidence exists that our mind is Bayesian? It is important to distinguish here 
between computational, algorithmic and instantiation levels of cognition (Fodor 
& Pylyshyn, 1988). The computational level refers to what a system does (what 
problems cognition solves or overcomes and why). The algorithmic (or 
representational) level refers to how a system solves these problems, that is, what 
processes cognition employs to solve problems. The instantiation (or physical) 
level refers to how a system performs these calculations within its physical make-
up (e.g., in the case of vision, what neural structures or activities implement the 
visual system). In the paragraphs below, I look  at each of these levels in turn. 
1.7.3 COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL 
On a computational level, the brain must represent probabilities to process 
information (Clark, 2013; Gallistel, 2012; Gallistel & King, 2009).28 That is, the 
brain must somehow represent the set of possible messages and a probability 
distribution over that set, in order to make decisions. Consider a hunter listening 
in the woods to the sounds of cracking sticks and crunching leaves. The hunter 
will inductively (and implicitly) assign likelihoods to these sounds based on prior 
experiences in the woods. Given the volume of sound, the pattern of silences and 
the speed the sound is travelling, the hunter assigns likelihoods that it is a raccoon 
                                                
28 According to Shannon’s (1948) theory of communication. 
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(P=0.4), a deer (P=0.2) or a squirrel (P=0.4) for a total probability = 1. If the brain 
has no expectation of the messages that might be sent, it is unable to disentangle 
information from noise. Even a novice hunter with no experience will make 
assumptions about the source of the noise (e.g., perhaps they assign a high 
likelihood that it is a bear?).  
An informative signal changes the receiver’s probability distribution about 
the possible states of the world. For example, a hunter who hears something 
scratching up a tree, might reduce the options to a raccoon (P=0.5) and a squirrel 
(P=0.5). An uninformative signal offers no change in the receiver’s probability 
distribution. The novice hunter might be too frightened to process the arboreal 
sounds, still fixating on the terrifying possibility of a bear, waiting in the 
undergrowth.  
The most informative signals are those that reduce the possible set of 
messages the most dramatically. This is a Bayesian operation—the receiver’s 
representation after an informative signal is their posterior probability distribution 
over the possible values of an empirical variable (such as animals in a forest). 
Crucially, the amount of information communicated is the difference in 
uncertainty between the prior probability (before the signal was sent) and the 
posterior probability (after the signal was sent). For example, hearing arboreal 
scratching is less informative than seeing a stripy tail, because seeing the latter 
reduces the options the most, i.e. a raccoon (P=1).  The likelihood is the 
probability of getting a particular signal given the state of the world. The 
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unconditional probability is the overall probability of getting a particular signal 
regardless of the state of the world. 
Accepting that the brain must incorporate Bayesian principles to some 
degree, the sufficiency of Bayesian psychology remains an issue. Humans are 
flexible thinkers—able to change their mind, go back on previous beliefs and be 
influenced by other beliefs. Classical conditionalization, meanwhile, is strict and 
irreversible—“no learning episode can be undone by any subsequent application 
of the classical rule” (Döring, 1999, p. S380). Human psychology has two 
features that conflict with classic conditionalization 1) confirmational holism: 
background beliefs influence the justification of occurrent beliefs, and 2) 
commutativity: the order in which information is learned ought not affect the 
outcome. On the subject of commutativity, Jonathan Weisberg (2009) points out 
that “it shouldn’t matter whether I find the murder weapon in the maid’s room 
first and then hear testimony about her alibi, or the other way around. Either way 
my ultimate attitude about her guilt should be one of guarded suspicion” (p.794). 
An ‘unlearning’ modification to conditionalization was suggested by Jeffrey 
(1983)—Jeffrey conditionalization—and aims to ensure conformational holism 
with repeated applications of the same rule of conditionalization. However, Frank 
Döring (1999) argues that Jeffrey conditionalisation fails to maintain 
commutativity, because it gives different probability distributions depending on 
the order of events. Additionally, Weisberg (2009). argues that the rigidity of 
conditionalization (both Jeffrey and standard) renders it inherently anti-holistic.  
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Many authors (Hawthorne, 2004b; Wagner, 2013; Zhao & Osherson, 2010) 
have defended Jeffrey conditionalization against these (and other) attacks. 
Wagner, in particular, argues that Weisberg has been a victim of parochialism—a 
sin that Jeffrey (1983) explicitly warned against. Parochialism occurs when 
evidence relevant to another event is ignored due to a poor choice of partition. 
Weisberg’s choice of partition makes Jeffrey conditionalization appear anti-
holistic, but, Jeffrey acknowledged that he had no procedure for picking the 
relevant partition—an example of the frame problem. 29  Note that adopting 
chorism—the view that a limited set of evidence ought to be sufficient for 
justification (see §1.2)—is an alternative to holism that retains the usefulness of 
sets of influential beliefs.  
The ‘frame problem’ arose in early applications of logical methods in 
artificial intelligence (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969). Consider an agent, with a set of 
beliefs S, who makes an action, A (e.g. turns a cup upside down). What other 
information in the set of beliefs needs to be updated in order to take account of 
this action? Almost all other knowledge seems irrelevant and should remain 
unchanged (e.g., that the street is empty or that the burglar alarm is off). 
Logically, however, it is possible that A has many consequences. For example, if 
the cup is valuable and located in an alarmed glass case, then turning it may set 
off the burglar alarm and draw crowds of interested bystanders to the street. The 
frame problem, therefore, describes the difficulty of creating a procedure that can 
distinguish relevant from irrelevant connections between beliefs to inform action. 
                                                
29 Even if holism can be resolved, Jeffrey still faces the conundrum of commutativity. 
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Fodor (1983) added that incorporating a new belief can overthrow pre-existing 
beliefs in almost any dimension, and in ways that are impossible to predict. The 
frame problem is arguably the most intractable problem facing any theory of 
cognition, and although recent advances by search engines have shown 
breakthroughs in information search (Shanahan, 2009), little headway has been 
made with regards to information choice in humans (and animals)30.  
Another problem for the Bayesian approach is the tendency of researchers 
to treat all evidence equally, combining any available data with prior beliefs 
(including those about causal structure) (Bes, Sloman, Lucas, & Raufaste, 2012). 
It may be that judgments are heavily influenced by beliefs about causal structure 
and only then are they influenced by statistical data (Pearl, 2000; Suppes, 1970; 
Wheeler & Scheines, 2013). Agents use a ‘causality heuristic,’ which means that 
they only pay attention to stochastic information when it alters their causal 
beliefs. Causal knowledge influences counterfactual reasoning and interventions, 
both of which are crucial components of reflective knowledge. In Chapter 2 I 
argue that hierarchical Bayesian models that incorporate causal structures and 
statistical information are a tractable computational account of reflective 
knowledge.  
1.7.4 ALGORITHMIC LEVEL 
Whatever the computational arguments, decades of research suggest that 
Bayesian standards are unintuitive, particularly with regards to base rate 
information (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman 
                                                
30 See (Xu & Wang, 2012) for a recent attempt to deal with the frame problem using a Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System 
(NARS) 
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& Tversky, 1996). Base rates are the likelihood of a phenomenon, without regards 
to properties of an individual. For example, the base rate of clear, sunny days in 
Perth, Western Australia, is 131 per year, regardless of the weather on any 
particular day. Knowing the base rate of clear, sunny days in Perth helps us to 
predict the likelihood of clear, sunny days on any arbitrary day in the future. Base 
rates matter, but unfortunately in ways that are not immediately obvious. Consider 
the following: 
You see a person reading the Economist on the New York subway. Which of the 
following is a better bet about the reading stranger? 
She has a PhD 
She does not have a college degree 
Many people would pick the PhD option because they tend to guess based 
on stereotypical rather than statistical information. In fact, it is statistically far 
more likely that the commuter reading the magazine has no college degree. 
Because the base rate of commuters without college degrees is far higher than the 
base rate of commuters with a college degree. People make this mistake because 
base rates are not as salient as the narrative of an individual. People typically 
overestimate the value of their evidence (e.g., reading the Economist) and 
underestimate the pull of associative coherence (e.g., the desire to make a 
compelling story), particularly for unlikely (low base-rate) events. Even Daniel 
Kahneman (2011) relates to this problem, explaining that “even now I find it 
unnatural [to consider base rates and question the diagnosticity of evidence]” (p. 
154). People prefer to explain events with causal stories rather than statistically 
appropriate inference (p. 166-170). The depressing difficulty of statistical 
inference is summed up by Nisbett and Borgida (1975), who argue that “subjects’ 
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unwillingness to deduce the particular from the general was matched only by their 
willingness to infer the general from the particular.” While humans are 
enthusiastic to generalize from a single instance, they are reluctant to apply 
likelihoods in any particular case.  
Gerd Gigerenzer’s lab (Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; 
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2007; Gigerenzer & Sturm, 2012) has been the most 
vocal opponent of the view that Tversky & Kahneman-style (1982) experiments 
show that humans are largely irrational, arguing that the design and assumptions 
of these experiments are inherently flawed. For example, Gigerenzer showed that 
people can reason according to Bayesian norms when base rates are more visible 
and when discussions are framed in frequentist terms (Gigerenzer, 1991).31 Note 
that Gigerenzer does not dispute the normative power of Bayesian rationality in 
this case, merely the ecological validity of the tests.  
Ecological validity is a cornerstone of bounded rationality; the notion that 
an agent’s success ought to be evaluated relative to their capacities, goals and 
information environment.32 There is no point having a theory of rationality that 
depends on information processing far outside the capacities of the agent because 
the typical information environment humans face is far removed from Laplace’s 
world of superintelligence where all past information must be considered.33 
                                                
31 Bayesianism and frequentism have, in the past, been considered incompatible, but Williamson (2013) argues that they 
should exist in harmonious symbiosis. Bayesians need frequentist information to calculate prior probabilities, and 
frequentists need Bayesian methods to calculate the odds of a single case. 
32 See also philosophical discussions of Minimal Rationality (Cherniak, 1981). 
33 “We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of the state that 
is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of 
all things in the universe, would be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest bodies as well as 
the lightest atoms in the world, provided that its intellect were sufficiently powerful to subject all data to analysis; to it, 
nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past would be present to its eyes. The perfection that the human mind 
has been able to give to astronomy affords but a feeble outline of such an intelligence” (Laplace, 1820/1951). 
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Instead, the world presents puzzles that lie somewhere between pure chance and 
pure strategy. In the actual world, Gigerenzer argues that heuristic processes can 
(and must) outperform decision-making based on crunching data. In fact, 
Gigerenzer and Sturm (2012) defend the normative use of heuristics when 
problems are computationally intractable (e.g., calculating the optimal sequence 
of chess moves), when circumstances lack robustness (e.g., when there is high 
uncertainty and a small sample size, such as predicting the stock market with ten 
years of data), or when problems are ill-defined (e.g., trying to find the best job, 
optimize a website, or buy the ideal car is hampered by a lack of knowledge about 
the alternatives, probabilities, consequences and utilities).  
All arguments in defense of heuristics stem either from descriptive or 
normative advantages (Gigerenzer & Sturm, 2012 Table 1). Descriptively, 
heuristics are defended as more explanatory and therefore more predictive than 
other models. For example, the default heuristic explains why marketing 
campaigns fail to increase organ donor registration. Normatively, heuristics are 
defended as outperforming other strategies, meaning that they are either more 
accurate, or more effective and efficient for the agent. For example, in a summary 
table of heuristics, Gigerenzer defends: The recognition heuristic, fluency 
heuristic, satisficing, imitate the majority and imitate the successful because they 
are beneficial to the agent in achieving their goals or aims. In the same table: 
  48 
 
Take-the-best, tallying, tit-for-tat and equality heuristic are pitched as matching or 
improving on the accuracy of other models34.  
Reconciling the usefulness of traditional epistemic values, such as accuracy 
and rationality, has led Gigerenzer and Sturm (2012) to a cooperative naturalized 
approach. They argue that empirical research ought to inform norms of rationality 
in some domains—as well as providing guidance for how human reasoning could 
be improved. However, in other domains, the ‘standard’ conception of rationality 
involving logic or probability ought to apply (Stein, 1996).  
1.7.5 IMPLEMENTATION 
To meet computational and algorithmic demands, the brain needs both 
Bayesian processes and symbolic representation—a read/write memory that can 
retain information and retrieve it for a later time (Gallistel & King, 2009). Due to 
the speed and complexity of human cognition, the physical basis of computation 
must achieve:  
high information density, (bits per cubic micron). It must have low volatility; hence, 
a low use of energy to maintain the physical changes that carry the information 
forward in time. It must be capable of entering either directly or via transcription 
into physically realized compact procedures for implementing two-argument 
functions (p.286).  
Gallistel and King are skeptical that these parameters are met by neural 
connections or connectionist architecture. A better model for how information is 
biologically processed is found in genetic code (p.125), because genetic 
mechanisms hold heritable information and direct the growth and development of 
living things by reading, transcribing and translating code into protein structures. 
                                                
34  Models include: Optimization models, multiple regression, neural networks, exemplar models and decision tree 
algorithms. 
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The scope, limits and demands of Bayesian cognition are relevant to this 
dissertation for a number of reasons. Rationality is ecologically constrained, but it 
is tested against traditional epistemic aims such as truth and reliability. Reliable 
beliefs are produced algorithmically by many processes including Bayesian, 
heuristic, inferential, and associationist processes, and so forth. Bayesian 
epistemology makes a substantial contribution to the normative standards for 
decision-making at a computational level, regardless of what occurs on either the 
algorithmic or biological instantiation and the justificatory status of beliefs is 
partly determined by the degree to which their production abides by the dictates 
of logic and probability theory.  
Reliability can do a lot of work to justify beliefs, but reliability alone is not 
enough. Calibrating traditionally internalist values of reflective knowledge (e.g. 
logical consistency) and non-arbitrary attribution of prior probabilities remains an 
issue for a hybrid Bayesian Virtue epistemology, and I try and resolve this 
weakness in Chapter 3 where I examine how virtue and Bayesian epistemologies 
bolster reliabilism with coherence. 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
I started this chapter with the notion that human flourishing depends on 
knowledge, but that certain knowledge may be unobtainable because humans 
flourish in informationally impoverished environments. In this dissertation, I 
examine our understanding of knowledge and our understanding of justified 
epistemic states that fall short of knowledge. In particular I focus on a virtue-
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Bayesian epistemology—the justification of animal and reflective knowledge 
through iterative Bayesian processes.  
While a Bayesian virtue epistemology seems promising, it faces some 
concerns: Is apt belief apt enough for knowledge?—addressed in Chapter 2; how 
can coherence add justification to a reliabilist account?—addressed in Chapter 3. 
What emerges from these investigations is homeostatic epistemology. 
Homeostatic epistemology argues that apt belief is apt enough for knowledge, 
Epistemic justification arises from the reliable coordination of limited sets of 
cohering, foundational beliefs, and it is the ebb and flow of coherence and 
distinctness between these beliefs that leads to homeostatic epistemology, which I 
articulate in Chapter 4.  
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2 BAYESIAN VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
Hornblower took his turn at the sheet, but he would not trust himself with the tiller, 
especially when night fell; he knew he had not the knack of keeping the boat on her 
course by the feel of the wind on his cheek and the tiller in his hand (Forester, 1950) 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Reflective knowledge is the pinnacle of human functioning, and it is 
traditionally conceived of as the reservoir of the a priori—a revered, almost 
mystical mental faculty through which Platonic ideals, truths, and axioms depart 
the heavens and settle on the brow of mortal man. In contrast, reliabilist beliefs 
are merely dumb associations, forged by mechanistic repetition of limited 
cognition, that create impoverished models of the external world. In this chapter, I 
splice together these apparently conflicting processes by examining Sosa’s 
reliabilist account of reflective knowledge. To do so, I draw on another agent-
centred, normative and reliabilist epistemology—Bayesian epistemology.  
Typically, the study of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’ has assumed that 
beliefs are all or nothing, rather than probabilistic (BonJour, 1985; Conee & 
Feldman, 2004; Goldman, 1986). The view that knowledge must be certain stems 
from Socrates, but it was Descartes who defined modern analytic philosophy 
through his efforts to seek certainty amidst powerful skeptical objections (Hajek 
& Hartmann, 2009)—the all-or-nothing view. However, Descartes had 
competition to set the agenda. Within four years of his death, Pascal and Fermat 
argued that one should strive for rational decision-making, rather than truth—the 
probabilistic view.  
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The all-or-nothing and probabilistic views are illustrated by the difference 
between Descartes’ Cogito and Pascal’s wager. In the Cogito, Descartes argues 
for a belief in God based on rational reflection and deductive reasoning. In the 
wager, Pascal argues for a belief in God based on outcomes evaluated 
probabilistically. Sosa’s virtue epistemology applauds the Cartesian quest for 
knowledge, but it does so with a competence-based epistemology.  
Sosa divides knowledge into categories of animal and reflective belief. 
More radically, he suggests that what justifies animal belief also justifies 
reflective belief, albeit on a higher level, and he hopes that this distinction can 
resolve a number of issues that arise from other epistemic accounts. As a 
reliabilist, he avoids the inductive and deductive limitations of a completely 
internalist account of justification.  By valuing the distinct contribution of the 
intellect, he avoids the simplistic outcomes of brute associations. Like decision-
theorists, Sosa argues that each performance of belief ought to be evaluated with 
regards to the agent experiencing it. Sosa believes that a competence-based virtue 
epistemology can circumvent difficulties faced by traditional accounts, including 
a way to explain the absence of knowledge in Gettier-cases.  
Bayesian epistemology offers a framework for rational-decision making that 
dovetails with a competence-based virtue epistemology. Epistemology becomes 
not just the study of justified true belief, but also the study of the processes of 
belief revision in response to confirming or disconfirming evidence. Justification 
arises from the apt performance of reliable processes and their coherence with 
other beliefs. 
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This chapter examines the success of Sosa’s justification of animal and 
reflective knowledge. Critics of his view argue that animal beliefs are too weak to 
do the work of knowledge, or that reflective knowledge represents nothing more 
than iterations of the same defective stuff. I respond to these criticisms by 
suggesting that Bayesian processes could supplement perceived deficiencies in 
the virtue epistemology model. From this, a hybrid Bayesian virtue epistemology 
emerges.  
In §2.2, I provide some background information on knowledge considered 
as justified true belief. In §2.3, I give more detail of animal knowledge and 
discuss whether it is sufficient for knowledge. In §2.4, I describe reflective 
knowledge and address concerns of infinite regress, the problem of luck, the KK 
principle, and finally the concern that reflective knowledge is just animal 
knowledge ‘twice over.’ In §2.5, I defend the ‘theory theory’ of reflective 
knowledge.  In §2.6, I use a theory theory account of reflective knowledge to 
defend reflective knowledge against the new evil demon skeptical scenario and 
propose some normative guidelines. In §2.7, I conclude by outlining the problem 
of coherence as a source of justification to be addressed in the subsequent chapter. 
2.2 BACKGROUND 
What is it to know? Prairie dogs are cooperative, social rodents with an 
astonishing capacity to communicate idiosyncratic details of individuals of 
different species. Their alarm calls can discriminate the color of clothes worn by a 
particular human, their shape, their size, and even whether a human has ever 
appeared with a gun. As an example, when human observers were unable to 
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distinguish between a German Shepherd and a coyote on a particular occasion, the 
prairie dogs made the distinction immediately (Slobodchikoff, Perla, & Verdolin, 
2009). As this example demonstrates, it seems reasonable to assert that prairie 
dogs know who is walking among them.   When we say this, however, do we 
really mean that they know, or are we anthropomorphizing the prairie dogs’ calls 
and actions to suit our own preference for narrative? After all, I hardly think my 
cat really knows that I’m coming to bed, but I use the term regardless.35 
Our varied use of the word ‘know’ should not be confused with its 
reference. What is it to know? Most people would agree that knowing refers, in 
some way, to the truth (e.g., if the prairie dog knows who is approaching, they 
must be accurate). I take this as a given. The second idea is that knowledge is 
propositional (i.e. that knowledge is the domain of creatures with beliefs about the 
world) and this is a far more controversial view. Gilbert Ryle (1946/1971, 1949) 
suggested that at least two kinds of knowledge exist: knowledge-that and 
knowledge-how.36 Empirical work on memory systems confirms Ryle’s original 
distinction and expands upon it (see §1.5). In this chapter, however, I only 
consider propositional knowledge (whilst acknowledging that other sorts of 
knowledge may exist). 
Knowledge consists of true beliefs. ‘Belief’ is a propositional attitude we 
have when we take something to be true (Schwitzgebel, 2011), and I take beliefs 
to be both functional and representational. Functionalism about mental states is 
                                                
35 I daresay that he anticipates that I will join him. 
36  There has been philosophical pushback against this division, claiming that knowledge-how ascriptions attribute 
propositional knowledge (see Stanley, 2011). However, for the sake of my discussions, I will take it as a given that “we 
know much more about the way the world is than we do about the semantics of our talk about that world” (Devitt, 2011). 
Although as Ernest Sosa points out (personal communication August 15, 2013), all knowledge may be propositional, even 
if people fail to adequately ascribe them. 
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the view that beliefs are causally related to sensory stimulations, behaviour and 
other mental states (Armstrong, 1968; Fodor, 1968b). Representationalism is the 
view that beliefs represent how things stand in the world (Fodor, 1975; Millikan, 
1984). This means that a true belief that there is a coffee cup is connected to the 
actual fact that there is a coffee cup. A belief that there is a coffee cup may cause 
an agent’s desire for coffee, prompting his hand to move to pick it up and the 
feeling of cold porcelain against his skin. In this chapter, I remain agnostic on the 
specifics of what particular variant of functionalism or representationalism ought 
to be adopted, as neither debate is central to the arguments of this chapter. For the 
purposes of this chapter, the important ideas are twofold (1) that beliefs are 
causally connected to our experiences and (2) that beliefs are internal 
representations of the world.  
Beliefs are also propositional—either language-like or map-like. Like 
language, beliefs can be combined in an infinite number of arrangements 
(productivity) and exhibit logical structure (systematicity) (Fodor, 1975; Fodor & 
Lepore, 1996). Beliefs also seem to be map-like, in that changes to one belief alter 
its relationships with other beliefs (just like moving a checkpoint on a hike 
simultaneously changes its relationships with all other checkpoints and features 
on a map) (Bradden-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996).   
Tying knowledge to propositional, functional, and representational belief 
means that animals such as sea slugs, insects, or bacteria do not have knowledge, 
although they can react to their environments in remarkably complex ways 
inviting one to use terms like ‘believe’ and ‘know.’ On the other hand, higher 
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order animals such as chimpanzees, dolphins, and perhaps even prairie dogs do 
have beliefs.37  Most importantly, young children at the age of three have beliefs, 
even though they have no concept of belief and their broader understanding of the 
world is deficient (Marcus, 1995). If we grant prairie dogs and children the 
capacity for belief and the capacity to believe accurately, the possibility exists that 
they can, in fact, know. 
Nonetheless, true belief is not usually considered sufficient for knowledge. 
Suppose my friend flips a coin, hides the result under his hand, and asks me 
whether I believe the coin came up heads or tails. I may believe ‘heads’ and, 
indeed, perhaps the coin is heads, but I do not know that it is heads until my friend 
lifts his hand and I can perceive Washington’s profile. Epistemologists are 
particularly interested in justification—i.e., what has to be added to true belief in 
order to create knowledge.  
Perception, memory, rational processes and testimony are all sources of 
justification.    In the coin example, what justifies my belief that the coin landed 
heads up is the reliable operation of my perceptual capacities in normal lighting 
conditions. Epistemologists argue about whether perceptual knowledge is 
different to higher order reflective knowledge—do my low-grade beliefs about the 
existence of my hand require the same sort of justification as my lofty high-grade 
beliefs about the existence of objective chances? Typically, epistemologists use 
different accounts of justification depending on the sort of knowledge they are 
trying to explain, because it is difficult to explain how low level associations 
                                                
37 Though it is plausible that prairie dogs have beliefs de re, but not de dicto (Davidson, 1984). 
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could result in justified rational thought and, conversely, how abstract thinking 
could explain perceptual knowledge. Much of this chapter will explore 
justification for two kinds of knowledge: animal and reflective. 
Before I articulate the details of animal knowledge and reflective 
knowledge in the sections that follow, it is important to note here that I assume 
that knowledge must be considered from the perspective of the agent who holds 
the belief, rather than as an isolated, objective fact. Knowledge is attributable in 
the same way that a shade of blue B is understood.  
B = a subjective visual experience within an animal A, at a time T, viewing an object 
O in conditions C.  
There is no understanding of the blueness of the sky without reference to the 
agent experiencing it. Similarly, knowledge (K) is analyzed with reference to the 
agent holding the belief: 
K = a justified true belief within an animal A, at a time T, in conditions C.  
Just because knowledge must be understood with reference to the agent 
does not make it subjective. There are objective facts about the processes and 
outcomes of how an agent and object interact in the world, and there are objective 
facts about the attainment of knowledge. 
2.3 ANIMAL KNOWLEDGE 
Sosa’s virtue epistemology begins with his account of animal knowledge. 
Animal knowledge is a reliabilist solution based on an animal’s capacity to 
survive and thrive in the environment, regardless of higher order beliefs about 
survival. Sosa asks us to consider an archer shooting an arrow at a target. A shot 
is apt when it is accurate not because of luck or a fortuitous wind that pushes the 
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arrow to the center, but because of the competence exhibited by the archer. Sosa 
takes beliefs to be long-sustained performances exhibiting a combination of 
accuracy, adroitness, and aptness. Apt beliefs are accurate (true), adroit (produced 
by skillful processes) and are accurate because they are adroit. Aptness is a 
measure of performance success, and accidental beliefs are therefore not apt, even 
if the individual who holds those beliefs is adroit. Take, for example, a skilled 
archer who hits the bullseye due to a gust of wind rather than the precision of his 
shot, or a nervous student who randomly picks the right answer to a multiple 
choice question, even though she might easily explain the content in normal 
conditions. Animal knowledge involves no reflection or understanding. Although 
animal knowledge can become reflective if the appropriate reflective stance 
targets it. For example, a person might have animal knowledge that a deer is 300 
feet away in the forest, and when questioned, they reflect on their belief and form 
a reflective judgment that the deer is 300 feet away with the addition of explicit 
considerations of the distance between trees, lighting conditions and prior 
experience.  
Sosa argues that unreflective knowledge counts for many implicit beliefs in 
an adult’s epistemology, and even explicitly considered beliefs are pieced 
together intuitively, rather than with formal reasoning apparatus (weighed up 
against scientific norms, or logical axioms). For this reason, we are unable to 
verbalize much of our “non-trivial” knowledge, because we lack the precision of 
vocabulary or concepts to describe what we know to be true. Sosa (2009a) 
provides an excellent example of this: 
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…experienced sailors embody practical lore that they cannot articulate… a certain 
gestalt look of the environment will prompt practically appropriate inferences: that a 
storm is coming, say, even if the knowledge embodied must remain inarticulate: the 
knowledge that when the sea and the heavens look a certain way, a storm is likely 
brewing (p.72) 
Animal knowledge might ‘remain inarticulate’ and yet yield ‘practically 
appropriate inferences’ nevertheless. We know the typical heft of a billiard ball 
and how it might perform on tasks against surfaces with various degrees of 
friction, such as carpet, floorboards, or bedding (Sosa, 2009a). We use our animal 
knowledge to guide our arms to move at a velocity, with a particular grace to suit 
the task at hand, without any capacity to enunciate the parameters of this 
knowledge (Sosa, 2009a). The capacity to explain our knowledge is the domain of 
reflective knowledge. 
2.3.1 APT BELIEF IS NOT APT ENOUGH 
One criticism of Sosa’s argument is that apt belief is too weak to do much 
work. Christopher Lepock (2010), for example, argues that apt belief is not 
sufficiently knowledge-conferring to act as the foundation on which reflective 
knowledge is built.  It is important to distinguish between two claims: 1) that apt 
belief is strong enough to do foundational epistemic work, and 2) that apt belief is 
sufficient for knowledge.  
Can apt beliefs perform foundational epistemic work? The answer to this 
will depend on what sort of epistemic objects count as foundational. Foundational 
states must increase the capacity of an agent to discern the truth. According to this 
definition, reliable credences, true beliefs and knowledge all count as 
foundational. Indeed, even a fairly weak belief (i.e. reliably formed credence) can 
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be useful because no belief must stand on its own; its reliability is bootstrapped by 
its relationships with other beliefs. A Bayesian account suggests that a number of 
weak beliefs, drawn together coherently, can be foundational (Lewis, 1946; 
Olsson & Shogenji, 2004). If aptness refers to competent treatment of belief with 
regards to one’s evidence, then it could also count as a foundational epistemic 
object—regardless of whether it produced knowledge, unGettier-proof justified 
true belief, or reliable credences. I grant that Sosa hopes that apt belief is 
knowledge-conferring, not just producing rational beliefs. However, there seems 
to be a need for quasi-apt beliefs to account for reliably formed credences that fall 
short of knowledge. 
Lepock claims that ordinary human knowledge has at least an implicit 
awareness of one’s competencies that a merely ‘reliable’ apt belief does not have. 
This ‘implicit awareness’ supposedly allows us to adapt to different 
circumstances, but, the concept ‘implicit awareness’ used by Lepock is confusing. 
Animal cognition involves implicit, cognitively impenetrable beliefs that play a 
complex functional role within an organism, allowing it to learn, adapt, and 
remain flexible in response to a changing environment or competence. Consider, 
for example, the flexibility and detail of the prairie dog when it communicates to 
its peers that a particular predator is approaching. Apt belief has the sensitivity 
and flexibility to adapt to different circumstances, a point I come back to in the 
next chapter on the topic of coordination. Even without implicit awareness, apt 
belief allows an organism to adapt to different circumstances, and, as such, can be 
considered ordinary knowledge.  
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Does Lepock mean that ordinary knowledge involves some sort of 
consciously accessible, cognitive penetrability? Perhaps my notion of ‘ordinary 
knowledge’ and Lepock’s notion differ? It seems that the knowledge defined by 
Lepock as ‘ordinary’ is actually reflective and although philosophers frequently 
discuss reflective knowledge, this in itself does not render it ‘ordinary’, as in 
‘most common’. To describe it as such would be foolish, just as it would be 
foolish to suppose that explicit memory systems are the dominant memory 
systems relied on by an agent because the philosophy of memory has been 
dominated by discussions of explicit memory38. It seems that animals and humans 
have the confidence and success that indicates they know much that they cannot 
articulate or access consciously.  
2.3.2 SOSA’S TRICKSTER 
One of the advantages of the AAA structure of Sosa’s virtue epistemology 
is that he hopes it will explain why Gettier-cases fail to be instances of 
knowledge. Sosa (2007) gives an example of Jim and the Jokester. Jim has apt 
perceptual beliefs in normal conditions, so in normal conditions he believes that 
the surface of a table in a room is red and it is red. But consider the risk to Jim’s 
apt beliefs if there’s a Jokester afoot who can change either (or both) the lighting 
in the room or the color of the surface of the table, or both, much like a 
kaleidoscope. At one moment, in normal lighting conditions, the surface really is 
red; and in another, the surface is white and merely looks red. The skeptical 
question here is this: In the situation where the surface really is red and Jim 
                                                
38 For examples of remembering and recollection in the analytic tradition see particularly Russell (1921), Ayer(1956), 
Sorabji (2004), Suddendorf & Moore (2011), Martin & Deutscher (1966), Reid (1785) 
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perceives it as red, does Jim know that it is red? Isn’t Jim’s true belief that the 
surface is red just a lucky accident (i.e., the table could easily have been white 
with red lighting), and therefore not knowledge? Sosa believes that Jim has 
animal knowledge that the surface is red because his perceptual faculties are 
operating in the appropriate performance context, with the right causal connection 
to yield true beliefs. Animal knowledge exists and being used, even though Jim’s 
reflective knowledge fails to realize that he is in a tricky environment.  
Some commentators might still feel that Sosa’s use of the term ‘know’ is 
misplaced (Lepock, 2010) and I am inclined to agree with Lepock that something 
is odd here. Jim may not have knowledge if believing “the table is red” equates to 
the stable property ‘redness,’ as derived from red paint or red plastic. A belief in a 
stably red table will not do Jim much good, because we know that the table is not, 
in fact, stably red, but can be either white or red depending on the whim of our 
jokester. In fact, the table is a clear laminate with internal lighting.  
On the other hand, if believing “the table is red” equates to the perceptual 
belief that the table looks red at time t, then Jim does have knowledge. The 
property of “looking red at time t” allows for stable or unstable redness as 
properties of the table. In the latter case, “Jim knows that the table is red” simply 
means that the table looks red and is red in the moment he sees it. However, this 
does not confer stable knowledge of the table’s true properties—i.e., a clear table 
with red lighting. The ordinary sense of ‘know’ that Lepock seeks, is one where 
Jim knows more about the world than what it seems to be, but also what the world 
actually is. I suspect Sosa is in trouble if he thinks Jim knows that the table is 
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stably red. Sosa agrees that Jim might only know that the table looks red, although 
he points that that this is an objective fact that the table looks red (based on Jim’s 
visual system), not just a subjective judgment by Jim39. In the end, Jim’s 
knowledge that the table looks red is best explained by the fact that the table is 
unstably red and Jim’s perceptual capacities were able to adroitly detect this 
redness. 
Apart from explaining instances of knowledge in tricky situations, Sosa’s 
trickster can also be used to demonstrate that what we need to know varies 
depending on our goals. For example, say Jim was a school child (Jsc) on an 
excursion to an art gallery. The goal of Jsc is to report his experience of art. Jsc 
knows enough when he reports accurately that the red table made him feel 
hungry, warm, and frightened. However, suppose Jim was an art critic (Jac). Jac 
may know that the table made him feel hungry, warm and frightened when it 
looked red, but this is not enough to write his review. For a review, Jac needs to 
know what the table is made of, how often it cycles through white and red, 
whether that cycle is random or not, why the artist chose the medium and 
apparatus, and so forth. Jac needs to experience all the fluctuations of the table in 
order to fully evaluate its success as an exhibit. Alternatively, suppose that Jim 
was a magician’s assistant (Jma). Jma needs to have the animal knowledge of the 
table’s redness, an understanding of materials and cycles,  and an understanding 
of the mechanism that switches the lights on, so that he can build an illusion for 
the magic show. An agent’s goals are critical to evaluating their level of 
                                                
39 Sosa (personal communication, August 15, 2013) 
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knowledge. If an agent seeks higher levels of knowledge, their beliefs must be 
evaluated on those terms. 
The way a Bayesian reacts when presented with a table that looks red is to 
form a set of likely hypotheses about what causes the redness, and to attribute 
priors from background beliefs. The prior probability that the table is red, given it 
looks red, ought to be high if other factors about its location and circumstances 
are usual for normal lighting conditions (for example, if the table were outside 
during the day or inside near a window, or in a police station where colored lights 
are unusual and white fluorescent lights are cheap). On the other hand, if the table 
was observed in a photography laboratory, a teenager’s bedroom, an art gallery, a 
circus or a nightclub, then the observer may have a legitimate basis to assign a 
much higher prior likelihood to the table being white with red lighting. The 
Bayesian might also have defensible reasons to withhold judgment regarding the 
table’s true color altogether. As these examples demonstrate, the scope of 
hypotheses under consideration is hugely impacted by the context of experiences. 
The Bayesian would prefer not to get embroiled in a discussion of knowledge, but 
to instead consider the table from the perspective of what likelihood ought 
rationally be assigned, given the evidence, limitations and goals of the agent. 
2.4 REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
Reflective knowledge is conscious knowing. Of the creatures that can know, 
not all have the capacity to reflect upon their knowledge. Reflective knowledge 
that p requires belief about our belief that p, and it emerges from thinking 
carefully, such as persevering through counter arguments, skeptical concerns, 
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differing contexts, and changed circumstances. Although reflective knowledge 
that p requires belief about our belief that p, it does not require an infinite set of 
justifications about one’s belief about one’s belief that p.40 Reflective knowledge 
is also the domain of highly abstract thinking. If a person knows the truth of 
necessity, causality, identity, and goodness, they understand them in the domain 
of reflective knowledge. Mathematical, metaphysical, epistemic, or conceptual 
truths are established in the higher order thinking of reflective knowledge. 
Rationalists argue that reflective knowledge is connected with the a priori—
beliefs arise from reason, insight or intuition, rather than sensory experience—but 
there is a growing literature (see Kornblith, 2012) that naturalizes reflective 
knowledge, building on the empiricism of Locke and Hume. One can agree that 
the mind has levels of capacity and sophistication without supposing that the 
origins of these capacities lie beyond contact with the world.  
The apparatus of Sosa’s reflective knowledge includes mental faculties 
traditionally associated with rationalism rather than reliabilism—i.e., “reflective 
acquisition of knowledge is…like attaining a prized objective guided by one’s 
own intelligence, information, and deliberation” (Sosa, 2009a, p. 142). Sosa’s 
vision for reflective knowledge is that it incorporates higher order cognition to 
improve epistemic virtue (i.e., knowledge) via experiences in the world. However, 
even reflective knowledge “tend[s] to rise only to a Moorean commensense level, 
below the sophistication of any Cartesian epistemology supernaturalized, or any 
Quinean epistemology naturalized.” (p.64) 
                                                
40 However, I do discuss the problem of infinite regress in §2.4.1 
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Reflective knowledge is built up over time and experience. The more aware 
we are of the reliability—or unreliability—of our faculties, the greater the 
epistemic value of our beliefs. Consequently, justified trust in our intelligence, 
memory, and deliberative capacities ought to increase reflective knowledge 
according to the Principle of the Criterion (PC)(Sosa, 2009a, p. 139).  
PC Knowledge is enhanced through justified trust in the reliability of its sources 
To take a developmental example, a simple proposition expressed by a 
toddler is less justified than the same proposition uttered by an adult, even if both 
are true. The adult gains justification in virtue of their capacity to explain their 
beliefs within a wider theoretical or informed understanding of the world and their 
own mental apparatus. A reflective belief does more epistemic work than a child’s 
belief “if it coheres properly with the believer’s understanding of why it is true… 
and of how in which it is sustained as reliably truth-conducive” (Sosa, 2007). 
Sosa’s reflective knowledge has the AAA structure of apt belief with 
additional ‘meta-aptness’ drawn from higher order reliable processes. Thus, 
‘knowing full well’ is having aptly apt beliefs. It is animal knowledge plus an 
“understanding of its place in a wider whole that includes one’s belief and 
knowledge of it and how these come about” (Kornblith, 2009, p. 128). The ‘meta-
aptness’ of reflective knowledge stems from higher order reliable processes that 
are themselves evaluable via the same performance model of regular apt belief. 
An apt performance becomes meta-apt when the agent reliably performs 
“competent risk assessment” based on her situation (both constitutional and 
circumstantial) (Sosa, 2011). Therefore, reflective knowledge is obtained only if 
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one can rule out every possibility that is incompatible with knowledge. This is the 
principle of exclusion (PE): 
PE “If one is to know that h, then one must exclude (rule out) every possibility that 
one knows to be incompatible with one’s knowing that h” (Sosa, 1997, p. 411)  
I know that I have a hand because I can rule out any possibility that is 
incompatible with my hand being here, attached to my body. The reflective 
knower has the capacity to defend his or her belief against any rational reason to 
reject it: 
…in order to know full well that p, one must be able to “defend it in the arena of 
reflection”: one must be able to view oneself as meeting every condition that one 
recognizes as required in order then to know that p; or, alternatively and to the same 
effect, one must be able to exclude justifiedly any possibility one consciously 
recognizes to be incompatible with one’s then knowing that p”  
and 
“one does not attain high-level [reflective] knowledge, when one consciously 
wonders whether one does know, unless one is able to say yes…with adequate 
justification”. (A. Some consequences of two principles, Lecture 6. The Problem of 
the Criterion, Sosa, 2007). 
Sosa is careful to acknowledge that one does not need to be consciously 
thinking of all these possibilities at the moment a belief is occurrent, only that a 
person “would be able to defend [it], no holds barred, were it cast in the arena, 
perhaps by a hypothetical skeptic.”41 Knowing full well requires being disposed to 
defend one’s beliefs by being able to explain how apt beliefs were formed with 
the guidance of one’s second-order apt perspective. Sosa explains,  
Diana’s performing full well requires not only that she host an apt perspective that 
constitutes her apt risk assessment. It requires also that she choose whether to act 
under the guidance of that perspective, and not, say, by a coin toss42.  
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Personal communication August 15, 2013. 
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Additionally, rather than coming up with explanations post hoc, the knower 
has thought of all skeptical concerns before being called upon to defend 
themselves. Knowing full well entails having the disposition to reject rational 
alternatives under skeptical pressure.  
According to the principle of exclusion, one must rule out every possibility 
that is incompatible with one’s knowing that h. But what precisely is meant by 
‘every possibility’ and how does our understanding of this affect the demands 
placed upon knowing full well? Surely ‘every possibility’ suggests that we do not 
have to rule out simply conceivable circumstances We ought not need to have 
dispositional readiness to defeat totally improbable, yet conceivable 
circumstances such as the notion that our hand is a holograph or that our 
memories are being systematically manipulated by a miraculous entity that does 
not obey the laws of physics. If ‘every possibility’ rules out simply conceivable 
worlds, then, what level of possibility must be excluded to know full well?   
Any very likely scenarios ought to be ruled out. I take likely scenarios to be 
close possible worlds where mundane differences result from every day choices, 
such as wearing a different sort of outfit, choosing a different route to work, 
deliberating more carefully before making a decision, or coming to a different 
belief about an important matter through different evidence. For example, I know 
that I ate porridge for breakfast today, rather than eggs on toast, even though I had 
eggs on toast earlier in the week. Apart from these mundane worlds, more remote 
worlds that obey the laws of science ought also be excluded. For example, 
knowing full well means having a sufficient grasp of cognition to know that 
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sometimes dream beliefs and experiences can be present and vivid to the waking 
mind and can cause minor confusion before being assessed and quarantined. 
Thus, excluding dream beliefs is important when considering one’s mental state 
over breakfast. In combination, these constraints (ruling out close possible worlds 
and more distant, science-compatible worlds) mean that the possibilities that must 
be ruled out are only those that cohere with the rest of a person’s beliefs about the 
way the world behaves and their own cognitive system. The new principle of 
exclusion via coherence (PEC) is: 
PEC: if one is to know that h, then one must exclude (rule out) every possibility that 
one knows to be incompatible with one’s knowing that h that coheres with the rest of 
one’s beliefs” 
Reflective knowledge requires being able to defeat possible 
counterarguments, but how much must one consider before knowledge is assured? 
Might there not be an infinite regress of cohering justifications that block 
knowledge attribution? 
2.4.1 THE RISK OF INFINITE REGRESS 
The Pyrrhonian dilemma refers to the problem of offering a justification for 
beliefs that does not lead to an infinite regress of justifications. That is, if a 
knower’s beliefs are justified by providing reasons for their beliefs, do we not also 
need justification for those reasons?—and then justifications for those higher level 
justifications?—and so on. The Pyrrhonian dilemma for Sosa (and other 
coherentists) is an infinite regress of justification from animal knowledge to 
reflective knowledge and to even higher reflective knowledge and so forth 
(BonJour, 2003, pp. 197-198).  Pyrrhonians argue that “any attempt to move 
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beyond foundations only misleads us into circles or regresses, viciously either 
way.” (Sosa, 2009a, p. 145) I argue, however, that degrees of knowledge can 
acknowledge and diffuse iterative concerns. The regress of aptness and meta-
aptness is not a threat to virtue epistemology, but an explanatory tool to describe 
different levels of competence and performance domains. The fact that aptness 
and meta-aptness could theoretically continue iteratively may present an 
inevitable, but not vicious circle.  
In this context, a vicious circle implies a never-ending search for the truth 
without ever knowing truth. An inevitable circle acknowledges the journey, but 
points out the stops along the way. The ideal knower moves through life and gains 
experiences, developing both more reliable knowledge and better justification for 
his or her beliefs in ever-increasing domains. These capabilities are not plucked 
from the a priori, but are honed via practice, attention, use and lessons from 
failure. As Sosa says, “’instinctive’ reactions are still subject to fine-tuning 
through further practice and training” (2009a, p. 142).  
Each level of justification only needs to explain an organism’s apt belief 
within a particular context of operation. The more justificatory levels one goes up, 
the broader the context of operation for that being. At the ceiling, one can imagine 
an omniscient being would have ultimate justification over all contexts. In sum, 
there are many levels of justification and many levels of knowledge. The fact that 
these can theoretically extend is not a threat to Sosa’s virtue epistemology so long 
as each level is described and knowledge attributed appropriately.  
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2.4.2 THE PROBLEM OF LUCK 
Another problem for reflective knowledge is the problem of luck. Pritchard 
(2009) points out that Sosa’s definition of knowledge allows possibly lucky shots 
to be considered knowledge. Consider the archer confronted with not one but two 
gusts of wind: first, an unlucky gust that pushes the arrow off target, and second, a 
lucky gust that pushes the arrow back in line with hitting the bullseye. Apparently 
Sosa (2007) would consider such a shot apt: 
If the act is due to a competence exercised in its appropriate conditions, its 
success may be due to luck in various ways. It may be just an accident that the 
agent retains his relevant competence, for example, or that the conditions 
remain appropriate. Either way, the act fails to be safely successful, since it 
might too easily have failed, through lack of the required competence or 
conditions. It might still be apt, nevertheless, indeed attributably, creditably 
apt. (p. 81) 
Pritchard’s concern is safety. He argues that aptness cannot count for 
knowledge, because an apt shot might have hit the target due to luck. Consider a 
General competently sending out orders down the chain of command to achieve a 
strategic outcome. Mostly the message is received accurately, thus is apt. 
However, there might be circumstances where errors occur. It is easy to imagine a 
pair of communication mistakes that accidently result in the correct message 
arriving for the troops and the desired outcome achieved. When this happens, the 
General was partly responsible for the message’s success, but his competence is 
exhibited in the strategic vision, not in ensuring reliable, clear communication. 
Pritchard’s point is that because the General’s capacity to get messages to the 
troops is unreliable, it is not apt even in the cases where it works. Aptness must 
come from consistent reliability. Thus, for Sosa to maintain his AAA structure 
against the critics, he may need to sure up his notion of reliability.  
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The earlier example of the double gust of wind (and indeed Sosa’s own 
version with a single gust of wind), is useful because it is analogous to belief and 
mental processes, yet how analogous are these cases really? Consider the period 
of time between the archer releasing the arrow and it hitting its target, during 
which the archer has no control or influence over the trajectory of the arrow. 
(Note that the same ‘no control’ period exists for the General above). The 
opportunity for lucky gusts of wind to upset the outcome is when the archer has 
no control. While this is true for arrows, is it true of beliefs?  
Beliefs are never loosened from man’s quiver. Beliefs are formed and 
deployed as time passes and circumstances change. Information and influences 
bear down on beliefs over time and are reacted to accordingly. The correct 
analogy for the archer is more like being both the releaser of the arrow and the 
radio operator (able to alter the trajectory to account for the wind changes). Or the 
archer holds a special device that can spurt puffs of air at the arrow to recorrect 
for freak gusts, or designs an arrow that can self-correct after being battered by 
freak gusts.  
The example of modern missiles also illustrates this point. Humans have 
designed the Tomahawk subsonic cruise missile to self-correct by comparing the 
terrain beneath it to satellite-generated maps stored onboard. If its trajectory is 
altered, motors will move the wings to counter unforeseen difficulties on its 
journey. The tactical Tomahawk can be reprogrammed remotely mid-flight to a 
different target using GPS coordinates stored locally. Similarly, a human being is 
both an animal agent with implicit systems (that course-correct and reevaluate 
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circumstances for each moment in time), and a reflective agent that aims and 
redirects. So, how do the Tomahawk engineers’ and operators’ competencies play 
a role in the success or failure of the missile to hit its target? Each gust of wind 
prompts automated reaction. If part of the guidance system fails, human decisions 
will affect how well the missile flies. The role of luck is minimized by the 
constant engagement of agents within their own mind and their environments.   
Another point is that many lucky outcomes are predictable, such as gusts of 
wind (consider the level of obsession with wind character, strength, and direction 
amongst professional golfers). Golfers would not attribute the full success of a 
shot that was buffeted by a double gust of wind to a player, but then golfers do not 
attribute any success entirely to skill. Everyone implicitly acknowledges the role 
of luck in any success. One of the pleasures of games is that they involve both 
luck and skill. There is always some luck for archers, golfers and others striving 
to hit a target in intrinsically imperfect conditions. Is there always the same 
balance of luck for human beliefs? Even if luck often plays a role in belief 
formation, surely some beliefs and belief-generating processes are certain in a 
particular context? See Chapter 4. For further comments on this issue.  
I certainly agree that humans do not know through luck, but the onus is on 
the critics to draw intuitions from appropriate analogies. Consider the Tomahawk 
missile: Even if wires short circuit, a human operator can intervene; conversely, if 
a human operator is waylaid, the missile can self-direct to the target. Similarly, 
virtue epistemology has layers of epistemic ‘course correction.’ In any case, 
supposing a better luck example can be imagined (and I do not doubt 
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philosophers’ capacities to create some outlandish example involving angels or 
other supernatural forces), should that upset virtue epistemology? 
Part of the reason why credences need to play a greater role in epistemology 
is that instances where knowledge does not obtain—yet competent processes are 
deployed—are often no big deal43. Knowledge is the ideal epistemic state, but 
epistemic states where luck defeats knowledge may leave behind another valuable 
justified epistemic state, plus a feedback opportunity to increase knowledge (or 
the probability of knowledge) for future situations. Alternatively, the lucky 
circumstance may be so unlikely that the absence of knowledge in the case 
specified is inconsequential for future actions. Likely luck can be understood and 
prepared for. If the tomahawk missile short circuits, engineers will investigate and 
reinforce the relevant mechanisms for future flights. Reliable processes are those 
that create knowledge, but also improve the odds of future knowledge in different 
conditions. Instances of knowledge are valuable in that they inform the agent and 
those around them of the scale of their competencies. However, there is no shame 
in justified credences or accidental true belief when treated appropriately by the 
agent.  
2.4.3 KK PRINCIPLE 
The KK principle is the idea that to know, one must know that one knows. 
The Cartesian characterization was that there was cognitio (knowledge) and then 
scientia (higher, reflective, enlightened knowledge). Scientia is a particularly 
                                                
43 I do not mean that all circumstances where knowledge does not obtain are inconsequential, merely that often we believe 
something that is almost true, such as we believe that our car is running out of gas and we only have 25 miles before our 
fuel tank is empty, but in actual fact, our car only has 20 miles of fuel left in the fuel tank. Presuming we prioritize getting 
more gas, the failure to know is not going to affect our ability to get to our destination.  
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comprehensive and coherent form of knowledge—knowledge of ourselves and 
our place in the universe—that stems from persistent reasoning. Wilfrid Sellars 
(Sosa, 2011) summarizes the intuition well: real knowledge only occurs when it is 
“…in some sense recognized by the person whose belief it is.” Say I know C—the 
cows will be fed at 5pm. The KK intuition is that if I know C, then I also know 
how I came to have this knowledge, such as through reliable testimony from the 
farmer, or through reliable perceptual experiences. The KK intuition derives from 
knowledge defined as ‘justified true belief,’ where ‘justified’ refers to some sort 
of rational or conscious appreciation for the knower’s state. The intuition is that, 
in virtue of being in such a reflective state, the knower is aware and thus knows 
when she knows. The knower can sense when knowledge obtains. Perhaps the 
knower has a quiet confidence, or a firm grasp on many factors relating to their 
current experience?  
At this point I would like to introduce two siblings, Diffident and his sister 
Dauntless44. Diffident and Dauntless are both highly experienced sailors, but they 
have different temperaments. Diffident tends to be more cautious with regards to 
his beliefs, setting his credences closer to indifference, even if he has evidence 
that justifies a high level of belief. Dauntless tends in the opposite direction and is 
overly confident with her evidence. If her evidence suggests a modest belief, she 
tends to push her credence further towards 0 or 1. Suppose the siblings set off on 
a circumnavigation of the globe in a 39’ yacht. They take turns at the helm; 
making decisions differently, and these decisions have varying outcomes. 
                                                
44 The character ‘Diffident’ stems from Sosa’s Knowing Full Well (Sosa, 1993). Sosa introduces him and his counterparts 
‘Normal’ and ‘Assertive’ in the following way: “How important epistemically is the distance from the actual to the ideal?” 
For the sake of narrative flow, I have chosen the name ‘Dauntless’, rather than ‘Assertive’. 
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We can imagine Dauntless knowing the right moment to jibe based on 
lining up two conspicuous trees on the shore behind one another. Her knowledge 
extends beyond physical knowledge to pull the rudder firmly portside—she 
knows that she knows this peculiar fact about the landscape and that safe passage 
is found between the shallow reefs beneath her. Her confidence stems from 
memories she has of navigating this in precisely the same way in the past during 
different winds, different swells and different crew. She knows that she knows. 
Conversely, Diffident sometimes knows when he doesn’t know. Say he 
makes an off-the-cuff comment that the QE245 can fit beneath the Sydney 
Harbour Bridge. Dauntless scoffs and asks him to put a modest wager on his 
claim. The mere discussion of money makes Diffident uneasy. Maybe he was 
wrong? His unease turns him off the idea and he refuses the bet until he feels 
confident that he knows. Here the feelings of dread count as evidence against his 
initial confidence. Upon checking their facts, it turns out the Sydney Harbour 
Bridge has a clearance of 49m46 and the QE2 is 2 metres too tall, rising 52.1m47 
above sea level. Diffident reviews his memories assiduously to find some 
explanation for his own confusion. He thinks he must have originally heard the 
story about the QE2 as a boy and forgotten the details. Worse, he reversed the 
pertinent fact about the ship—that it was marginally too big for the bridge. 
Diffident’s urge to check whether he knew forced him to reflect and revise his 
beliefs. Virtuously, Diffident quickly assimilated truthful propositions in light of 
                                                
45 The Queen Elizabeth II (QEII) was a famous ocean liner built in 1968. Her predecessor, the QE, was an infamous Allied 
troop carrier in World War II, who, along with her sister, the QM, were said by Winston Churchill to have shortened the 
war by one year. http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/26074619  
46 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sydney_Harbour_Bridge accessed 7 March 2013. 
47 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QE2 accessed 7 March 2013 
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skeptical pressure and disconfirming evidence. Do all people respond 
appropriately to skeptical pressure or disconfirming evidence? I will consider both 
in turn. 
The problems with KK are twofold: 1) You can believe that you do not 
know, but still know; and 2) You can believe that you know, but you do not 
know. Consider Diffident and Dauntless sailing past sunset to reach safe harbor 
behind Cedar Bay before a storm batters the North Carolina coast. Dauntless 
claims that she saw two flashes, 15 seconds apart, indicating that they have passed 
Cape Lookout lighthouse.48 She believes her calculations and continues to believe 
them strongly—even when challenged by Diffident—digging in her heels. It is 
critical to get their trajectory correct to get a safe night’s sleep, but a strong wind 
and a broad reach means they have sailed quickly away from perceptible 
additional lighthouse flashes. As it turns out, Dauntless either misperceived or 
misremembered the pattern of lighthouse flashes she saw earlier. Perhaps she 
mistook Diffident’s torch light—which she saw in the corner of her eye as she 
focused on trimming the mainsail—for a lighthouse flash? Perhaps she did not 
actually count the seconds, and instead estimated them poorly based on subjective 
time dilation (i.e., 7.5 seconds felt like 15 seconds).49 Either way, their actual 
position is just north of Cape Hatteras lighthouse (which flashes every 7.5 
seconds). Because of her mistake, their vessel is in open water and unable to berth 
safely. Dauntless does not know where they are, but, she believes that she knows 
and she knows that she believes that she knows. She can give good reasons for 
                                                
48 http://www.us-lighthouses.com/faq.php accessed 8th March 2013 
49 Subjective time dilation is documented during ‘action preparedness’, that is when a professional ball game player sees 
the ball coming towards them and must focus and plan their response (Hagura, Kanai, Orgs, & Haggard, 2012) 
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why she feels she knows what she knows, such as her experience sailing and 
navigating using lighthouse flashes in the past. The key point for our discussion is 
that her feeling of confidence is the same regardless of whether she does or does 
not know. The feeling of knowing is a fallible guide to knowledge.  
The opposite circumstance can apply too. That is, someone can know 
something, yet not know that they know it. Diffident—being more cautious 
generally—knew that they were north of Cape Hatteras Lighthouse. Perhaps he 
knew this because he accurately counted the light flashing 7.5 seconds apart, or 
because he perceived swirling black and white stripes across its column, rather 
than the black and white diamond shapes that define Cape Lookout? Either way, 
he does not feel confident. He knows where they are, but he does not know that he 
knows this. Thus, he assents to Dauntless’ confident dismissal of his skeptical 
concern. The feeling of not knowing is also a fallible guide to not knowing. 
What does this mean for Sosa’s distinction between animal and reflective 
knowledge? Animal knowledge does not require KK to be traditionally defined. 
Sosa’s ‘knowing’ equates to apt belief, but no introspective connection to this 
aptness. This means that I can know that I have a hand without any reflection 
about it. Of course, if knowledge is defined as ‘apt belief’ as a performance, then 
KK means having an apt belief about apt belief. This meta-aptness is reflective 
knowledge—a beneficial and valuable sort of knowing, but not one necessary for 
knowledge.   
Having knowledge requires an agent to have utilized reliable processes in an 
appropriate environment to achieve true beliefs. A reflective agent capable of 
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introspection and testimony will intuit whether they are in a state of disbelief, 
withholding, or belief, and they ought to have a sense of the degree to which they 
are in any of these three states. However, knowing whether they are in a 
knowledge state may be elusive to them. An agent may not know if or how their 
beliefs about beliefs are justified, or indeed whether they are true. This is okay, 
because agents do not need to have knowledge to be credible informants. 
Remember that for an agent to be virtuous, they just need to be reliable at gauging 
the likelihood of their non-belief/belief state.  
A “philosophically satisfying” account of reflective knowledge ought to be 
one where one’s reasons for trusting the faculty do not in themselves depend on 
the faculty. The beauty of reliabilism is that it does not rely on introspection to 
validate its operation. Animal knowledge is easy this way, but reflective processes 
also work regardless of how one understands how they work or can justify them 
to an enquiring skeptic. Our evidence of their success is measured by performance 
success, which is evaluated through our remembrances calibrated against 
testimony and epistemic artifacts in our external environment, such as written 
evidence, alerts and alarms, ordered physical spaces, and photos and videos. Our 
responsibility as reflective knowers is not to have a theoretical understanding of 
the mechanisms of reflective knowledge, but rather to adjust our trust in these 
capacities according to their performance context and success.  
Consider Sosa’s example of a hunter. A hunter does not need to know the 
physics of muscular-skeletal function in order to adjust her shot based on her 
perception of a change in wind conditions, visibility, or tension in her bow. 
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Similarly, the reflective knower need not know the levels of interacting 
mechanisms that produce human understanding. A reflective knower’s 
responsibility is to evaluate the context of knowing and adjust her confidence and 
her beliefs accordingly. The reflective knower’s reasons for trusting her faculties 
are limited to being able to report on the level of success of their prior 
performances. 
Sosa (Ch. 3 2011) claims that there is a sufficiency intuition for knowledge, 
meaning that once a particular justificatory threshold has been reached, it does not 
matter exactly how confident a person is in their belief past that point. His 
motivation is to create conditions for knowledge without the forbidding demands 
of certainty. An uncertain belief, believed with sufficient evidence to manifest 
knowledge, is apt (i.e., not flawed) (2011). Sosa gives the following example: 
Suppose that given the evidence at his disposal, Diffident should be extremely 
confident, while yet his great intellectual caution makes him much less confident. 
His belief may then still be highly justified epistemically, with the sort of full 
justification relevant to whether one knows. Diffident’s belief could then be 
justified, surely, even if he could properly be much more confident than he is, with 
justification to spare. Compare Normal, who has much slighter evidence than 
Diffident on the question at issue. Sufficiently weightier evidence could make 
Diffident better justified, and might even trump the fact that Normal’s actual degree 
of confidence is perfectly aligned with his ideal degree. (p.36). 
Sosa’s point is that as long as Diffident’s reasoning pushes him correctly 
past the threshold to belief (or disbelief), perhaps it does not matter precisely what 
degree of confidence he has in his beliefs? The same point can be made for the 
overconfident Dauntless.  
Is it epistemically insignificant for an agent’s confidence to be distant from 
the ideal? I argue that while a single instance of variance may not have 
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detrimental consequences for a particular performance, it is epistemically very 
significant in the longer term. Subtle degrees of confidence can have long-term 
impacts on epistemic success—thresholds are not the only things that matter. The 
Bayesian defense of formalized degrees of confidence or belief is that beliefs 
ranging across many degrees of confidence are rational components of decision-
making. Failure to discriminate gradations of belief carefully will lead to a 
guaranteed loss for an agent over the long term—incurring a Dutch book 
(Parmigiani & Inoue, 2009). 
2.4.4 ANIMAL KNOWLEDGE TWICE OVER 
A number of commentators (Goldman, 2008; Kornblith, 2009) have asked 
how reflective knowledge adds anything epistemically to what has been achieved 
via regular apt belief. Goldman asks, “if a first-level of reliability and non-
accidentality is inadequate to achieve genuinely human knowledge, why does an 
added layer of the same deficient stuff turn low-grade knowledge into high-grade 
knowledge?” (Goldman, 2008). Goldman cannot understand how the iterative 
mechanisms that produce animal knowledge could produce differentiated 
justification for higher order beliefs. Hilary Kornblith claims that Sosa’s reflective 
knowledge cannot gain justification beyond that established by animal knowledge 
unless Sosa adopts traditional rationalist (i.e., non reliabilist) justificatory 
apparatus. In the end, he considers reflective knowledge to be just ‘animal 
knowledge twice over.’  
Kornblith uses the case of ‘Norman’ to explain his concerns about using the 
same mechanisms of animal knowledge for reflective knowledge (2009). Norman 
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has a reliable capacity to form beliefs due to clairvoyance. He is able to form true 
beliefs about the future—for example, the US President’s whereabouts at a 
particular time psychically—but he is unable to defend this capacity. 
Additionally, he “does not have evidence of having a reliable clairvoyant 
capacity, and he has no beliefs at all about whether he has such a capacity” 
(BonJour, 1985). This supposedly qualifies as having animal knowledge, without 
reflective knowledge. Kornblith goes on to imagine ‘Aptly apt Norman.’ Aptly 
apt Norman has apt beliefs about his apt beliefs. Without being able to offer an 
explanation, he simply expresses his belief—“I just believe my belief about the 
President’s whereabouts is apt,” (Kornblith, 2009)—when asked about it. 
Kornblith argues that this explanation does not defend either the first order or 
second order belief. Thus, he states that “we cannot legitimately make the move 
from ‘aptly believed to be apt’ to ‘defensible’” (p. 129). 
I question whether Kornblith’s hypothetical scenario is a suitable test of 
Sosa’s views. Is Aptly apt Norman really ‘aptly apt’ if he has no evidence or 
belief of having a reliable capacity? Animal knowledge is forged from feedback 
within one’s environment. Second-order beliefs about the aptness of first order 
beliefs are also formed using precisely the sort of evidence that Norman lacks. 
Without feedback about our second-order beliefs, we are not in a position to 
defend them. Let me be clear, I do not mean that Norman ought to have feedback 
about the structure of his cognitive capacities, but rather that he does not have any 
feedback about the aptness of his performances. Norman fails to have aptly apt 
beliefs because he cannot report on previous performances, not because he is 
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ignorant of the mechanisms that create his beliefs. Norman’s belief, though true, 
is not integrated with any other beliefs. Thus, it is not surprising that Kornblith 
thinks that Aptly apt Norman’s self-examination confers no defense—it doesn’t.  
Yet, the failure of Aptly Apt Norman to have reflective knowledge does not 
bring down Sosa’s theory because it is unclear how Norman would believe that 
his beliefs about the president’s whereabouts are apt without any further 
explanation. If he is a normal sort of person, then beliefs of the sort he is 
experiencing would lack the right type of justification to count as aptly apt—or 
even apt. Now, if he had some sort of theory about clairvoyance (even its 
possibility) and this was a probable belief, then he might have some reason to 
suppose that his believing the President’s whereabouts might be apt. However, 
there is no indication that he does and, in any case, there is no clairvoyance. The 
difference between BonJour’s example and real cognition is that an organism gets 
continual feedback from the impact of their animal beliefs via the environment or 
social interaction. Animals build confidence via learning and experience. 
BonJour’s clairvoyant has no evidence for his capacity50. 
There are ways that animal knowledge and reflective knowledge can be 
built with iterations of similar processes to produce differentiated results. 
Reflective and animal knowledge are both forged in a Bayesian fire. Just as a 
blacksmith can create a wrought iron poker or decorative gate, the instantiation of 
animal and reflective knowledge is quite different. Animal knowledge 
                                                
50 One can imagine Kornblith responding that even if humans do not have Norman-style clairvoyance, it is logically 
possible that some beings do and that these beings have clairvoyant access to their first order competences sufficient for 
reflective knowledge (Ernest Sosa, personal communication, August 12, 2013). I agree that it is logically possible that such 
a capacity exists, but evolved creatures of earth are not so endowed, thus the relevant study of knowledge must be catered 
to human (or higher order animal) knowledge-generating competencies.  
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mechanisms are largely low-level, bottom up processes that systematically sort 
and categorize sensory experiences into basic beliefs and adaptive behaviors. 
Reflective knowledge mechanisms are largely high-level, top-down processes that 
systematically analyze and reconsider beliefs drawn from animal processes. 
Reflective knowledge yields ‘enlightened discovery’ (Sosa, 2009a, p. 146), which 
makes an agent better at evaluating beliefs and honing expectations and intuitions. 
Using and developing reflective knowledge improves the efficiency with which 
an agent achieves its goals. There need not be anything magical or ‘a priori’ about 
reflective knowledge—we build reflective capacity just as we develop other 
reliable processes. Cognitive scientists (Gallistel & King, 2009) and decision-
theorists (Bovens & Hartmann, 2004; Gwin, 2011; Hajek & Hartmann, 2009; 
Pearl, 1985; Talbott, 2011) suggest that Bayesian processes must underlie 
knowledge acquisition at all levels. 
Still, even if BonJour’s Norman is not a good example, it is reasonable to 
wonder how reliable animal knowledge could become rationally defensible 
reflective knowledge through the application of ‘the same stuff.’ How could 
‘dumb’ Bayesian processes produce enlightened Cartesian ‘scientia’? Is this just 
connectionism (Elman et al., 1997) or dynamic systems theory (Thelen & Smith, 
1996) redux? A new propositional approach using hierarchical, Bayesian 
processes (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012) may demonstrate how “meta-aptness 
imports some knowledge and understanding... of how one's first-order belief 
attains success” (Sosa, 2009b). A successful account of reflective knowledge must 
explain how a child develops adequate abstract, causal, or counterfactual 
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knowledge from iterations of animal knowledge. Thus, as I argue, the same 
Bayesian framework that makes sense of animal knowledge can be layered to 
function in particularly complex ways.  
2.5 THE THEORY THEORY OF REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
Sosa’s account of reflective knowledge coheres with work in cognitive 
psychology on how people develop theories of how the mind works—the so-
called ‘theory theory.’ The theory theory attempts to explain higher order belief 
revision by proposing that all humans, from babies to adults, come to understand 
the world abstractly by forming hypotheses and then rigorously testing them and 
updating them in light of evidence. The ‘theory theory’ supposes that children and 
adults develop or construct hypotheses of the world and alter them according to 
new evidence.  
Theories have a distinctive structure involving coherent, abstract, causal 
representations of the world, including unobservable theoretical entities. Higher-
level theories describe kinds of entities and relations more generally, rather than 
particulars within a domain. Theories have particular cognitive functions 
including predicting future events and interpretations of evidence, and they allow 
counterfactual inferences. Counterfactual inference might relate to what might 
have happened in the past, or to what would happen if something intervened in 
the present to affect the future. Theories that have been studied empirically 
include intuitive theories of one’s own mind and others (Gopnik & Wellman, 
2012), the biological world (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Bryant, 1997), the physical 
world (Gelman, 2003) and social world (Baillargeon, 2008). These theories 
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enable individuals to understand and predict phenomena in the world via 
counterfactual inference.  
As promising as the ‘theory theory’ research program has been, it has been 
quite vague on how theories are represented or what learning mechanisms 
underpin them. Rational constructivism (Xu, Dewar, & Perfors, 2009) uses the 
framework of probabilistic models, specifically Bayesian learning, to defend a 
new version of the ‘theory theory’ of cognitive development. The marriage of the 
‘theory theory’ with probabilistic models seems a promising way to map the 
development of reflective knowledge. New work being done on hierarchically 
nested probabilistic models (HNPM) shows how complex thoughts can be 
achieved through iterations of the same justificatory processes that underlie basic 
probabilistic processes. HNPM are structured, describing the relations between 
models and patterns of evidence in rigorous ways.  
HNPM show that higher order theories (e.g., about abstract ideas) can 
become inductive constraints on the interpretation of lower level theories—what 
Goodman (1983) describes as an overhypothesis. Higher order theories remain 
dynamic because they are updated in light of new evidence, unlike modules or 
‘core knowledge’ (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007) that remain fairly static. Unlike 
associationist structures, dynamic theories change at a high, broad level, not just 
at the level of particulars. It turns out that children and adults continually conduct 
informal experiments (exploratory play, observation, imitation, and intervention) 
in order to evaluate and revise their theories of the world. Cognitive development 
depends on statistical information about the probabilistic contingencies between 
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events. Models help individuals predict and hypothesize the abstract structure of 
the world from perceptual or low-level inputs. 
The capacity to form abstract theories from low-level data is known as ‘the 
inverse problem.’  In vision, the ‘inverse problem’ means inferring properties of 
three-dimensional objects from flat retinal images. The ‘inverse problem’ for 
theory change means inferring the causal structure of the world from observing 
events. The traditional problem for these sorts of inferences is that the set of 
possible hypotheses commensurate with available evidence is almost unlimited. 
Indeed, it is the intractable nature of the problem that has led theorists to suggest 
that theories of reality must be innate (Pinker, 1984).  
The difference between traditional modeling and newer, probabilistic 
modeling is the impact of Bayesian inference on reducing the scope of plausible 
hypotheses. Bayes’ rule limits the range of hypotheses under consideration by 
making a prediction about the probability of each hypothesis, such that one need 
only consider seriously the most likely under a Bayesian interpretation. That is, 
Bayesian methods allow individuals to determine the probability of the 
possibilities to reduce the range of plausible hypotheses. Gopnik & Wellman 
(2012) give the following example: 
Suppose Mary is travelling, and she wakes up with a terrible pain in her neck. She 
considers three possible hypotheses about what caused the pain: perhaps she has a 
clogged carotid artery, perhaps she slept in an awkward position on that wretched 
lumpy mattress, or perhaps it was that dubious lobster she ate last night. She goes to 
WebMD and discovers that both a clogged artery and awkward sleeping position are 
much more likely to lead to neck aches than bad shellfish—neck aches have a higher 
likelihood of occurring given a clogged carotid and awkward sleeping position than 
they do given ingestion of bad shellfish. In fact, Mary reads that clogged carotids 
always lead to neck aches—the likelihood of a neck ache given a clogged carotid is 
particularly high. Should she panic? Not yet. After all, it is much less likely to begin 
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with that she has a clogged carotid artery than that she slept awkwardly or ate bad 
lobster—awkward sleeping positions and bad lobsters have a higher prior probability 
than severely blocked carotids. If you combined these two factors, the likelihood and 
the prior, you would conclude that a bad night on the lumpy mattress is the most 
likely hypothesis. 
Eventually though, enough evidence could lead you to accept even an 
initially very unlikely idea. Sufficient additional evidence (the ache persists, an X-
ray shows blockage) might indeed lead to the initially unlikely and grim diagnosis of 
a clogged carotid artery. This gives Bayesian reasoning a characteristic combination 
of stability and flexibility. You will not abandon a very likely hypothesis right away, 
but only if enough counter-evidence accumulates (p.1088). 
Still, how effectively do Bayesian solutions reduce the set of possible 
hypotheses? By itself, Bayes’ rule is not sufficient. What is needed is a more 
complex application of Bayesianism, also known as ‘Bayes nets.’ Bayes nets are 
coherent, systematic, hierarchical sets of hypotheses, nested and interacting with 
evidence on different levels to interpret complex events using finite cognitive 
resources. These complex applications lead to HNPM.   
HNPM can account for multiple levels of knowledge, including: 1) abstract 
generalizations relating to higher level principles, 2) specific theories about a set 
of instances, and 3) particular experiences. HNPM explains how abstract 
generalizations arise from specific theories that are, in turn, learnt from particular 
experiences. What is strikingly different about these models (compared with 
classic empiricist, foundational accounts of knowledge acquisition) is that abstract 
generalizations can precede specific ones, as I explain below. 
Suppose many bags of marbles were placed in front of you and your job 
was to identify the color of the marbles in each bag (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). 
An experimenter takes a red marble out of the first bag and asks you what color 
you think the next marble will be.  She then goes on removing marbles from that 
bag, pausing between each one to ask the same question, and each time the marble 
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is red. The experimenter then repeats the procedure with the second bag of 
marbles. This time a succession of blue marbles appears. You will quickly assume 
that all the bags of marbles contain only one color. Predicting that the contents of 
any bag of marbles will match the color of the first one is an abstract 
generalization—an overhypothesis. Learning this overhypothesis precedes 
learning about the contents of bag 3 (for eample, that all marbles are purple). In 
fact, hierarchical Bayesian models make it just as easy to learn causal structures at 
several levels at once. As Gopnik & Wellman (2012) explain, “Probabilistic 
hierarchical Bayesian learners thus learn abstract structures alongside and even 
before the specifics that those regularities subsume”. These abstract structures can 
then be used to limit the scope of hypotheses considered at a range of levels. 
Reflective knowledge consists of beliefs that cohere across multiple levels of 
explanation.  
Work on HNPM is still in a very preliminary stage, and it is not yet clear 
how radically new hypotheses are generated from data. One possible addition is 
‘Quinean bootstrapping,’ where linguistic structures and analogical reasoning 
affect conceptual insight (Carey, 2009).51 Another suggestion is that new causal 
hypotheses are formed in exploratory, pretend, and imaginary childhood play 
(Buchsbaum, Bridgers, & Weisberg, 2012). Indeed, traditional adult methods of 
counterfactual reasoning and conjecture most likely play a role in the 
                                                
51 Although this suggestion (like all others) cannot explain which analogies—of the infinitely available numbers—are 
picked as suitable. Note that this is another example of the relevance problem that plagues all accounts. As Fodor (1983) 
explains, “how … does the machine's program determine which beliefs the robot ought to re-evaluate given that it has 
embarked upon some or other course of action?” (p.114). 
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development of reflective knowledge. However, cognitive science is yet to 
untangle the computational, algorithmic, or instantiation of these capabilities.  
In sum, reflective knowledge is not, as some have argued, merely iterations 
of defective animal knowledge. New work in HNPM suggests that many aspects 
of higher-level knowledge can be created iteratively from low-level processes. 
Newer probabilistic models can restrict the scope of hypotheses considered and 
explain how multiple levels of knowledge can be learnt at once. Brute, reliabilist 
processes can generate reflective knowledge if they yield cohering beliefs across a 
broad explanatory domain. 
How then should these findings affect our definition of reflective 
knowledge? I argue that a further condition ought to be placed on PEC that allows 
multiple hypotheses to be considered simultaneously and to be considered 
possible within the epistemic state of the knower. The principle of exclusion via 
coherence of multiple hypotheses PECMH is: 
PECMH: if one is to know that h, then h must be the most likely amongst a set of 
plausible hypotheses hm to hn that cohere with the rest of one’s beliefs at lower 
likelihoods. 
 Reflective knowledge requires the knower to believe the hypothesis with 
the greatest evidence and the greatest coherence with other beliefs, and to hold 
other, less likely (but possible) hypotheses within consideration. A Bayesian 
virtue epistemology values both knowledge and credences. Epistemology 
becomes not just the study of justified true belief then, but also the study of the 
processes of belief revision in response to confirming or disconfirming evidence. 
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Justification arises from the apt performance of reliable processes and their 
coherence with other beliefs.  
A significant problem still exists for a Bayesian virtue epistemology, 
however. How do we know that reliable Bayesian processes actually connect with 
the true structure of the world, rather than just an instrumentally valid facsimile? 
This skeptical concern is known as the ‘new evil demon’ problem, which I 
address it in the next section.  
2.6 NEW EVIL DEMON 
The new evil demon scenario is the idea that even though we feel as though 
our cognitive processes (perception, memory, and inference) are reliable, they are 
not because the world is not as it appears. Instead, the world is a fanciful hoax 
(Cohen, 1984). The main thrust of the argument is that there is no method a 
reliabilist could rely on to break out of the hoax, because the reliabilist toolkit 
consists entirely of mechanical processes that draw on (false) information from 
the external world to justify his beliefs. The worry is that a successful capacity to 
operate in the world does not necessarily mean that our beliefs correspond to an 
underlying reality (Comesaña, 2002). I offer two natural worlds (i.e., probable, 
consistent with natural laws and existing knowledge) to examine the new evil 
demon problem:  
1. A high epistemic standards world (HES), where accurate recollection of 
past events is socially very highly regarded:  
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2. A low epistemic standards world (LES), where recollection is either not 
valued, or is valued as an exercise in reinforcing a collective identity, but 
with less concern for truth.  
Anthropologists have found that autobiographical memory (episodic and 
semantic memory about oneself) develops quite differently depending on the 
cultural value placed on recollection (Fivush & Haden, 2003). Parents have a 
huge impact on their child’s aptitude for accurately recalling past events, which 
they build by discussing events as they happen and then forming and reinstating 
the past.  
2.6.1 HIGH EPISTEMIC STANDARDS WORLD 
 Maori children show earlier, richer, and more robust childhood memories 
than many cultures because of the value that is placed on the oral transmission of 
accurate facts about the past (Hayne & MacDonald, 2003). They live in a very 
high epistemic standards world (HES). In HES, Maori mothers create strong, 
accurate memories by talking with their children about events with elaboration, 
repetition, and evaluation. Maori mothers prompt their children for descriptive 
details about the larger context of the event, particular objects, and the people 
who were present. They include repetition, both within conversations and across 
conversations, to strengthen and preserve memories. They also repeatedly 
question and correct children to improve their accuracy. HES develops adroit 
children capable of strikingly apt beliefs about the past. 
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2.6.2 LOW EPISTEMIC STANDARDS WORLD 
In low epistemic standards worlds (LES), people get very little feedback or 
recrimination for holding false beliefs about their memories. There might be 
several reasons for this. Perhaps their world is one where individualism (hence 
autobiographical memory itself) is not valued. Or the world is one where an 
individual’s narrative is valued so highly that slight confabulations or even wildly 
implausible ‘memories’ are not held up to scrutiny. Leichtman, Wang, and 
Pillemer  (2003) found that when participants from India, a highly interdependent 
culture, were asked to recall specific childhood memories they could only produce 
general memories, even when pressed. This is in contrast to participants from the 
United States, an independent culture, who almost all produced a memory. It is 
possible that within cultures that value memories, a strong personal narrative can 
have such high value that characteristics of stories (i.e., their dramatic effect) may 
be more valuable than accuracy. In LES, it is more valuable to have an engaging 
false narrative than to withhold due to concerns for accuracy. In LES, memories 
are praised for the degree to which they cohere with the collective memories 
being woven by the group, rather than the extent to which the events described are 
truthfully retold. One can imagine a child at summer camp sharing stories around 
the campfire. If one child describes a terrifying incident with a raccoon that gets 
attention, other individuals may be tempted to confabulate or construct a memory 
to suit the occasion rather than acknowledge a less interesting episode. In LES, 
intentionally and deliberately forbearing from recounting a memory due to 
concerns about its accuracy is a less valuable social behavior than telling a story 
for entertainment with no other ramifications.  
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LES parental guidance with regards to the value of truth might be limited or 
absent. In its place, invention, creativity, adaptation, and deceit are central aids to 
survival. A rational child growing up in these circumstances does not experience 
the feedback and subsequent pressure to hone their memory judgments to be 
reliably descriptive of the past. Instead, they speak of their memories freely and 
confidently, weaving them into a long temporal autobiographical tapestry that 
warps with each retelling. Perhaps some individuals in these circumstances can 
still differentiate true and false memories, but, potentially deceitful methods and 
stories become so dominant that the individual no longer has normal mechanisms 
for differentiating content. They might believe that they are reliably indicating 
true from false memory, but in actual fact they are deceived.  
I take this LES world to be not unlike the new evil demon world—at least as 
it pertains to memory. Each individual in an LES world has in situ reliabilism, as 
described by Lyons (2012). Although it feels as though their memory processes 
are reliable, they are consistently deceived. LES offers a strong example against 
which a successful reliabilist theory must respond, and it is strong for two 
particular reasons. Firstly, the actual world may be a LES world or a near LES 
world. Normal people, or even highly trained epistemologists, might 
systematically endorse dramatic narrative and social coherence over truth in most 
instances, and this endorsement might be explicit or implicit. It might exist as a 
cognitive bias that is just as insidious as implicit racism in individuals who 
explicitly disavow racial stereotyping. Secondly, LES is a strong skeptical case 
because it creates a probable world for the reliabilist to solve.  
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Sosa (2009a) discusses a new evil demon case by the example of a young 
child brainwashed by a superstitious upbringing (p.36). The causal origins of the 
child’s beliefs and inference patterns means that they are subjectively rational 
agents, even though they are not objectively rational. Subjective rationality is “the 
status that a belief has when it would survive deep reflection by the subject in the 
light of her deepest epistemic standards (roughly)” (p.37). That is, it does not 
matter how well the superstitious child reasons—or correctly takes her 
experiences into account or remembers those experiences—because she does not 
have an apt connection with reality. In the end, for Sosa, knowledge is not just 
about truth and coherence. A sane individual must also be “adequately related, 
causally or counterfactually [to] the objects of one’s knowledge” (Sosa, 1997). 
The lack of an appropriate causal connection to reality means that the 
superstitious child does not know and is not a reliable agent.  
If this is true, then has the skeptic won? How do any of us know if our 
beliefs and experiences have led us to true, coherent, causally appropriate 
beliefs? We need to keep in mind that animal knowledge does not require that we 
know (with priority) that we are properly connected, only that the correct causal 
connection occurs (Ernest Sosa, private communication, August 12). Similarly, if 
we are in a position to have reflective knowledge, the reflective processes may be 
opaque to us, but this is not problematic so long as the right causal connection 
occurs between the reflective processes and the reflective belief produced by them 
(Ernest Sosa, private communication, August 12). Supposing these are the 
conditions for knowledge. is it not still possible that we have all been brought up 
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in an epistemically impoverished upbringing, which gives us the collective 
delusion of justification? 
2.6.3 THE SUCCESS OF SCIENCE ARGUMENT 
Can an external justification of reflective knowledge provide sufficient 
grounds to defeat the new evil demon? To address this, I use the success of 
science argument. The success argument—also known as the ‘no miracles’ 
(Carrier, 1991) or ‘ultimate’ (Musgrave, 1988) argument—claims that we should 
believe that scientific theories actually correspond to the world because these 
theories have such tremendous success. Or conversely, it would be a miracle if 
science had the predictive success it did, if its theories did not correspond with 
underlying reality. The success of science is so great—so the argument goes—that 
achievements such as the development of antibiotics, walking on the moon and so 
forth would be miraculous if science had not glummed onto some approximately 
true theory about the theoretical entities and natural laws underpinning these 
successes. Similarly, agents are successful in the world because they hold true 
beliefs. Human survival would be a miracle if humans held beliefs about how to 
hunt for food, build shelter, and care for infants (let alone the quirks of our mental 
states) if those beliefs did not correspond to an underlying reality52. Science is 
successful because its theories are scrutinized constantly and objectively in 
varying conditions. Similarly, the great success of individual cognitive agents 
navigating their life is due to those individuals hypothesis testing their beliefs and 
cognitive capacities against social and environmental feedback. We become more 
                                                
52 I recognised that the radical skeptic will not be mollified by this argument (Ernest Sosa, August 12, 2013). The target of 
my concern is a conservative skeptic who raises the serious problems in the normal world such as false memories, visual 
illusions and so forth, rather than brains in vats and so forth. 
  97 
 
and more able to successfully ‘perform’ our beliefs because we build up better 
and more approximately true representations of the world and our capacities 
within it. Reflective knowledge is justified because it has successive, successful 
performances, and because these performances are evaluated via external means, 
such as photographs, testimony, or written records. More importantly, reflective 
knowledge allows us to predict future performances, and to build expectations to 
be tested. 
Sosa’s reflective knowledge provides the knower with contexts of likely 
success just like a scientific theory provides type predictions for token instances. 
True scientific theories have descriptive and predictive success, particularly with 
regards to novel predictions. Similarly, ‘knowing full well’ enables an agent to 
make predictions about the sorts of contexts and circumstances that would put 
knowing at risk, and about how to mitigate against risk. Scientific realism states 
that only scientific theories that are ‘mature’ and ‘non ad-hoc’ count as real. 
Similarly, Sosa claims that individuals become better knowers over time. A 
human being begins life with naïve theories but develops more reliable, mature 
theories until an accident, dementia, or senility interrupts the proper processing of 
data. A reflective knower has a complex set of understandings of themselves in 
various environments and she evaluates her beliefs against a set of beliefs to 
ensure their coherence, even if the mechanisms of these reflections are invisible.  
If the success of science argument is analogous to the development of 
reflective knowledge, then some of same problems that beleaguer that argument 
need also to be addressed by Sosa. Chief amongst these is the claim that success 
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only secures the instrumental value of a scientific theory, rather than pinpointing 
truth. The evidence for instrumentalism is shown by the history of theory change. 
Each mature scientific theory gets close enough to aspects of reality to yield 
limited predictive success, but sure enough, a new theory replaces the old and the 
cycle continues—the pessimistic meta-induction (Laudan, 1981). Instrumentalist 
concerns are particularly analogous to reflective knowledge in new evil demon 
cases.  
It can be argued that taking the success of a theory to indicate truth is 
meaningless unless you know the base rate of approximately true, successful 
theories (Magnus & Callender, 2004; Stanford, 2010). Perhaps every theory has 
empirically equivalent rivals (Stanford, 2010)? However, Worrall (2007) argues 
against this concern by supposing that even a disproven scientific theory gets 
some facts right about the world and approximates the truth in an important and 
long-lasting fashion. He offers, as an example, the fact that Fresnel’s 
misidentification of the nature of light still conveyed truthful facts about the 
structure of optical phenomena such as the relative intensities of light in refracted 
and reflected polarized beams. In this case, the structural facts, (i.e., mathematical 
equations), survived theory change (Worrall, 2007, p. 51). 
Worrall (2007) argues that not all scientific progress is instrumental or 
interchangeable. Successful science does access at least some true facts about the 
world, even if the theories explaining those facts are ultimately replaced. As long 
as some truth or some reality is grasped by scientific theory progression, and more 
and more reality is uncovered with progress, instrumentalist concerns are not 
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destructive to scientific realism and particularly the success of science argument. 
Applied to reflective knowledge, Worrall’s argument would mean that our 
theories of how our mind works might be fallible, but they’re not groundless, nor  
are they merely coherent propositions. Our reflective knowledge actually 
approximates the truth and becomes more and more truth-baring and reliable as a 
result of experiences measured by performance success. These successes are due 
to the constancy of structurally true knowledge, even in the face of higher-order 
belief revision.  
Indeed, research shows that children hold multiple hypotheses 
simultaneously, rather than accepting one and rejecting another. Each hypothesis 
is given a probability by the child and revised in light of different evidence. For 
example, a child’s initial theory of natural kinds is morphological, but it becomes 
essentialist after being tested in the world. The slow, gradual change in belief 
“results in a characteristic series of related conceptions that forms a bridge from 
one broad theory to the next” (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). The multiple-
hypothesis concept is contrary to typical accounts of normal scientific progress 
found in Popper or Kuhn (1970), and to knowledge structures in epistemology.  
Typically, scientific research is conducted within a single theoretical 
framework agreed to by collective majority of scientists. Typical epistemic 
reasoning supposes that only a single hypothesis or theory can be held at any one 
time about a particular proposition. However, according to the multiple 
hypotheses account, beliefs held probabilistically cohere in a fuzzy or gappy 
fashion (Alxatib & Pelletier, 2011). Such an account abides by the principle of 
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exclusion via coherence of multiple hypotheses (PECMH) which states that 
reflective knowledge requires the knower to actively consider many possible 
hypotheses, but to bring to prominence, and act upon, the hypothesis with the 
greatest evidence and coherence with other beliefs.  
So, how do we defeat the new evil demon skeptic without begging the 
question? My answer is somewhat paradoxical. I argue that to defeat the skeptic 
we have to give in to him a little—i.e., we ought to join the skeptic in believing 
each skeptical hypothesis to an appropriate degree. There are many highly 
probable skeptical scenarios that we all face each day with regards to our 
memories and our cognitive faculties, and each hypothesis ought to be entertained 
to the degree that we have evidence for its likelihood. The answer to the new evil 
demon may be to relax about needing to ‘defeat’ the skeptic, if ‘defeat’ means 
being able to state categorically that hypothesis x or y is untrue or disproven.53 
The skeptics’ laments can be heard, yet our beliefs remain justified. What seems 
right about the evil demon threat is that knowledge is only possible with the right 
causal connection to the world, with a variety of other factors, including reliable 
faculties using Bayesian updating. These are the methods by which we adjudicate 
and ultimately come to know the world. 
2.6.4 NORMS OF BAYESIAN REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
Reflective agents are active hypothesis-testers who respond to well-founded 
skeptical concerns and opposing evidence. They assess new information relative 
to existing beliefs and they evaluate the role of incoherent information, but, they 
                                                
53 The naturalist has good reply to the unconvinced skeptic, see Devitt (2002) 
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are not unduly skeptical. They trust the reliability of their faculties in 
circumstances that justify it (such as driving a familiar car during clement weather 
on familiar roads), and they can also hold multiple-plausible hypotheses 
simultaneously. This is an important point. Entertaining multiple hypotheses 
means that an agent is in a state between belief and disbelief with a number of 
theories—playing both the skeptic and the advocate at once—and it is not the 
same as trusting reliable faculties. 
Some might be wary of this promiscuous consideration of hypotheses, 
supposing it to be indiscriminate, but this mischaracterizes the view. Surely it is 
better to speak of open-mindedness and responsible cautiousness (which Sosa 
(2011)refers to as withholding)? The withholding argument highlights the virtue 
in hedging one’s bets in the absence of appropriate evidence, so long as doing so 
does not interfere with one’s capacity to flourish in other areas. Withholding is a 
virtue as long as doing so does not interfere with flourishing regarding another 
matter. Take Sosa’s (2011, p. 4) hunter example: The hunter may withhold from 
shooting to ensure a good shot, but, they must not withhold forever. The hunter 
has an obligation to find food and must, at some stage, take appropriate risk to 
further this aim. Similarly, a wholly rational agent ought to adopt a belief about 
one hypothesis or another to some degree in order to function, but they should 
always be ready to reevaluate as circumstances change.  
Daniel Kahneman (2011, p. 154) notes that there are two essential 
competencies associated with explicit (i.e., reflective) Bayesian reasoning: 
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1. Anchor your judgment of the probability of an outcome on a plausible 
base rate. 
2. Question the diagnosticity of your evidence.  
Kahneman warns that base rates are notoriously forgotten when we consider 
the case in front of us and that we tend to jump to conclusions using only the 
evidence to hand (which he describes as the ‘what you see is all there is’ 
tendency). This tendency is absolutely prevalent. It drives an agent’s intuitions 
and impressions, regardless of the quality and quantity of the evidence, and any 
associations brought to mind by this evidence will be forged into a coherent story 
too enticing not to believe.  
In order to have a reasonable chance of strongly confirming a true 
hypothesis, the following additional virtues (Gwin, 2011) also need to be 
cultivated: 
1. Open-mindedness: Seek alternate hypotheses because the ones we are 
currently considering may not be right. 
2. Adaptive: Consider new plausibility considerations based on reevaluations, 
revisions, and alterations of background knowledge. Avoid fixing the prior 
probabilities of any hypothesis.  
3. Objective: Create testing environments where the two hypotheses differ 
with regards to the objective likelihoods of possible outcomes. Keep the 
environments as objective and unbiased as possible with regards to one 
hypothesis versus another. 
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Gwin (2011) argues that these virtues ought to guide groups of scientists as 
they plan, write, conduct, and write up their experiments, but can these principles 
be applied to individual epistemic endeavor?  
The first virtue—open-mindedness—suggests that we ought to keep 
considering new hypotheses. The obvious danger with such a dictate is that it 
would demand that we test every possible hypothesis in order to use Bayesian 
logic effectively. Humans must reason efficiently to meet other social and 
individual goals, thus it is not rational for us to consider all hypotheses. Luckily, it 
has been shown that only plausible hypotheses need to be considered (that is, 
hypotheses where the prior probability has been set extremely low can be left to 
the side of one’s calculations). After continual testing, all the remaining, plausible 
hypotheses—including the true hypothesis Hi—will become overwhelmingly 
more strongly confirmed than all the other hypotheses. As mentioned in §1.7.3, 
ascertaining ‘plausibility’ is an area that pure Bayesian analysis (or Bayesian 
psychology) has difficulties answering, but this is a problem for many epistemic 
theories.  
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I proposed that apt belief is sufficient for knowledge when it 
is adroitly produced in the service of meeting an agent’s goals, and that restricting 
knowledge to the domain of an agent’s interest reduces the risk of infinite regress 
or concerns of insufficiency. I also introduced the concept of ‘quasi-apt’ beliefs to 
describe the reliable processes that create defensible and valuable degrees of 
belief that do not necessarily equate to knowledge. According to this view, 
credences that pass a certain threshold for action are knowledge if they are: a) true 
and b) produced aptly (true in virtue of adroit processes). The story so far looks 
promising. However, there are some problems that need to be addressed. Precisely 
how do quasi-apt and apt-beliefs interact? That is, how do Bayesian credences 
merge with Virtue apt beliefs? For example what does it mean if an agent is 
reasoning correctly using Bayesian methods and begins testing a hypothesis that 
has a fairly low prior, but nevertheless is true? Say, a police officer is at the 
beginning of her investigation of a cafe robbery and considers the hypothesis that 
the thief is a retiree. Now, the officer has never arrested a retiree for any crime, let 
alone seen a retiree convicted. But, being a diligent law enforcement agent, she 
considers the possibility that the retiree stole the money because he was a 
customer at the crime scene just prior to the incident. Still, the officer puts more 
weight the hypothesis that that the cash was misplaced or stolen by a barista or 
waitress. Now, suppose that in fact, the retiree was the guilty party and did steal 
the cash. What is the doxastic state of the officer when their credence for H < .5, 
yet H is true? Their hunch is justified because it is reliably formed using approved 
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and reliable Bayesian methods and it is true—the retiree did steal the money. Her 
hunch is not an accident or lucky. Her hunch is true in virtue of apt processes. 
Yet, there is something not-quite-right to say that their early intuition or hunch 
constitutes knowledge of H. It seems like a hypothesis with a low prior is not 
effective enough to count as knowledge. The intuition then is that a hunch must 
go through rigorous evaluation with respect to evidence in order for the agent to 
come to believe it to be true (i.e. to assign a high enough probability that it hits a 
functional threshold for belief or knowledge). Justifying the police officer’s 
degrees of belief cannot easily be solved by either virtue epistemology or 
Bayesian epistemology alone. Virtue epistemology needs apparatus to manage 
and value subtle degrees of belief. Bayesian epistemology cannot explain 
knowledge attribution or its absence. 
Meta-apt beliefs are higher order beliefs that constitute reflective 
knowledge. Reflective knowledge works iteratively through processes that are 
similar to those employed for animal knowledge—imparting greater wisdom and 
reliability through widening its context of successful operation. Joining together 
Bayesian processes with virtue epistemic theory means that similar justificatory 
apparatus can be used for animal and reflective knowledge, and that reflective 
beliefs may be forged from complex, hierarchical, nested Bayesian processes.   
I conclude this chapter by arguing that reliable processes succeed gradually, 
by drawing an analogy between individual knowledge development and the 
growth of scientific knowledge. Under this conception of reflective knowledge, 
only those skeptical scenarios with high prior probabilities ought to be evaluated 
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and considered by a rational agent, and reflective knowers ought to exist in a 
constant state of reevaluation with regards to their evidence, beliefs, and 
hypotheses. Reflective knowledge depends on the accurate assignment of prior 
probabilities and the justification-bolstering impact of explanatory beliefs, both of 
which depend on an adequate account of coherence as a source of justification—
the topic of the next chapter. 
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3 HOW COHERENCE AND COORDINATION JUSTIFY BELIEF 
“Now that you accept A and B and C and D, of course you accept Z.” 
“Do I?” said the Tortoise innocently. “Let's make that quite clear. I accept A and B 
and C and D. Suppose I still refused to accept Z?” 
“Then Logic would take you by the throat, and force you to do it!” Achilles 
triumphantly replied. “Logic would tell you ‘You ca'n't help yourself. Now that 
you've accepted A and B and C and D, you must accept Z!’ So you've no choice, you 
see” (Carroll, 1895). 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Coherentism is the view that beliefs are justified in so far as they cohere 
with one another, and it is typically seen as distinct from foundationalism—the 
view that beliefs are justified from foundational sources of knowledge (e.g., 
perception, memory). Coherence is a relation of mutual support, consistency, or 
agreement between a set of beliefs (Plantinga, 1993; Sosa, 1980) that informs how 
inconsistent data from cognitive faculties, instruments, or testimony ought be 
treated (Talbott, 2011). Coherence among true beliefs offers prima facie evidence 
that a belief is true. For example, if a witness reports seeing the suspect at 
midnight, and this evidence aligns with the time and place of the crime, then 
surely the report gains some justification, regardless of the reliability of the 
witness? A measure of coherence can justify accepting information or explaining 
why information is rejected, as well as shedding light on inference to the best 
explanation (Weiner, 2012) and hypothesis selection (Quine & Ullian, 1970). 
Coherence is also important for traditional internalist virtues (e.g., logical 
consistency) and as such it may help Bayesianism justify the attribution of prior 
probabilities. However, coherentism is plagued with difficulties defining and 
formalizing its benefits. This chapter moves through some of these challenges and 
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argues for a new theory of coherentist justification that fits a hybrid Bayesian 
virtue epistemology. 
Coherence, by itself, is an insufficient justificatory source as is suggested by 
the fact that a set of falsehoods can cohere without yielding the truth. A logical 
next step is to bolster coherence with reliability to ensure that beliefs are 
adequately grounded in foundational sources such as perception and memory. 
Weak foundationalism holds that beliefs are grounded by reliable basic processes, 
and that they gain justification to the degree that they cohere with beliefs from 
other reliable processes. Weak foundationalism is supported by both traditional 
epistemologists (BonJour, 1985) and Bayesian epistemologists (Lewis, 1946; 
Olsson, 2012; Olsson & Shogenji, 2004). Each belief can be evaluated and 
reviewed against all other beliefs in an agent’s ‘web of belief’ (Quine & Ullian, 
1970) in order to improve the agent’s reliability overall—belief holism.  
While weak foundationalism seems promising, Klein and Warfield (1994) 
make the startling claim that more coherent sets, even those formed reliably, are 
often less likely to be true than less coherent sets.  
What we wish to point out is that coherence, per se, is not truth conducive; that is, 
we will argue that by increasing the coherence of a set of beliefs, the new, more 
coherent set of beliefs is often less likely to be true than the original, less coherent 
set. 
In essence, they argue that whenever an additional belief is added to a 
coherent set of beliefs, the likelihood that a belief is false increases. As each belief 
is added to a coherent whole, the likelihood that a belief is false increases. Holism 
means that a maximally coherent set of beliefs is almost certain to contain 
falsehoods—thus negating the purported benefits of coherence. 
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I overcome this objection by declaring holism to be false. Beliefs are not 
justified by cohering simultaneously with a whole system nor are beliefs justified 
locally. Instead, coherence adds justification choristically. I use the term 
‘chorism’ (see §1.2) to explain how limited sets of mutually supporting apt beliefs 
improve performance success in a context C, towards goal G. At any time tn, an 
agent has sets of justified cohering beliefs that may be inconsistent with other sets 
of beliefs. Sets of beliefs are revised and coordinated by the agent in turn, and it is 
this coordination of cycling sets of beliefs that best explains epistemic success. 
Achieving performance success requires not only coherence, but also distinction 
between sets of beliefs, and it is the ebb and flow of coherence and distinctness 
that leads to homeostatic epistemology (see Chapter 4). 
In this chapter, I begin (in §3.2) by summarizing the argument for weak 
foundationalism, specifying how beliefs with low initial degrees of warrant 
contribute to an agent’s success, and outlining some principles of coherence. In 
§3.3, I discuss holism, including cross-level coherence. In §3.4, I provide an 
explanation of a Bayesian coherentist account. In §3.5, I present the concern that 
coherence does not lead to truth and respond to this concern (in §3.6) before 
presenting an argument for coherence as maximal fittedness in §3.7. In §3.8, I 
advocate the value of distinction as a third source of epistemic justification, and in 
§3.9 I defend justification as the coordination between cohering and disintegrating 
sets of beliefs.  
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3.2 WEAK FOUNDATIONALISM 
Foundationalism attempts to “axiomatize” knowledge, then bootstrap from 
basic beliefs to complex ideas—see Sosa’s (1980) account of the ‘pyramid’ of 
foundationalist justification. Both empiricists and rationalists have tried to justify 
beliefs with foundationalist approaches—consider Hume's program of 
impressions that iteratively build to abstract ideas, or Descartes justification of 
beliefs generated from first principles that were themselves derived from self-
evident truths—but both have failed to explain how normal, everyday beliefs 
count as knowledge. Most beliefs do not arise from self-evident truths or fully-
informative sensory information, which is one of the reasons coherence is 
valuable, as it is meant to shore-up beliefs generated through fallible or dubious 
processes such as perception and memory. Furthermore, it is a means of managing 
possibly inconsistent or incomplete data. 
However, by itself coherence has a limited capacity to justify beliefs—
indeed Schlick thought that relying on coherence was “an astounding error” 
(Sosa, 2009a, p. 82). A madman, for example, could have a coherent set of 
delusional beliefs that have little bearing on reality and this obvious fact is known 
as the isolation objection (Olsson, 2012), which suggests that an internally 
consistent system offers little insight to either truth or reality. Related to this 
objection is the alternative systems objection, which raises the possibility of two 
independently coherent yet incompatible theories. Avoiding the isolation and 
alternative systems objections has led some philosophers to a weak 
foundationalism.  
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Weak foundationalism assigns a special warrant to highly reliable beliefs 
and then applies coherentist principles to scaffold a theory of knowledge 
(BonJour, 1985; Lewis, 1946). BonJour calls foundational beliefs “cognitively 
spontaneous” and Lewis calls them “supposed facts asserted.” Cognitively 
spontaneous facts are not acquired by inference, but rather by highly reliable 
faculties such as sense perception, memory and introspection (BonJour, 1985). 
Lewis’ account is more moderate, however, in that he requires ‘supposed facts 
asserted’ to have some measure of warrant for them to be useful within a 
coherentist justification of belief.  
One advantage of weak foundationalism is that coherence raises the 
justification for beliefs with very low degrees of warrant, but a disadvantage of 
this approach is that the weak foundationalism appears to result in very low levels 
of knowledge of the external world. Perhaps it can identify true properties of 
physical objects and such, but how is abstract knowledge justified? Even 
perceptual success in the world may not set apart coherent theories—e.g., both 
Diffident and Dauntless could navigate across the Atlantic Ocean with a sextant 
regardless of Diffident’s belief in a geocentric solar system and Dauntless’ 
heliocentric inclination. Even weak foundationalism may not be sufficient for 
higher order justification. 
BonJour (1985) attempts to improve weak foundationalism by defining 
coherence beyond mere consistency, to the mutual inferability of beliefs in the 
system and relations between these beliefs. He suggests that five principles 
govern coherence (pp. 97-99): 
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1. A system of beliefs is coherent only if it is logically consistent. 
2. A system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilistic 
consistency. 
3. The coherence of a system of beliefs is increased by the presence of 
inferential connections between its component beliefs and increased in 
proportion to the number and strength of such connections.  
4. The coherence of a system of beliefs is diminished to the extent to which it 
is divided into subsystems of beliefs which are relatively unconnected to 
each other by inferential connections. 
5. The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to the 
presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system. 
BonJour’s notion of coherence is that the beliefs in question must cohere 
with the individual’s other beliefs, and not simply with some externally justified 
system of beliefs. I take BonJour to be largely right about coherence, but 
specifically, I concur that a system of beliefs is minimally coherent iff it is 
logically and probabilistically consistent. The coherence of a system of beliefs is 
increased by the presence of inferential connections between its component 
beliefs and it increases in proportion to the strength of such connections. 
Coherence is decreased, meanwhile, by the presence of unexplained anomalies in 
a system of beliefs, or by its division into inferentially unconnected subsystems. 
As this chapter progresses, I will argue that coherence adds justification 
when cohering beliefs increase the explanatory value of a set of beliefs towards 
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some goal, not necessarily in proportion to the number of inferential connections 
between beliefs. In any circumstance, there is an optimal set of beliefs and 
inferential connections that improve outcomes for the agent. If the optimal theory 
is right, then adding beliefs may increase the likelihood of truth to a point and 
additional beliefs thereafter may decrease the likelihood of truth. The greatest 
number of inferential connections occurs in reflective knowledge, and a lower 
number of inferential connections would occur in animal knowledge. 
3.3 HOLISM 
Hornblower's mind completed the solution of the problem of the effect of the rudder 
at the same time as his senses solved it empirically (Forester, 1950)  
Holism offers a different approach to justification. According to this view, 
beliefs are equal members of a ‘web of belief’ (Quine & Ullian, 1970), more like 
a ship being rebuilt on an open sea (Neurath, 1983/1932) than a pyramid standing 
on its apex. As Sosa (1980) eloquently states: 
…our body of knowledge is a raft that floats free of any anchor or tie. Repairs must 
be made afloat, and though no part is untouchable, we must stand on some in order 
to replace or repair others….what justifies a belief is not that it be an infallible belief 
with an indubitable object, nor that it have been proved deductively on such a basis, 
but that it cohere with a comprehensive system of beliefs.  
Holism allows justification to flow downwards from rational considerations 
and upwards from perceptual beliefs. In this way, holism brings together 
internalist and externalist preferences, and beliefs are informationally integrated 
(Fodor, 1983; Weiskopf, 2008). Informational integration stems from Fodor’s 
notion (1983) of isotropy, where justification for a doxastic state may be gained or 
lost due to changes elsewhere in the subject’s doxastic state. Informational 
integration based on isotropy requires existing beliefs (and desires, hopes, and so 
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on etc…) to be updated “in concert” to reflect the impacts of new beliefs 
(Weiskopf, 2008). Extending Neurath’s metaphor, beliefs are not reviewed 
individually when attention is directed to them, but instead are simultaneously and 
implicitly re-considered when new beliefs are formed. As Weiskopf (2008) 
explains: 
Informational integration is a relation that sets of mental states bear to one another 
such that a change to one such set causes appropriate changes in other, relevantly 
related sets of states. To count as a belief a state has to be part of a system of states 
in which processes of integration and updating function to keep the subject’s mental 
contents in epistemic equilibrium to some degree or other. The hard work of spelling 
out how informational integration works requires saying under what circumstances a 
set of states is relevantly related to another and what changes count as appropriate 
(p.5). 
Weiskopf explains the process of epistemic equilibrium by discussing the 
impact of discovering that a married couple has divorced on one’s beliefs about 
their addresses. Weiskopf comments that “integration is part of the everyday 
dynamics of belief” (p.6) and they can occur either implicitly or explicitly. He 
imagines that while rapid, implicit mechanisms operate below the level of 
conscious awareness, conscious processes are slower and more deliberative. 
Though these conceptions are not central to the concept of informational 
integration, they are supported by the decision-making literature (Kahneman, 
2011) and in line with Sosa’s (2007) distinction between animal and reflective 
knowledge.  
Sosa refers to integration as ‘cross-level coherence’: 
Proper reflective knowledge will after all satisfy requirements of coherence, which 
means not just logical or probabilistic coherence of the respective belief contents, 
but also the mutual basing relations that can properly reflect such coherence among 
the contents. Cross-level coherence, from the object to the meta, and conversely, is a 
special case of such coherence, and it imports ‘guidance’ of the animal belief by the 
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relevant meta-beliefs (or in other words, basing of the former on the latter) (Sosa, 
2011, p. 13 footnote) 
What is clear from Sosa’s description is that he agrees with the first two of 
BonJour’s criteria: logical and probabilistic consistency. Cross-level coherence 
entails that animal beliefs and reflective beliefs agree, even though reflective 
beliefs have greater justification.  
Take, for example, the sailor Dauntless on her ocean-faring yacht. She has 
an apt animal belief that the boom is about to swing across the boat. Her animal 
knowledge is built up from quite complex muscle memories from many 
experiences tacking across the wind. She has tactile memories of the way the 
wind changes its impressions upon her face as the boat swings dead into the wind, 
then grips orthogonally the other way. She knows when to duck her head. This 
animal knowledge is justified. Even more impressively, if asked about why she 
ducked her head at the precise moment she did, she can justify that decision with 
reflective knowledge of sailing theory. She can explain how the boat lists 
starboard on a port tack, how it stabilizes directly into the wind, and how the 
boom comes across just as the boat begins to list towards port and wind collects in 
its sails. Dauntless’ reflective beliefs cohere with her animal knowledge.  
Plantinga (1993) raise an objection to coherentism, however. He argues that 
a subject could go his whole life without managing to achieve logical consistency 
across his beliefs. If coherence is necessary for knowledge, then we could not 
possibly know anything. Conversely, if we do know, then some less onerous 
notion of coherence must be agreed upon. Plantinga argues that we must not aim 
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for possibility in the broadly logical sense, or even first-order logic, but that we 
instead should aim for a weak coherence: 
Weak coherence: impossibility that would be obvious after a certain degree of 
reflection. 
Nonetheless, even weak coherence spells trouble for knowledge. It is 
unclear that humans have sufficient reflective capacity to always determine that 
beliefs are incoherent, yet they are still knowledgeable in many ways.  
Another criticism stems from the lottery paradox (Gwin, 2011; Hawthorne, 
2004a), where an individual might rationally believe the ticket they are holding 
will not win, and yet, simultaneously know that there is at least one ticket in the 
lottery that will win. If this person went through each purchase of all the tickets, 
they would be conflicted due to the conjunction of all their beliefs not leading to 
the reality that one ticket will indeed be the lucky ticket. No matter of reflection 
or ‘weak coherence’ can overcome this contradiction. The lottery paradox 
prompts a Bayesian analysis of belief where the probability that any particular 
ticket will win is very small and the probability that the ticket will lose is very 
high. The Bayesian argues that it is rational at each purchase to believe the 
objective probability of getting a winning ticket—it is not inconsistent to 
acknowledge uncertainty and take objective chance at each decision. If Bayesian 
means can help interpret the Lottery paradox, perhaps it can also inform the 
notion of coherence itself? To explore this question, I turn to a weak 
foundationalist Bayesian model of coherence.  
  
  117 
 
3.4 BAYESIAN COHERENCE 
Coherence between propositions promises to fix the vexing circumstance of 
prior probabilities for Bayesianism (de Finetti, 1980). Prior probabilities require 
the knower to either know the base rates of the phenomena being considered or be 
justified in assigning equal likelihoods to each hypothesis. One way to circumvent 
a lack of knowledge that is pertinent to evaluating a proposition is to ensure that 
the prior coheres with existing, justified beliefs. It is worth noting this is only a 
problem for subjectivists. Objectivist Bayesians assign priors based on objective 
chances or frequencies. Subjectivists aim for beliefs to cohere with probabilistic 
axioms to avoid possible Dutch book scenarios. This section examines how 
subjectivists treat coherence. 
Ewing (1934) took a consistent set to be coherent if each element followed 
by logical deduction from the rest considered together. Consider the following set 
of propositions: 
T1 = a triangle is made of three lines  
T2 = the sum of interior angles equals 180 degrees 
T3 = all lines connect with the vertex of each other line.  
Each element of this set is consistent with the other elements and, more 
importantly, each follows deductively when the others in the set are considered 
simultaneously. Although Ewing’s definition captures a maximal sense of 
coherence, it fails to capture the intuitive (albeit weaker) sense of coherence used 
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in common circumstances. Olsson (2012) considers the following propositions, 
where 
A = “John was at the crime scene at the time of the robbery” 
B = “John owns a gun of the type used by the robber” 
C = “John deposited a large sum of money in his bank account the next day” 
Intuitively, these three propositions are coherent, even though individually 
they do not deductively follow from the remaining two. It does not follow that 
John was at the crime scene at the time of the robbery because he owns the same 
gun as the robber and he deposited large sums of money in this bank account the 
next day. B & C offer circumstantial evidence for A, but they do not provide 
deductive evidence for A. The same logical processes can be applied to all three 
propositions to show that Ewing’s definition is too strict.  
Lewis (1946) improved on Ewing’s theory by arguing that propositions 
‘support’ one another if they raise the probability that a proposition is true. Here, 
‘support’ is used in a weak probabilistic sense, rather than a strict logical sense.  
Weak probabilistic support: P supports Q if an only if the probability of Q is raised 
on the assumption that P is true. 
Lewis’ definition explains why we think circumstantial evidence ought to 
be brought together. He argued that congruence between evidence collected from 
independent and partially reliable witnesses ought to increase our confidence in a 
hypothesis. As he explains: 
For any one of these reports, taken singly, the extent to which it confirms what is 
reported may be slight. And antecedently, the probability of what is reported may 
also be small. But congruence of the reports establishes a high probability of what 
they agree upon, by principles of probability determination which are familiar: on 
any other hypothesis than that of truth-telling, this agreement is highly unlikely; the 
story any one false witness might tell being one out of so very large a number of 
equally possible choices. (It is comparable to the improbability that successive 
drawings of one marble out of a very large number will each result in the one white 
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marble in the lot.) And the one hypothesis which itself is congruent with this 
agreement becomes thereby commensurably well established (p.246) 
Lewis says that even moderately reliable witnesses contribute something 
evidential towards evaluating hypotheses so long as there is a non-zero prior 
probability that their report is right. Consider two competing hypotheses. There 
ought to be a rational way to determine how the evidence collected should be 
evaluated with respect to each hypothesis. For example, if there are two suspects 
in a murder, there would be much overlapping evidence (such as crime scene 
evidence) and eye-witness report evidence, but there would be background 
information on each suspect that would affect how likely we might consider the 
evidence surrounding the crime.  
Bayesian approaches to coherence create a procedure for deciding between 
hypotheses. First, the Bayesian asks: How expected is the result? There may be 
historical precedents, personality traits or circumstantial factors that set up a base 
level of likelihood that each suspect was involved in the crime. Second, a 
Bayesian asks: How reliable is the evidence? Evidence stemming from highly 
reliable sources, such as DNA-matching experts, ought to be considered more 
seriously than less reliable sources (for example, an absent-minded bystander’s 
eye-witness report). Third, a Bayesian treats coherent evidence more seriously 
than incongruent evidence. So, if the absent-minded bystander claims he 
remembers orange headphones on one suspect and another eye-witness 
remembers seeing an .mp3 player, the coherence of their testimony ought to raise 
the seriousness of their claims. Bayesians treat the third of these, coherence, as 
ceteris paribus claims (i.e., all else being equal, evidence that is coherent is 
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preferred over incoherent evidence). In other words, coherence is the least 
valuable of the three considerations above, and knowledge about the prior 
likelihood of an event and the reliability of the evidence is of the greatest value 
(e.g., highly reliable DNA-test results trump coherent evidence from less reliable 
sources).  
In addition to the non-zero prior, Lewis’ theory requires both a positive and 
a negative thesis: The positive thesis is that coherence increases the posterior 
probability that x occurred with the number of consistent beliefs. The negative 
thesis is that the coherence of independent items of evidence has no impact on the 
probability of a conclusion unless each item has some credibility of its own. The 
outcome is that the degree of congruence is inversely related to the prior 
probability of the supported hypothesis, so agreement on something antecedently 
improbable gives rise to a high degree of congruence and should lead to notable 
belief revision. 
There has been a response to this account regarding whether a prior 
probability must be greater than 0, which some commentators saying ‘no’ 
(BonJour, 1985; Siebel & Wolff, 2008) and others saying ‘yes,’ with some 
restrictions (Roche, 2010; Van Cleve, 2011). BonJour (1985) argues that “[w]hat 
Lewis does not see, however, is that his own [witness] example shows quite 
convincingly that no antecedent degree of warrant or credibility is required” 
(p.148). BonJour supposes that the independence of witnesses, so long as their 
accounts cohere, is sufficient to “eventually dictate the hypothesis of truth telling 
as the only available explanation of their agreement” (p.148).  
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The intuition BonJour is alluding to here is the unlikelihood of two 
independent witnesses coming up with cohering propositions without good 
reason—the most likely reason being that they both saw the same thing and are 
reporting on it. How could two people easily imagine the complex details of an 
idiosyncratic event? The worry, as Bovens and Hartmann (2004) point out, is that 
people can imagine cohering ideas because they are the most obvious, rather than 
because they have specific knowledge relating to an event. For example if one 
asks a westerner to think of a fruit, they often say ‘banana’ because it is 
associatively connected (see Ch.4 Kahneman, 2011). There are typical or socially 
acceptable suggestions that may attract credit and status for the individual, but 
these may have been generated through sheer guesswork, and may have no 
bearing on what actually occurred.  
Below, I outline Olsson’s (2012) argument that some antecedent degree of 
warrant must exist for coherence to bring justification. Consider the following two 
testimonies. 
Let E1 be the proposition that the first witness reports that A, and let E2 be 
the proposition that the second witness reports that A. Consider the following 
conditions:  
Conditional Independence 
P(E2|E1,A) = P(E2|A) 
P(E2|E1, ~A) = P(E2|~A) 
Nonfoundationalism 
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P(A| E1) = P(A) 
P(A| E2) = P(A) 
Coherence Justification 
P(A|E1, E2) > P(A) 
The conditional independence requirement means that there would be 
nothing connecting testimonies apart from seeing the actual event in question, 
thus ensuring no influence or communication between the parties, and no third 
party interference to adulterate the probabilities. Nonfoundationalism states that 
by itself, neither testimony offers insight on the probability of A (replicating the 
circumstances where neither witness’ testimonies have any prior probability). The 
coherence justification claims that when considered together, coherence between 
two reports does provide justification, and therefore does increase the likelihood 
of A. From conditional independence and nonfoundationalism it follows that:  
P(A|E1, E2) = P(A) 
Thus, as Olsson (2012) says, “combining collectively independent but 
individually useless testimonies, however coherent, fails to give rise to anything 
useful.” Note the difference between nonfoundationalism and weak 
foundationalism. 
Weak foundationalism 
P(A| E1) > P(A) 
P(A| E2) > P(A) 
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Weak foundationalism with conditional independence implies coherence 
justification. The combination of cohering testimonies increases the likelihood of 
A more than a single testimony, and in this way, coherence can boost credibility 
or justification even if it cannot do so from scratch (Van Cleve, 2011). Employing 
apparatus from foundationalism is one way to save coherence from the isolation 
objection—the worry about how purely internal relations could specify the 
conditions of an external reality.  
There are other characterizations of independence and nonfoundationalism 
(e.g., Huemer, 2011), although their power to explain various intuitions has been 
questioned (Olsson, 2010; Scheibehenne, et al., 2012). Contrary to Huemer’s 
view, the value of conditional independence has been shown in the success of 
Bayesian networks (Pearl, 1985, 2000) and standard applications of probability 
theory (Scheibehenne, et al., 2012). Even BonJour (1999) has retracted his earlier 
coherentist position. 
3.5 COHERENCE DOES NOT LEAD TO TRUTH  
If some variant of weak foundationalism is indeed the way to save 
coherentism, what follows now? The idea might be that ideal epistemic agents 
ought to constantly improve the coherence of their beliefs, and that coherence—
with reliable foundations—will eventually lead them to truth. However, Peter 
Klein and Ted Warfield (1994) (henceforth KW) suggest a disturbing situation 
where, contrary to expectations, a higher degree of coherence can in fact lower 
the probability of a set of beliefs. KW’s counterintuitive result comes from the 
following argument from their paper: 
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In order to show that a coherentist must prefer coherence to truth, only two premises 
are needed: 
 
(P1) Any consistent set of beliefs, B, is more likely to be true than any set, B*, 
which contains all members of B and at least one additional belief, so long as at least 
one additional belief in B* has neither an objective probability of 1 nor is entailed by 
B. 
 
(P2) One strategy for converting a less coherent set of beliefs into a more coherent 
set of beliefs is to add a belief (to the less coherent set) which has neither an 
objective probability of 1 nor is entailed by the less coherent set of beliefs. 
 
(C) a more coherent set of beliefs resulting from the addition of a belief to a less 
coherent set of beliefs is less likely to be true than the less coherent set of beliefs 
(Klein & Warfield, 1994, p. 130). 
KW defend P2 by claiming that a set of beliefs can be rendered more 
coherent in two basic ways: 
(a) the Subtraction Strategy in which a belief (and perhaps with it many more) is 
subtracted from a less coherent set, thereby rendering it more coherent; 
(b) the Addition Strategy in which one or more beliefs are added to a consistent set 
of beliefs to render the set more coherent (Klein & Warfield, 1994, p. 130). 
They also acknowledge a third strategy that employs both (a) and (b).  
I take issue with P1 and P2, which leads me to reject C as a consequent of 
P1 & P2. However, there is much clarity to be gained from discussing both the 
argument and my own defense of coherence that emerges from it. 
First I wish to address the commitments of P1. Is it necessarily true that any 
consistent set of beliefs smaller than another consistent set of beliefs is more 
likely to be true, where a belief added to the larger set is not entailed by the 
existing beliefs and objective probability ≠ 1? Suppose I am reliably looking at 
my hand and I come to believe I have a hand. Is it any less likely to be true if I 
also form beliefs that I have a thumb, forefinger, a wrist, and so on based on the 
same perceptual experience? One can logically have a hand with no fingers, so 
having fingers is not entailed by seeing a hand. Perhaps KW would reject my 
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example because they expect new beliefs in a set to have to been generated via 
independent processes? Supposing that is true let us imagine that I believe I have 
a hand because I have a perceptual experience of my hand and I have a memory 
that I saw my fingers yesterday. These perceptual and memory beliefs were 
independently generated,54 are consistent, and they form a larger set. Is it less 
likely to be true that I have a hand and that I saw my fingers yesterday, than the 
likelihood that I have a hand?  
Ceteris paribus, the more beliefs one has, the more likely they were 
generated in ways that make them false. But, for any particular set of beliefs, it is 
not obvious that the larger set must be less likely than the smaller set when all 
relevant information is considered. Suppose I am just living in the normal, 
mundane world, with perceptual processes and memory processes operating 
reliably in normal conditions. In this context, the larger set of beliefs about my 
hands and fingers could be just as likely to be true as the belief that I have a hand. 
That is, there are plenty of exceptions that make P1 false. Nonetheless, the ceteris 
paribus intuition does have some value. We may not know, for example, whether 
we are in good conditions or bad conditions, which means that perhaps we ought 
to assume that larger sets of beliefs are more likely to be false than smaller sets of 
beliefs? For now, I put this issue aside and turn instead to the question of whether 
KW notion of coherence in P2 is correct. 
                                                
54 One might argue that the memory of seeing my fingers yesterday is not independent because it is foundationally justified 
by a perceptual experience akin to the one I am now having. However, I will treat the two perceiving instances as 
independent due to differences in context, where some aberrant factor may have influenced my judgment (e.g., perhaps I 
only dreamt that I saw my fingers yesterday and I have misremembered this dream as a veridical perception). 
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In P2, KW claim that coherence can be increased through the addition of a 
logically consistent belief that does not have an objective probability of 1 and is 
not entailed by the less coherent set of beliefs. I want to separate the notion that 
coherence is simply a synonym for ‘logically consistent’ from the more nuanced 
notions introduced by BonJour (1985) and Lewis (1946). BonJour pointed out that 
coherence involves logical consistency—the strength and number of inferential 
and explanatory connections between beliefs. (Notice that KW explicitly remove 
entailment from P1 and P2—a point that I get back to in §3.6).  I will refer to 
these more nuanced ideas about coherence as I proceed through this discussion, 
but the first explanatory connections relevant to coherence that I consider are 
informativeness and explanatory relevance. 
Coherence as a source of justification is not merely a matter of the number 
of logically consistent beliefs, but also the degree to which they are informative to 
each other—and by 'informative', I mean in Shannon's (1948) sense of increasing 
the probability of the other beliefs in the set by being true. Consider the 
hypothesis BD and the radio report RR:  
BD: The bushfire will destroy Farmer Bob’s barn.  
 
RR: The bushfire has shifted its path westwards. 
Hearing a radio report RR may be evidence in support of BD. However, 
other reports—such as internet reports of the destruction of houses along the fire’s 
path or the heat of the fire— do not bear on BD, despite being logically consistent 
with BD and RR,. In fact, there are an infinite number of beliefs that are logically 
consistent with BD but have no relevance to evaluating BD. The beliefs that 
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increase coherence amongst beliefs—as a source of justification—are those that 
increase the likelihood that the hypothesis is correct, but KW do not take 
informativeness or relevance into consideration in P2.  
Critically, relevance is not just informative relative to the hypothesis, 
because if epistemology is an agent-centered endeavor (as virtue epistemology 
and Bayesian epistemology recommend), beliefs relevant to the hypothesis must 
also relevant to the goals, capacities and context of the agent. While the 
firefighter’s goal is to prioritize limiting the loss of life, the farmer’s goal is to 
minimize the destruction of his barn. Each individual has a domain of competence 
that will affect the justificatory value of a belief to the coherence of a set, and the 
firefighter’s belief BD and the farmer’s belief BD may both be justified within 
different integrated sets of beliefs. The firefighter’s belief BD might be inferred 
from his beliefs, RR, FD and BFD. 
FD: the bushfire will destroy all properties west of Flowerdale 
 
BFD: Farmer Bob’s barn is west of Flowerdale 
On the other hand, Farmer Bob’s belief BD is justified perceptually and 
through testimony (RR). Both Farmer Bob and the fireman believe the same radio 
report RR that the fire has shifted its path, but they use that information 
differently to justify their belief BD. In sum, the value of coherence as a source of 
justification depends on whether when a belief is informative and relevant to the 
goals and context of an agent, rather than whether it is logically consistent with 
other beliefs.  
Olsson (2012) recasts KW’s argument from the perspective of information: 
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P1: Coherence can be raised by adding more information that explains the 
information already in the set.  
P2: The more information in the set, the more likely some elements are untrue. 
C: Coherence is not truth-conducive. 
Olsson (2012) illustrates this argument in the following way. Suppose there 
are two sources of information about Tweety. Jane says that Tweety is a bird and 
Carl says that Tweety cannot fly. The resulting set S is not particularly coherent. 
After all, typical birds can fly, so it would be odd if Tweety was a bird and could 
not fly. However, suppose a third source presents a third piece of evidence about 
Tweety, informs us that Tweety is a penguin. This new set, S’, consists of three 
statements and seems more coherent than the first set. It is explanatory, and more 
information has increased coherence. KW argue that the likelihood of all three 
statements being true is less than the likelihood of two statements being true, 
which means that the conjunction of fewer propositions is more probable than the 
conjunction of more propositions. As a result, more coherence does not imply a 
higher likelihood of truth in the sense of higher joint probability. 
Olsson also argues that the joint probability of a set of reported propositions 
is as follows.  
A1 = “Tweety is a bird” 
A2 = “Tweety cannot fly” 
A3 = “Tweety is a penguin” 
The less coherent set of S consists of A1 and A2., whereas the more coherent 
set S’ consists of A1, A2, and A3. Intuitively, if C denotes the degree of coherence, 
then: 
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C(A1,A2) < C(A1,A2,A3). 
Yet, given the increased informational content of S’, it is less likely than the 
smaller set S: 
P(A1,A2) > P(A1,A2,A3). 
This formulation treats the propositions as facts, instead of what they are: 
testimonies. Olsson reformulates this on the basis of testimonial evidence. Keep 
in mind that reports from different witnesses might have different reliabilities that 
might affect the outcome. 
E1 = “Jane reports that Tweety is a bird”  
E2 = “Carl reports that Tweety cannot fly” 
E3 = “Rick reports that Tweety is a Penguin” 
Using the principle of total evidence, 55 the true probabilities are: 
S is P(A1,A2 | E1, E2)  
S’ is  P(A1,A2,A3 | E1, E2, E3). 
However, even when the problem is restated in these terms, smaller sets are 
more likely to be true than bigger sets (2012).56  
P(A1,A2 | E1, E2) >  P(A1,A2,A3 | E1, E2, E3). 
So, have KW and Olsson shown that increased coherence reduces the 
likelihood that a set of beliefs is true? I believe that the problem is not a problem 
                                                
55 One of the features of Bayesian confirmation theory is that “a rational believer will proportion her confidence in a 
hypothesis H to her total evidence for H, so that her subjective probability for H reflects the overall balance of her reasons 
for or against its truth” (Spiegel, 2012). 
56 Even if the restatement does not resolve K&W point, Olsson’s reformulation suggests that all evidence must be taken 
into equally account (beliefs, testimonies etc…). Coherence operates not just on testimony, but on testimonies that have 
been reflectively considered in light of other evidence. 
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of coherence, but rather is a problem coherence as it has been formally 
constructed by KW and Olsson (2012).  
Let us return to Olsson’s example of Tweety. The purpose of S and S’ is not 
to form a set of consistent true beliefs, but rather to determine what Tweety is.57 
Tweety turns out to be a penguin, which means that the only belief necessary for 
the maximum coherence of the set, qua explanation, is E3 (assuming E3 is reliably 
formed). The fact that E1 and E2 exist and are logically consistent with E3 does not 
add much justification to E3. To demonstrate this, I use KW’s subtraction strategy 
P2 (a). Examining the set [E1, E2, E3], we should subtract E1 and E2, because they 
are entailed by E3. That is, the fact that Tweety is a penguin entails that Tweety 
cannot fly and that Tweety is a bird. We would only keep Ex in a set if it added 
explanatory information, e.g., suppose additional evidence E4 exists. 
E4 = “Sarah reports that Tweety is 60 million years old” 
Adding E4 may add information, but it does not affect the coherence of the 
existing beliefs because it does not change the credence of any of the beliefs. 
However, if Tweety turns out to be a Waimanu penguin—an ancestral penguin 
that is classified as a bird and probably also capable of flight (Slack et al., 
2006)—then E2, (‘Tweety cannot fly’), may be explanatorily inconsistent (though 
logically consistent), and therefore should be subtracted from the set. One of the 
problems Olsson appears to have is the problem faced by classical 
conditionalization that no learning episode can be undone by further applications 
of the same rule (see §1.7.3). The way humans justify beliefs is by choosing those 
                                                
57 KW have a similar purpose in their example of a crime scene, they wish to identify a murderer. 
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most explanatory, regardless of the order in which information is learned. The 
point here is that the normative value of coherence to the truth of a set of beliefs is 
more than logical consistency or even informativeness but explanation, more 
precisely, explanation relative to some goal. Adding a belief to a set raises the 
probability of another belief in the set when it plays the appropriate role, which I 
define it in the next section.  
I want to end this section by noting KW and Olsson’s excellent 
observation—that increasing beliefs in a set increases the odds that some of them 
are false—is a problem fallible belief-producing processes generally, not a 
problem for coherence per se. I take the threat of increasing beliefs seriously 
enough to suggest in addition to reconsidering coherence, we must also redefine 
the justification of beliefs relative to limited choristic sets, rather than beliefs 
considered holistically.  
3.6 WHAT IS COHERENCE? 
In P2, KW define coherence as consistency separate to implication, but 
removing implication actually side-steps what coherence is. Coherence adds 
strength to independently and reliably informed beliefs in virtue of its 
implications (that is, its relationships and explanatory connections to other beliefs 
in a set). Beliefs that add coherence add logical glue to the existing beliefs in the 
set. Some beliefs, because they fail to add understanding or depth, may not 
increase these relations, and therefore not increase coherence. Coherence is all 
about the relations between beliefs, and not necessarily (or even generally) 
deductive relations, but also inductive relations (e.g., I believe the swan I just saw 
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is white and the swan I’m seeing now is white) and abductive relations (e.g., the 
most likely explanation for beliefs p1, p2 and p3 is that my car was towed away). 
However, coherence goes even further than these relations; beliefs cohere with 
other beliefs due to causation, contiguity and natural laws, as well as semantic, 
temporal, or conceptual associations and processes. 
In trying to make sense of these varied connections, I am reminded of Lewis 
Carroll’s (1895) parable, of What the Tortoise said to Achilles. In the parable, the 
obtuse tortoise points out to an exasperated Achilles that the paradox of logic is 
that you always seem to need to add further premises in order to make the jump 
from a set of premises to conclusion. This prompts the question, is there ever 
enough coherence between our beliefs to adequately justify them? Quine & 
Ullian(1970) addressed aspects of this dilemma by situating fundamental beliefs 
more centrally in his web of belief so that there was some order within the whole, 
but, explicating precisely the relationship between fundamental beliefs and 
peripheral beliefs is yet to be agreed on or formalized. Trying to understand the 
relations between beliefs and how they entail or connect with one another—and 
when any finite set of beliefs is enough for some goal in a particular context—
remains the central puzzle of coherence. 
One distinction that that should be made explicit is the difference between 
coherence as a description of relations between beliefs and coherence as a 
normative notion that plays a justificatory role in raising the probability that 
beliefs are true58. Beliefs may cohere with one another poorly, such as when a 
                                                
58 Thanks to Michael Devitt for making this distinction clear to me (personal communication, August 18, 2013). 
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person justifies their drunk driving by explaining that they have been drunk 
driving for 20 years and have not yet had an accident, and argues that they are 
therefore unlikely to have an accident in the future (a misuse of induction based 
on confusing his extraordinary luck with application of skill). For the sake of the 
rest of the discussion, please assume that when I mention coherence, I refer to 
normative coherence (i.e. that coherence raises the likelihood that a belief is true 
when it arises as a result of an appropriate application of normative rules of 
inference).  
I consider a coherent set of beliefs to be a set that is satisfactorily held 
together. By removing implication, KW’s notion of coherence is equivalent to 
stacking a load of matching planks next to one another, eschewing fastenings, and 
complaining that there is no house, only planks.59 Of course no house exists—a 
house is built when planks are put together in an emergent way that produces an 
object greater than its parts. The relationships between beliefs are the nails, glue, 
and joinery that form greater knowledge. Coherence is the joining together of 
beliefs. To be fair, some beliefs can be the joinery and some behave as planks, 
and sometimes beliefs butt against one another weakly. Some beliefs (to stretch 
the analogy) like a bridle joint, add strength because they have overlapping 
implications, while some are superfluous in many contexts, but are needed under 
great stress (perhaps a virtue of reflective rather than animal knowledge?). Other 
beliefs are part of a contingency design, which will ensure that the roof remains 
even when some planks or other joinery fail or rot. Beliefs that yield coherence 
                                                
59 And the more planks one stacks, the more likely some of the planks will be termite-ridden or suffering  from fungal rot. 
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can be hidden premises that ensure entailment, and by making hidden premises 
explicit reflective justification improves. It is also possible that non-beliefs are the 
fastenings. Perhaps the rules of logic and inference, like the rules of grammar, are 
not explicitly represented in the agent’s cognitive architecture (Devitt, 2006)? In 
truth, we do not yet know the relations that precisely define or justify coherence, 
but we know that they must exist, otherwise there could be no house. Is there a 
way forward with coherence that limits the danger of endlessly increasing the 
number of propositions, and therefore increasing the odds of falsehoods? 
A cohering belief that makes a set of beliefs more likely to be true must add 
logical glue and relational fastenings—i.e. explanatory clarity. Sets of unrelated 
but consistent beliefs are not coherent, and they add danger (increase likely 
falsehood), without adding veritistic benefit. Ironically, KW hint that they 
understand this in P2 (a) and (b), where they note that either adding or subtracting 
beliefs can bring more coherence. This suggests that KW appreciate that 
normative coherence represents more than logical consistency; instead, coherence 
reaches some maximal point for some set of beliefs for some goal. So what makes 
someone remove a belief to make something more coherent? Removing or adding 
a belief is based on how contributive to the truth the belief is. 
I argue that there might be a maximally coherent set of beliefs for which no 
further propositions would be informationally or explanatorily useful to justifying 
a belief for the agent in a context towards a particular goal. Limiting the number 
of beliefs in a set is one method for reducing the threat of falsehood through ever-
increasing propositions. Note that this is contrary to the typical Bayesian 
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solution—that it is always better to add more informative propositions to increase 
the probability that a hypothesis is true. As a normative guideline, the Bayesian 
answer to coherence leads to an infinite search for more information relevant to a 
hypothesis. By adopting ideas from virtue epistemology, however, I presume that 
meeting a threshold for cohering beliefs can suffice for knowledge and this offers 
a way to limit how many propositions must cohere.   
3.7 COHERENCE AS MAXIMAL FITTEDNESS  
Why do KW and Olsson—and holism more generally—suppose that 
increasing the number of logically consistent propositions ought to increase 
justification? I argue that this intuition is not about justification, but rather is 
about detail or comprehensiveness. Our ideas do not necessarily become more 
coherent because we have more of them. Instead, I argue that coherence is a 
measure of how well propositions fit together to serve some goal in a particular 
context. Suppose there was a maximum fittedness. Just as there is a perfect 
cohesion between carved pieces of green oak to make a wood frame for a home, 
there is a perfect level of cohesion between any number of propositions to serve 
some purpose of the agent (see Figure 3.1). There is nothing to be gained by 
adding more pieces of wood to the frame once the ideal construction has been 
built. The frame’s job is to be sturdy and mutually supportive. Once this has been 
achieved, its job is done. The best solution is the most efficient and effective.  
Efficient: Requires the least wood (cheap and environmentally sensitive) and the 
wood chosen lasts the longest (and grows harder and becomes more sturdy over 
time).  
Effective: Can hold up the roof, is suitable for long-term weather conditions, allows 
the greatest distance between supports for windows, doors and so forth. 
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Analogously, one ought not clutter or clog the mind with inefficient or 
ineffective facts. For example, having true beliefs about how many grains of sand 
exist on the beach is pointless (Pritchard & Turri, 2012). Conceiving knowledge 
as just objective facts calls its value is in question, but, if knowledge is defined as 
a) relative to an agent and b) relative to an agent’s goals, then knowledge is not 
clutter. The intuitive pull of the ‘grains of sand’ example is the pointlessness of 
such facts to actually help anyone achieve anything. The value of beliefs is that 
they progress a creature to some end.60 As such, coherence as a source of 
justification should not aimless consistency or an infinite number of connections 
between beliefs, but rather should offer connections that allow the agent to 
achieve success. After all, the propositions that define a triangle are mutually 
supporting and do not need any more propositions—see Ewing’s (1934) original 
definition.  
                                                
60 It is not relevant here to delve into the details of the value of the agent’s goals. Perhaps there are objectively valuable 
actions—such as making moral decisions, or making decisions to improve one’s health or happiness or the health and 
happiness of others?—Or are there subjectively valuable actions such as putting in the least effort, being comfortable or 
getting a thrill? Regardless, the answer to this has little bearing on my point. 
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Figure 3.1 Cohesion as maximal fittedness. A set of beliefs (Boc) is maximally 
cohesive when it reaches the maximal likelihood for performance success for an 
organism in a particular circumstance. The optimal cohesion balances the benefits of 
beliefs adding explanatory strength to existing beliefs with the risk of adding too 
many irrelevant beliefs. 
What are the consequences of coherence if it is defined as maximal 
fittedness, and if, for any set of propositions, coherence increases up until they 
reach an optimal point. Less coherent sets are those that do not manage to serve 
their function ideally—like a green wood frame missing an arch. There would be 
some coherence, some success achieved by the construction, but it would be at 
some risk—slightly unsafe to use Sosa’s (1999) terminology. Note that not just 
any additional wood (proposition) would do; only the missing pieces add 
coherence. Similarly, a poorly coherent set of propositions would not be made 
more coherent just by adding more propositions that add little additional strength 
to the case.  
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Consider the following example: A single security camera that captures the 
thief’s face on film is useful to identify a suspect. Once this footage is obtained, 
no further security cameras are necessary to prove the thief’s identity. The footage 
of many security cameras may increase the total information, but it does not 
improve coherence unless the additional cameras do more than place the thief at 
the crime scene (e.g., they show the thief stealing a particular object). 
Propositions to increase coherence must be shaped finely to add to the mutual 
supportiveness of the set, but (unlike Ewing’s stringent demands on mutual 
coherence) no one proposition must be useful to all other propositions. Instead, 
each proposition must have a relationship with some subset of propositions to 
build a strong component of the entire structure.  
A skeptic might wonder if there is such a thing as a single optimal set of 
beliefs. What if there are many different optimal or close-to-optimal solutions that 
work in different ways? For example, there are many near-optimal ways of 
playing chess, and each grandmaster has their optimal playing style. In response 
to this criticism, it is worth pointing out that while there are differences between 
these playing styles, grandmasters share many of the same strategies and 
techniques. There are books of agreed lore on the strategy and tactics of chess that 
underpin much of the grandmaster’s success; for example, principles such as 
‘control the center’, ‘develop the pieces as rapidly as possible’ or even the simple 
‘avoid having your pieces taken.’ (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, p. 283). Similarly, 
there are some agreed rules of inference (Oaksford & Chater, 2007) (mondus 
ponens, modus tollens, biconditional introduction etc.) and explanation (Hempel, 
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1965; Salmon, 1971, 1984) (e.g. deductive-nomological model, statistical 
relevance, causal mechanical etc.) to improve coherence (as a source of 
justification). My view does not depend on a single set or arrangement of beliefs 
necessarily and sufficiently described. Optimality is measured in terms of success 
for the agent, and optimal means that a person has balanced finite resources to 
resolve their current predicament. Did the grandmaster win the game? Did they 
win their game faster than another person or retain the most pieces at its 
conclusion?  
A skeptic might also point out that most of our belief sets are not optimally 
cohesive, but rather are satisficing (see Figure 3.2). We are justified because we 
get enough of what we need to get by, and striving for optimality does not mean 
that we fail if we ‘just get by.’ Sosa (2009a) supports the idea of ‘sufficiency’ 
with regards to coherence. He states:  
It is very hard to see how to draw a line above which lie the degrees of 
comprehensiveness and coherence that suffice for knowledge…compare a concept 
like that of being tall. That is presumably to be defined in some such way as this: 
being sufficiently taller than the average. Presumably someone just infinitesimally 
taller than the average is not tall. One has to be taller than the average by some 
margin, one has to be ‘sufficiently’ taller than the average. But how do we define 
that margin? Is there, even in principle, some way to capture our actual concept of 
tallness by means of some such definition? There seems no way. Yet we do surely 
have and use a concept of tallness, do we not? Why can’t we view epistemic 
justification similarly in terms of “sufficient” comprehensiveness and coherence? 
(Footnote, p.150) 
Sosa supposes that epistemic justification is a matter of finding sufficient 
coherence above a certain threshold, and it seems right that satisficing coherence 
meets a minimal level to ensure performance success—see Godfrey-Smith (2001) 
for a discussion of satisficing as it pertains to evolutionary adaptation. 
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Figure 3.2 Cohesion as maximal fittedness plus satisficing cohesion conditions that 
meet a threshold for performance success.  
One consequence of the view that coherence is maximal fittedness might be 
that removing one proposition would have disastrous consequences on the whole, 
rendering it suboptimal. Certainly, such a rigid structure would never work in the 
flurry of uncertain reasoning. It must be kept in mind that a green wood frame is 
designed to hold up a home. It does not necessarily require a particular design: A 
frame might hold up the roof with fewer propositions using different shapes; it 
might hold up the roof with existing propositions arranged differently; and it may 
hold up the roof with a few more propositions. Similarly, the mind does not 
depend on only one set of beliefs by which to glum onto the truth, and it does not 
depend only on sight or only on touch. Sets of beliefs can be rearranged 
(imagined, considered, deliberated on) to test different structures. Rearranging 
sets is the process of hypothesis testing—of finding what structures are possible 
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given the number of beams, just like a game of trying to build 3-D shapes from a 
set of match sticks. The main point is that coherence does not increase along with 
the number of consistent propositions. Instead, coherence hits a threshold when a 
set of propositions enables the agent to perform optimally (although most of the 
time agents are in a process of flux with their beliefs, attuning them and revising 
them in response to, or in anticipation of, their changing environment).  
Coherence means more than just ‘mutually supportive’, or ‘consistent’. 
Coherence requires an ideal number of propositions to achieve some goal, and 
this is where coherence and consistency differ. While coherence is relevant to an 
agent, consistency is only relative to belief (objectively measured). My approach 
treats coherence as a limited interdependency that supposes that a limited set of 
beliefs functions better than the individual beliefs would if they were treated 
separately. This is not the same as encapsulation, because beliefs are mostly not 
locked away from other beliefs.61 Consider the mutual support of green oak 
timber planks for a house: There are a set number of planks required for a 
particular design no more (and no less) are needed for ideal coherence.  
3.8 THE VALUE OF DISTINCTNESS 
In this section, I justify epistemological distinctness between beliefs.62 The 
value of coherence lies in its role as part of a two-stage process of belief revision. 
Sometimes incoherence (between subsets of our beliefs) is necessary and it 
prompts us to ‘go back to square 1’, ‘reset’ thinks, or ‘shake things up.’ We reach 
a dead end, where we have achieved great coherence, but a not-so-great design. It 
                                                
61 Beliefs can work in functional, computationally limited sets, yet still be cognitively accessible to other sets of beliefs. 
Unlike cognitively impenetrable modules described in the Modularity of Mind(Fodor, 1983). 
62 Separate to the metaphysical notion of distinctness in Descartes (Hoffman, 2002) 
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is better at these points to disassemble the set into its constituent parts and 
reconceptualize what we want. Slavish devotion to coherence can leave us 
vulnerable to changing contexts. To use the analogy of the sabre tooth cat, the 
canines get longer and longer in order to target specific prey (goals), but if the 
prey become extinct (context change), the cat will become extinct too because 
they cannot adapt to the new circumstances (Van Valkenburgh, 2007). To be 
adaptive, coherence must be balanced with disintegration or distinction.   
Disintegrative processes ought to be implemented when our systems begin 
to be sluggish—like a computer that needs its hard drive defragmented. Notice, 
for example, the value put on ‘analytic work’ in analytic philosophy—insights 
emerge from isolating and disentangling ideas from one another. Taking beliefs 
out of context allows the philosopher to focus on them without the influence of 
other ideas. Consider also the value in ‘unbiased’ observation,63 where putting 
aside preconceptions and expectations makes us realize that we sometimes do 
need to overhaul our approach to ideas to find the truth. A relentless focus on 
coherence will not lead to truth. Useful philosophical work occurs within a set of 
assumptions, relations, and outcomes that can then slot into other sets of beliefs, 
but limited sets can be tinkered with without sinking the ship of reason. 
Consider the concept of a ‘fast deck’ in trading card games. Trading card 
games require players to build strategic decks of cards from hundreds of possible 
cards and then play against one another. If a player selects a fast deck, she has 
selected cards that will help her to move efficiently through them for maximum 
                                                
63 Even though totally unbiased observation may be impossible (Chalmers, 1989) 
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effectiveness (e.g., awarding more actions such as attacks or buys). However, 
selecting a fast deck requires a great deal of skill, and novice players are revealed 
by their slow or ‘flabby’ decks, which they have selected because they overvalued 
expensive power cards and underappreciated the value of cards that work with 
other cards to produce larger effects. A flabby deck stops cards circulating 
quickly, which prevents double or triple plays or synergistic power-ups. Flabby 
decks depend on too many rounds to wash through the cards. A deck with the 
wrong cards or too many cards fails to get the player what they need, when they 
need it. Sets of beliefs, like decks of cards, should be fast. Beliefs work best in 
efficient, collaborative groups, not added merely to have more. The risk of ‘flabby 
beliefs’ is real in memory research, where remembering too much from one’s past 
can prevent one from remembering pertinent facts today (Nairne & Pandeirada, 
2008), or being able to make distinctions (Luria, 1987). 
Work that involves discrimination and distinction is important, and it is 
necessarily separate from synergies and interdependencies found in synthesis. In 
fact, most of the time, we believe little enclaves of propositions to a certain 
degree, despite an awareness that they do not perfectly cohere with the entire 
body of knowledge we rely on. Of course, there is nothing new in these ideas. 
Thomas Kuhn famously argued that the progression of science depends on 
periods of revolution rather than normal science. Given what we now think it is 
plausible to think of children as young scientists, testing hypotheses, it is 
reasonable to suppose that children (and adults) go through doxastic periods of 
stability and disintegration. If coherentism means to converge, connect, and 
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decipher a single message from a set of data,64 then multiple-hypothesis-holding 
means to diverge, separate, and elucidate many interpretations from a set of 
data,65 and both convergence and divergence have their place. 
Distinctness is a source of justification when we can ascertain no necessary, 
causal, or explanatory connection between one set of beliefs and another. 
Rationalists might defend distinctness by alluding to the clarity of understanding 
or declaring the analytic truth of a set of beliefs. A virtue-Bayesian, however, 
justifies distinctness when a set of accurate beliefs (produced by adroit processes) 
is sufficient for a particular agent to perform successfully in a particular context. 
Take my belief that it is snowing outside and my belief that a diner has smoked 
meat sandwiches. My belief that it is snowing is part of a larger set of beliefs 
about weather and visual perception. My belief that a diner has smoked meat 
sandwiches is part of a set of beliefs about common menu items in Montreal 
diners. These sets of beliefs are valuable distinct from one another so long as no 
pertinent facts from one set affect the other. No menu information from the latter 
set will affect the weather. However, it may be that the diner does not have 
smoked meat sandwiches today because it is snowing and the delivery van could 
not deliver.  Here the agent still knows that it is snowing, but now fails to know 
that there are smoked meat sandwiches at the diner. This failure of knowledge is 
easily explained by the missing belief connecting weather conditions and smoked 
meat delivery, but the newly integrated set of beliefs leads the agent to different 
                                                
64 Convergent thinking involves linking together three separate ideas through one unifying idea, (for example, noting that 
food, forward, and break can all be united with the word ‘forward’) (Guilford, 1967). 
65 Divergent thinking involves coming up with multiple explanations, such as the multiple uses for a brick (Schulkin, 2003, 
p. 4). 
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sorts of knowledge as their beliefs are updated. Of course, many beliefs remain 
distinct and irrelevant (for example, knowledge of my niece’s birthday in six 
months time). A distinct credence (i.e. treating a proposition as probable that does 
not cohere with other, existing beliefs/propositions) remains valuable in so far as 
it obeys Bayesian norms in being valued proportionately with the circumstances 
and evidence.  
However, distinctness can be problematic when a proposition conflicts with 
other beliefs.   Davidson (2004) gives the example of walking home to his house 
in Princeton and accidently walking into his neighbor’s house. He describes the 
set of houses as being identical architecturally, although mirrored in their layout. 
Walking over the hearth, he perceives aspects of his neighbour’s house that are 
incoherent with his memories of his house. The furniture is not right and he finds 
the neighbor’s wife (rather than his own wife) in the kitchen and so forth. 
Initially, he rationalizes that his neighbor must be visiting him and that his own 
wife must have bought new furniture. So set in his belief that he has walked into 
his own home (how could he not!) that he invents a post hoc justification for each 
disconfirming piece of evidence that would ensure coherence amongst his beliefs.  
A desire for coherence kept Davidson from the truth far longer than his 
pride and bashfulness would prefer. The fastest means for Davidson to get into the 
comfort of his own home would be to immediately doubt that he had arrived 
home upon seeing his neighbor in his kitchen. (After all, it would be a very rare 
occurrence indeed if she were there, alone in the afternoon.) Bayesian principles 
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offer the mechanism by which to have appropriate doubts: Very unlikely evidence 
given the hypothesis is a good justification for reconsidering the hypothesis.  
This example shows the value of holding incoherent credences 
simultaneously. Davidson is rational to feel that he is home (after all, he just 
walked down his street). He is also rational to think that his neighbor’s wife is in 
his kitchen (after all, there she is!). He is rational to suppose that he is in his 
neighbor’s house (he can see his neighbor’s furniture). He is also rational to 
imagine that his wife has bought new living room furniture (it is within the realm 
of possibility that she would do this).  
It is rational for Davidson to hold many credences simultaneously that do 
not cohere as long as he attempts to resolve this incoherence for the sake of his 
goals. In this instance, his goal is to sit in his own armchair as quickly as possible. 
To reach that goal most effectively, he can apply Bayesian hypothesis testing with 
his evidence and derive the correct response—that he ought to apologize to his 
neighbor and walk directly out the door to his actual home next door. Choosing 
the right hypothesis depends on distinctness. 
Incoherent sets of beliefs at different degrees are a normal state of play for 
any epistemic agent. What makes them defensible is that they are arrived at 
through reliable foundational means (e.g. perception, memory) or reliable 
intellectual competencies (e.g., Bayesian updating, causal reasoning). The rational 
being decides which of these incoherent sets to resolve in order to achieve her 
goals. Beliefs that are irrelevant to an agent’s goals may remain distinct for the 
time being, but the rational being aims for epistemic homeostasis: the attainment 
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of true integrated beliefs optimized for their goals. Incoherence and distinctness 
are necessary and valuable parts of epistemic endeavor. 
A critic of distinctness might say that distinctness is surely not a valuable 
epistemic good. Sometimes we consider a subset of beliefs regarding a particular 
problem, but this is a rhetorical method and not an evaluable end. Those methods 
are valuable only so far as they produce beliefs that cohere with our other beliefs. 
We do not value the blurry image produced by a short-sighted eye; no, we wait 
for the owner to put on glasses and give their pronouncement. We do not value 
the act of putting together a microscope (although we may respect it), but we 
value the completed object working well and calibrated correctly. The reason why 
epistemologists have not included distinctness as a valued epistemic good is that 
its goodness is entirely based on its role once no longer distinct. The parts of a 
microscope are valueless until we know they function cohesively together.  
My response is: There no doubt traditional epistemology is focused on ends, 
not means, and in such a framework, distinctness is not particularly valuable. 
However, distinctness is highly relevant in a competence-based epistemology, 
such as a Bayesian virtue epistemology, which values the way agents come to 
hold beliefs and rationalizes each decision made. Bayesians value action under 
uncertainty: Has the agent chosen the most rational odds, given their 
circumstances? Virtue epistemology includes the processes by which agents come 
to hold beliefs as part of their definition of knowledge. If methods and outcomes 
are valuable, then distinctness is examinable and valuable. 
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3.8.1 FAILURES ARE A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE 
A single failure… is a source of knowledge we might not have gained in any other 
way… [They reveal] weakness in reasoning, knowledge and performance that all the 
successful designs may not even hint at… the best way of achieving lasting success 
is by more fully understanding failure. (Petroski, 1985)—Quoted in the New York 
Review of Books June 2013, LX(11), p.53. 
Why are failures a source of knowledge? Why are skeptical attacks and 
counterexamples ‘good practice’ in epistemology? Failures are a source of 
knowledge because they a) allow us to identify the scope of what we did know, 
and b) help us adjust our parameters to know more in the future. Take the 
example of children constructing with sticks. They learn through experiment and 
failure that two sticks cannot stand on their own, but that three sticks mutually 
support one another in a teepee-type shape. Consider this a low level of 
knowledge. Through further experimenting, the children observe that the sticks 
cannot withstand downwards pressure from a fourth stick. They must reconsider 
their sticks and their aims before embarking on their next attempt. If they aim to 
build a fire, then the fourth stick is best placed within a teepee-like shape, which 
will strengthen it. However, if their aim is to build the tallest or strongest 
structures, their placement of subsequent sticks may diverge.  
The point here is that as children progress and fail, they achieve certain 
aims and create new aims, and it is the same with knowledge: One starts with low 
levels of knowledge and build up to ever more comprehensive knowledge in 
certain domains. Knowledge is built by failing under skeptical pressure and 
through various internal and external permutations in conditions. There are limits 
to human knowledge, constrained by our physical selves, but each level of 
knowledge, rising from animal to reflective, is fully described within a particular 
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context, serving a particular knowledge need. Building knowledge requires 
perseverance, experimentation, failure, and feedback. With knowledge comes 
greater reliability and confidence, in a positive feedback cycle, which builds 
competence and capacity.  
In the buzzing blooming confusion (James, 1890) of early life, agents are 
immersed in their environments physically. Mathematical properties of three-
dimensional space are learnt geometrically by the splaying and retraction of 
limbs. Babies see unclearly, but they grasp and come to know embodied. The 
triangulation of multi-modal data and feedback through hypothesis testing is 
surely how knowledge is forged and first justified. Coordination between these 
sensory and propriosensory systems is vital for the success of the organism in 
their environment, but how does it work? 
3.9 COORDINATION AS A SOURCE OF JUSTIFICATION  
In this chapter, I have presented the theory that coherence is a source of 
justification when it emerges from satisficing or optimal relations between 
choristic sets of beliefs. I have also defended the justification of these sets as 
distinct from the rest of one’s beliefs. At this point, one might reasonable ask 
what justifies the set up and dissolution of these sets? Is there a need for a third 
kind of justification: reliability, coherence, and coordination? Is a belief in any 
particular context justified not just because it is reliably formed and coherent, but 
also because of how it is coordinated between local and holistic goals? 
The difficulty of coordination is well known in artificial intelligence 
through their attempts to get a legged robot to move over unpredictable surfaces 
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such as ice, mud, and rocks. To adapt and recover from obstacles and challenges, 
the ‘Big Dog’ robot responds quickly to adjudicate input from 50 sensors 
including: the motion of the body (acceleration and attitude) and joints; engine 
speed, temperature, and hydraulic pressure; the position and force the joints and 
the velocity and altitude during locomotion; and so on. (Raibert, Blankespoor, 
Nelson, Playter, & Boston Dynamics, 2013) Big Dog has robust fault tolerances 
due to the difficulties associated with managing the complexity of data. 
Coordination means that data from different inputs works together and supports 
other data to ensure performance success, and better coordination means faster 
progress across unpredictable surfaces. Importantly, the robot does not become 
more coordinated just through an increase of data. It is the way the data is 
managed and utilized that dictates its usefulness. 
Coordination also means more than just mutual support—it means 
suppressing some data and communicating other data to ensure the stability of a 
system, and it results in convergence on the right action. The asymptotic 
convergence of error signals is crucial to ensure system stability and improve 
performance for mobile robots. So how does coordination relate to weak 
foundationalism and coherence?  
Coherence for robots relates directly to performance over a given terrain or 
context. The degree to which they know the surface they are moving across 
depends on foundational data and the convergence of that data adjusting for 
errors. Sosa argues that epistemic virtues are dispositions to behave in ways that 
are likely to hit on the truth. The formation, maintenance and adjustment of these 
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dispositions stems from the convergence of error-prone systems and their 
divergence from data irrelevant to the task. Coordination justifies sets of beliefs, 
acknowledging that there is no way that all a person’s beliefs could possibly reach 
consistency (Plantinga, 1993). As a result, any epistemology that depends on 
holistic logical consistency or advocates for it is untenable.  
If information is not holistically integrated or encapsulated how might the 
mind interact with it? David Lewis (1968) set up the problem of coordination for 
cooperative decision-making. Take the dilemma of trying to call another person 
who is also trying to call you. Both parties cannot pick up the phone or leave the 
phone without failing to coordinate. As another example, consider some campers 
looking for firewood:  
It matters little to anyone in which direction he goes, but if any two go in the same 
direction they are likely to cover the same ground so that the one who gets there later 
finds no wood. Each must choose a direction to go according to his expectations 
about the others: one different from anyone else’s (Lewis, 1968) 
In this example, each person must modify their actions to promote shared 
interests. Lewis used his theory of convention to resolve social coordination 
problems, and although I do not draw on his social coordination solution (or 
justification) here, let us instead transpose the same issue of coordination to the 
mind. Suppose each of the mind’s faculties behaved like self-interested entities 
with a shared agenda. A partial conflict of interest exists between these sub-
systems; they have to compromise to produce optimal behavior—an impure 
coordination problem (Rescorla, 2011).  Sets of beliefs coordinate like crew on an 
air raid. Pilots, gunners, bombers, photographers, and navigators have their own 
preferred trajectory with a shared desire to expel their arsenal and return safely to 
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base. They must coordinate with the rest of the crew to optimize the outcome for 
all. 
Imagine the difficulties that beset the hunter on horseback during a storm. 
Her capacity to shoot arrows depends on output from the visual system, auditory 
system, and vestibular system amongst others. The visual system may return 
messages regarding prey ahead that conflicts with grunts heard off to the left. The 
muscles of the body rely on the horse’s steady gait in order to line up a shot. The 
hunter is hungry and tired and wants to finish quickly, but she wants to shoot a 
male deer rather than a nursing mother. Each system is updating its beliefs 
continuously, and outputs may not cohere perfectly with one another to decide 
when to shoot one of a limited set of arrows. How might these systems coordinate 
when the aim is to accurately and discriminately shoot as quickly as possible?  
Does the mind really have self-interested components? Can a coordination 
theory relevant to social convention (also decision theory) be ported across to 
justification? My approach to coordination is consistent with the Bayesian 
treatment of coherence in that: 1) Bayesian coherence is based on faculties of the 
mind operating like independent witnesses (Lewis, 1946); and 2) Bayesian 
coordination algorithms are already researched in neuroscience and implemented 
in robotics. I consider two coordination alternatives below—one from 
neuroscience and the other from engineering. 
Recent work in dynamic coordination in the brain (von der Malsburg, 
Phillips, & Singer, 2010) offers a framework for coordination based on how the 
mind maintains flexibility and reliability:  
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Neural activity…is dynamically coordinated so as to produce coherent patterns of 
macroscopic activity that are adapted to the current context, without corrupting the 
information that is transmitted by the local signals… 
 
…We need to understand better how these diverse activities [adaptation to different 
environments and tasks between brain regions, groups of cells and cells] are 
coordinated. Most locally specialized streams of activity can affect most others, 
either directly or indirectly. In this sense, the brain operates as an integrated whole. 
It is also clear that percepts, thoughts, and actions are normally, in some sense, both 
coherent and relevant to the current context. 
The need to combine flexibility with reliability means that beliefs need to be 
used in different ways at different times and in different contexts. I do not have 
the space to go into dynamic coordination in great detail here, but I hope it is 
sufficient to suggest that there is a burgeoning field in studying coordination in 
the brain that might extend our understanding of the justification of beliefs. 
Separate to biology, there has been work in engineering to enable limited 
separability of beliefs under the banner of enabling multiple autonomous entities 
to interact in a distributed, asynchronous manner (Pfeffer & Tai, 2012). This work 
concentrates on the practical problem of how to coordinate robots, but the slightly 
orthogonal domain should not put us off. In the same way that research in 
testimony helps us consider faculties of the mind, the outcomes for separate 
robots might be analogous to the fairly autonomous and asynchronous workings 
of human mental faculties. This work may further the goals of holism and 
informational integration (Weiskopf, 2008). It turns out that asynchronous 
updating works because the entire system relies on reflective beliefs formed 
earlier than current beliefs held at any one location. As Pfeffer & Tai (2012) state: 
Even with this scheme, we still cannot use the beliefs at the current subnode as the 
beliefs about the system state. Instead we have to use beliefs at a historical subnode. 
The problem is that the current subnodes will always have just received their first 
messages at the time they form their first beliefs. Thus they will not have had time to 
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converge to the correct beliefs. In contrast, historical subnodes will have received 
multiple sets of messages that will have traveled around the loops several times. The 
belief of a historical subnode about the state of the system at its time point will be 
much more accurate than the belief of the current node about the current state. …  
There is a natural tradeoff here. Older reporting subnodes will have had more chance 
to converge to the approximately correct beliefs and will be more accurate about the 
state at their time point. On the other hand, as nodes get older, their beliefs become 
more stale and become a less accurate reflection of the state at the current time point 
In our experiments, we find that the second most current subnode is the best one to 
use. 
One might think that using beliefs about a historical state as a substitute for beliefs 
about the current state is a drawback of our approach. However, this is unavoidable 
for any system that updates beliefs in real time. … It is inevitable that in any system 
that takes time to process information, the information will be old by the time it has 
been processed.  
This account resolves the coordination problem by accepting the considered 
output of slightly older beliefs. Pfeffer & Tai’s (2012) asynchronous algorithm 
has two advantages: 1) it avoids the need for a centralized controller (good for 
animal knowledge) and 2) it does not need synchronization (holistic coherence) in 
monitoring dynamic systems. Their algorithm assumes the entire system is 
changing even as updates occur. Each update requires small levels of computation 
and limited capacity to communicate at each node. Evidence is exchanged across 
nodes in the network imperfectly, in the sense that updating in one part of the 
system prevents another part from immediately benefiting from its processes. 
Nevertheless, eventually, evidence is propagated around the network. 
Adding coordination as a source of justification is meant to shift the focus 
of debates in coherence beyond notions of ‘mutual support’ or ‘consistency’. 
Somehow, agents come to know their world. They are justified because they get 
factual feedback with enough coherence such that they can hold beliefs. The 
success of these beliefs can be seen in the thriving of some organisms and the 
failures of others. Factors that affect an organism’s capacity to manage data will 
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affect those organisms’ capacities to have appropriately rational dispositions and 
this will be evidenced in their failure to achieve goals such as navigating over a 
particular terrain.  
What emerges in this chapter is that normative coherence is perhaps best 
thought of as another form of reliabilism—a set of mechanisms or processes that 
govern belief-to-belief relations. Coherence includes the rules and processes that 
establish defensible relations between beliefs. This is a good outcome for Sosa’s 
virtue epistemology, because Sosa wants to include coherence in his view, but 
notes that he had not decided precisely what role coherence might play. 
“I leave open the question of whether the nature of coherence, and of 
understanding/explanation, requires explanation in terms of reliability in the actual 
world. Even if such explanation would be required at bottom, it may still be that 
coherence is a distinctive value with its own special status” (Sosa, 2009, V.2, II. 
Epistemic Values and Why Knowledge Is a Matter of Degree).  
Foundationalist and coherentist justification are both ultimately based on 
reliabilist principles. That is, perception, memory, testimony, inference, and 
coordination need to be reliable in a particular context in order to justify belief. 
Virtue epistemology is right that the relevant measure of reliability is the 
competence of the agent’s processes, rather than some externalist measure.  
However, coherence is a set of processes that is distinct from foundational 
processes. Whereas foundational processes primarily concern the relationship 
between non-beliefs and beliefs, coherence relate beliefs to one another. In 
addition, coordination may be another layer of reliabilist justification, in that 
coordination processes manage the relevance and flexibility of foundational and 
coherence processes. 
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3.10 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have outlined a number of different theories of what 
coherence might be. Pure coherentism suffers from both the isolation and 
alternative systems objections. Weak foundationalism requires weak coherence—
and even this is hard to defend. A Bayesian formulation of weak foundationalism 
produces dubious results including that highly cohering sets of propositions are 
less likely to be true than less coherent sets of propositions.  
In response, I have argued that formal attempts (to date) to define coherence 
have not captured the sense in which coherence adds justification to reliably 
produced beliefs. Coherence is the inferential fastenings that hold beliefs together. 
These fastenings might be explicit beliefs, implicit beliefs, or unrepresented 
processes that weave beliefs together into functional sets in order for an agent to 
succeed in a particular context towards a particular goal.  Coherence understood 
in this way raises the likelihood that a single belief (or hypothesis) is true by 
binding (entailment, inference, explanation, and so on) limited sets of 
propositions. Agents are reliable in so far as they coordinate the coherence and 
distinctness of their beliefs, and the skepticism and confidence with which they 
hold those beliefs. The mind will adopt principles of both coherence and 
distinctness as it moves through a variety of hypotheses. There is not an unlimited 
number of ways propositions can cohere under a weakly foundational account so 
described, because beliefs (or processes) based on causal inference will restrict 
the set of plausible alternatives.  
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When our performance is missing its mark, we need to reassess our patterns, 
and once a new strategy is confirmed, we can yet again set forth valuing 
coherence within a new paradigm. In this way, coherence and disintegration both 
act on the agent in turn, like the catabolic and anabolic forces within a cell. 
Ideally, the agent’s epistemic structures operate like homeostasis: Self-regulating 
to maintain the optimum health of the organism.  
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4 HOMEOSTATIC EPISTEMOLOGY.  
In general, coordinating interactions are those that produce coherent and relevant 
overall patterns of activity, while preserving the essential individual identities and 
functions of the activities coordinated. (von der Malsburg, et al., 2010, p. 1) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is a study of virtue epistemology (Sosa, 2007, 2009a, 
2011) and, in particular the competencies that produce rational credences and 
knowledge in the service of human flourishing despite the inevitable uncertainties 
an agent faces and the myriad limitations both on human cognition and the 
availability of information. Homeostatic epistemology supposes that an agent has 
a rational credence p when p is the product of reliable processes aligned with the 
norms of probability theory; whereas an agent knows that p when a rational 
credence p is the product of reliable processes such that:  
1. p meets some relevant threshold for belief (such that the agent acts as 
though p were true and indeed p is true),  
2. p coheres with a satisficing set of relevant beliefs and,  
3. the relevant set of beliefs is coordinated appropriately to meet the 
integrated aims of the agent.  
This chapter examines whether homeostatic epistemology can resolve some 
of the issues originally raised for virtue epistemology regarding the sufficiency of 
apt belief: In §4.2, I motivate the use of the term ‘homeostatic epistemology’ and 
clarify its commitments; in §4.3, I show how homeostatic justification might 
extend the usefulness and applicability of Sosa’s ‘apt belief’ by defending the 
‘aptness’ of apt belief, explaining levels of knowledge, limiting the risk of infinite 
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regress, and addressing the problem of luck and the value of testimony. I conclude 
the dissertation in §4.4.  
4.2 HOMEOSTATIC EPISTEMOLOGY 
Physiologists have long understood how important of the regulation of 
milieu intérieur (or the internal environment) is for the regulation of bodily 
functions (Bernard, 1858). The term ‘homeostasis’ was coined by an American 
physiologist Walter Cannon, to describe how the body maintains relative stability 
in bodily tissues that are critical to cell survival—e.g., nutrient availability, 
oxygen availability, temperature, pH, and ion concentrations (Cannon, 1929, 
1939; Day, 2005)—and it refers specifically to the range of nested, self-regulating 
physiological processes that aim to achieve equilibrium within the body, despite 
varying internal and external conditions (Schulkin, 2003). Although homeostasis 
operates at the cell level, it involves many organs—“brain and nerves, the heart, 
lungs, kidneys and spleen, all working cooperatively” (Cannon, 1939)—and the 
processes are both local (e.g. heart, kidney) and broadly coordinated (e.g. by the 
brain) to maintain internal viability.  
Additionally, homeostastic processes are intrinsically normative (Schulkin, 
2003), aiming to improve the wellbeing of the agent, which links back to the 
Aristotelian notion of flourishing (that is, the best explanation of why the body’s 
systems function the way they do is that they are calibrated to strive for optimal 
functionality given the constraints faced by the individual). The degree to which a 
physiological process is competent is, in essence, the degree to which it 
contributes to the body’s optimal functioning. As an example, achieving a rapid 
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heart rate through athletic exertion is an appropriate way to both escape 
immediate threat and improve one’s aerobic fitness, and as a result increase one’s 
lifespan (Yataco Md, Fleisher Md, & Katzel Md, 1997). However, a rapid heart 
rate  could also be a symptom of Graves’ disease,66 and in this particular 
circumstance it does not contribute to optimal functioning and instead leads to the 
loss of one’s normal heart rhythm (atrial fibrillation), which in turn may lead to a 
stroke (Biondi & Kahaly, 2010). In summary, homeostatic processes are 
competent only when they operate reliably and coordinate across many of the 
body’s systems to improve wellbeing. 
Just as the heart reliably pumps blood to meet the needs of an animal during 
times of rest and times of intense activity, the mind reliably forms beliefs in 
different contexts67. Like homeostatic processes in the body, many of the mind’s 
processes strive to put the agent in circumstances that are most conducive to their 
wellbeing.68 The primary epistemic driver for an agent is achieving true beliefs 
about external and internal conditions that are relevant to their success. However, 
due to the limits of human cognition and the poverty of information in any given 
situation, there is also a secondary epistemic driver—achieving rational degrees 
of belief given one’s evidence and circumstances (which includes withholding 
belief or maintaining low degrees of belief in a hypothesis). For example, even if 
                                                
66 Graves disease is a common form of hyperthyroidism in young women that affects homeostasis in a range of systems 
including circulation (heart palpitations), affect (nervousness), digestion (diarrhea, weight loss, increased appetite), skin 
(excessive sweating), and the muscular system (tremor and muscle weakness) (Hollander & Davies, 2009) 
67 An agent might reliably use their hearing to detect a fire alarm and reliably reason that the sound indicates a fire drill—
because inductively, most times they have heard a fire alarm in that building, it has been an exercise, a prank, an accident 
or a fault, rather than evidence of an actual fire. The agent reliably reevaluates their evidence that the fire alarm signals a 
drill if new evidence relevant to their belief occurs, such as the smell of smoke (that has an prior probability close to zero if 
there is no fire). The agent does not alter their beliefs about the fire drill if they have evidence irrelevant to the existence of 
the fire (e.g. they smell perfume). In this way, for any context, there is a limited set of beliefs that are relevant to the 
justification of a single belief and can elevate that belief to knowledge. 
68 Sosa (2011, p. 57) argues that beliefs aim for truth. I argue that it is not the beliefs per se, but the homeostatic processes 
that control the production, coherence and coordination of beliefs that are truth-seeking. 
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an agent rationally believes that there is no fire despite being able to hear a fire 
alarm sounding, they maintain an appropriate caution in case their inductive 
inference is not justified in this particular instance. 
 Epistemologists have long wondered how the mind regulates beliefs to 
achieve correspondence with the world, and what justifies these processes. Two 
prevalent conceptions of justification include reliability (that belief-making 
processes consistently make true beliefs) and coherence (that beliefs gain 
justification to the degree that they support other beliefs).69 I take Quine (1970) to 
be correct when he asserts that any belief might be affected by any new belief, but 
that justification must be limited to choristic sets (partitions of cohering beliefs 
that add justification to foundationally justified beliefs) where no further 
explanation is needed (see §1.2, §3.1, §3.5, and §3.6). The homeostatic choristic 
solution reconciles the following statements: 1) knowledge is common and 
ubiquitous, 2) people hold inconsistent and false beliefs, 3) people hold beliefs 
that do not abide by normative coherentist (inference) rules, and 4) all beliefs are 
part of a web of belief. Justification by limited sets explains how agents know 
about the world, but also how they cope with uncertainty, incomplete evidence, 
inconsistent or false beliefs, and changing environments.  
                                                
69 Other sources of justification include a priori and evidential. A priori beliefs are justified in so far as they arise from 
processes independent of experience “beyond that needed to acquire the concepts required to understand the proposition at 
issue” (Russell, 2013 )(author’s italics). My arguments do not depend on disproving a priori theories of justification, 
though I err on the side of doubt that a priori justification is genuinely explanatory. Evidential justification supposes that 
the presence of perceptual, introspective, memorial, and/or intuitional experiences justify beliefs (e.g. the fact a cup of 
coffee tastes sweet is evidence that it is sweet). Reliabilists agree that evidence plays a role, but only if the experience 
arises as a result of reliable processes, rather than the experience per se (e.g., a bent-looking stick is not evidence that it is 
bent if the stick is partially underwater and viewed from above).  
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Homeostatic knowledge is achieved when localized sets of beliefs function 
within narrow constraints and coordinate across different contexts and 
circumstances to converge on the right action. These beliefs may be quasi-apt 
beliefs (rational credences) or apt beliefs that confer knowledge within a specified 
domain. Like the organs and biological systems of the body, rational credences 
and apt beliefs operate in functional sets that may or may not relate to one 
another, depending on the circumstances. Epistemic homeostasis occurs when an 
organism coordinates sets of beliefs to achieve their aims. The project of 
homeostatic epistemology can shed valuable light on epistemological issues 
raised earlier in this thesis.  
4.3 HOMEOSTATIC JUSTIFICATION 
4.3.1 APT BELIEF IS APT ENOUGH 
In §2.3.1, I considered the argument that apt belief is not ‘apt enough’ to 
count as knowledge, ordinarily conceived (Lepock, 2010) which Lepock argued is 
robust against a myriad of skeptical concerns that simple reliabilist animal beliefs 
fail to adequately respond to. I suggested, however, that apt belief is sensitive and 
flexible enough to adapt to difference circumstances, which makes it plausible 
that apt belief is sufficient for ordinary knowledge. I then argued, in §3.9, that 
reliabilist processes include not only foundational processes, but also the subtle 
and complex processes of coherence that bind together foundationally acquired 
beliefs, as well as the integrative and dissociative processes of coordination that 
determine what sets of beliefs are relevant to the agent in the circumstances they 
are in. The creative, flexible, adaptive quality of apt belief may stem from 
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processes of dynamic coordination between sets of foundational, coherent beliefs. 
To be efficient and dependable, beliefs must arise predictably when used at 
different times and in different contexts; but to be flexible and creative, beliefs 
must arise idiosyncratically at different times and in different contexts. Dynamic 
coordination is the study of the processes that combine and sequence beliefs in a 
context-sensitive way, changing from moment to moment, even though the beliefs 
that are coordinated retain individual or group justification (von der Malsburg, et 
al., 2010, p. 2). A good introduction to dynamic coordination is the effect of 
attention on beliefs. 
Consider the difference between seeing a hiking trail ahead of you and 
focusing on a particular part of the trail, say a footprint on the track. It is not 
difficult to imagine the typical absent-mindedness that occurs when one is hiking, 
which means that although we see the path ahead, we see it in a trivial way. The 
act of paying attention to something in your visual field does not radically change 
your visual percept, i.e. the same sorts of colors, shapes, and textures are 
processed. But, paying attention can have a large impact on how you think about 
what you see. Suppose the footprint that you saw entered your foveal area just 
before you heard an unnerving guttural sound. Once paying attention you would 
analyse the paw print carefully—is it a brown bear or a black bear? Are these 
tracks fresh? The act of paying attention to a visual stimulus is an example of 
dynamic coordination because it alters the way perceptual information is 
processed in the visual cortex—e.g., increasing sensitivity to faint stimuli, or 
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reducing the impact of task irrelevant distractors, while preserving the original 
inputs (Reynolds & Heeger, 2009).  
Attention is particularly relevant to a discussion of apt belief because—as 
discussed in §1.6—attention can be a reaction to stimuli (e.g., orienting to a 
threatening sound) or a conscious choice (e.g., focusing on footprints on the path). 
The former is typical of the animal knowledge produced by System 1, whereas 
deliberative attention is typical of reflective knowledge and is produced by 
System 2 (Kahneman, 2011). Although dynamic coordination occurs for both 
animal and reflective knowledge, reflective knowledge engages a level of analysis 
that is more comprehensive than the coordination of animal knowledge. These 
findings are good news for Sosa’s virtue epistemology. Interpreted 
homeostatically, the ‘adroitness’ in Sosa’s AAA knowledge structure consists of 
foundational, cohering, and coordinating competencies that ebb and flow 
depending on the agent’s circumstances, needs, and limitations. 
4.3.2 LEVELS OF KNOWLEDGE  
In §2.3.2 I used Sosa’s trickster (2007) to demonstrate that the level of our 
knowledge at any particular moment varies depending on our goals and 
capacities. For example, a child, an art critic and a magician’s assistant have 
different epistemic priorities when they view a table in unusual lighting 
conditions, and their success ought to be measured relative to their interests. The 
set of beliefs required for a child’s animal knowledge that the table is red is 
different from the set of beliefs required for the magician’s assistant to 
reflectively know that the table is red. However, both the child and the magician’s 
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assistant will be similarly justified in believing that the table is red at the level of 
animal knowledge. It is also possible that an individual’s epistemic priorities may 
change over time. For example, a father and son at an art gallery might view the 
red table and share animal knowledge of its redness. The son may then ask his 
father why the table looks red, prompting the father to reflect on the question and 
direct his attention more closely in order to understand how the table has been 
made and the origin of the redness. Based on his inspection, the father might 
deduce that the table looks red because there is red LED lighting within what is 
actually a clear laminate table.  
I believe that at any one point in time, an agent has animal knowledge about 
a variety of different things in their internal and external environment. Reflective 
knowledge is attained when beliefs that constitute animal knowledge are 
integrated into larger, choristic sets that include beliefs about why the animal 
knowledge is truth-conducive. In the case of the father, he has animal knowledge 
that the table is red and reflective knowledge that the human visual system will 
produce the experience of redness when red LED lights are switched on inside the 
table and external lighting is normal white light. He might also hypothesize with 
his son that the table could still look red if the internal LEDs were changed to 
white and the external lighting was changed to red. Theoretically, reflective 
knowledge could become iteratively more comprehensive if the cohering sets of 
beliefs that are relevant to an agent’s goal incorporated even more explanation. 
However, as an agent’s explanatory goals become more broad-ranging, and the 
size of the choristic set becomes larger, the risk of falsehoods within the set 
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increases—as warned by Klein & Warfield (1994) in §3.5—which places the 
coherence of the entire set at risk and therefore threatens its justification. 
4.3.3 REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
In §2.4, I began my analysis of reflective knowledge by considering Sosa’s 
application of the principle of exclusion PE: 
PE: if one is to know that h, then one must exclude (rule out) every possibility that 
one knows to be incompatible with one’s knowing that h” (Sosa, 1997, p. 411). 
However, PE seemed too permissive of merely conceivable possibilities, 
rather than likely alternatives, and for this reason, I argued that reflective 
knowledge must only be defended against incompatible possibilities that cohere 
with the rest of one’s beliefs by the principle of exclusion and coherence PEC:  
PEC: if one is to know that h, then one must exclude (rule out) every possibility that 
one knows to be incompatible with one’s knowing that h that coheres with the rest 
of one’s beliefs. 
I then reconsidered reflective knowledge from a Bayesian perspective (in 
§2.5) and transformed PEC into the principle of exclusion and coherence from 
multiple hypotheses PECMH:  
PECMH: if one is to know that h, then h must be the most likely amongst a set of 
plausible hypotheses hm to hn that cohere with the rest of one’s beliefs at lower 
likelihoods. 
After analyzing the role of coherence in §3.5, §3.6, and §3.7, I redefined 
reflective knowledge again based on a principle of exclusion and relevant 
coherence from multiple hypotheses (PERCMH): 
PERCMH: if one is to know that h, then h must be the most likely amongst a set of 
plausible hypotheses hm to hn that cohere with the relevant partition of one’s beliefs 
at lower likelihoods. 
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While both animal and reflective knowledge involve limited, mutually 
supporting partitions of beliefs, reflective knowledge includes higher order 
beliefs—including beliefs about abstract concepts, causality and theoretical 
entities or relations as well as particulars within a domain that explain animal 
knowledge (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). Hierarchically nested probabilistic 
methods and other inferential fastenings weave beliefs together into functional 
sets in order for an agent to attain reflective knowledge in a particular context, 
towards a particular goal.  
When Sosa says that he wants reflective knowledge to encompass the 
capacities of the intellect, information and deliberation, he calls for an account 
that acknowledges that the mind can hold multiple hypotheses simultaneously, 
and adjust credences, as needed, in response to deliberation and information. The 
mind adopts principles of both coherence and distinctness as it considers a variety 
of hypotheses according to the norms of Bayesian reasoning (see §2.6.4) which 
includes: anchoring your judgment in base rates relevant for the decision, 
questioning the diagnosticity of your evidence, and remaining open-minded, 
adaptive, and objective. Homeostatic epistemology can strengthen Sosa’s 
reflective knowledge against the wrath of rationalists seeking to vindicate the 
intellect. 
One of the advantages of limiting coherence to a partition of beliefs is that 
counterfactual reasoning and conjecture can take place distinct from other beliefs. 
In this dissertation, I have made the case that distinction should be viewed as a 
valuable part of epistemic justification (§3.8). If beliefs are coordinated 
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dynamically, then justified partitions of beliefs can easily be taken offline, 
decoupled for intellectual hypothesis testing, or recoupled to sets of beliefs for 
empirical testing in the world—as occurs during exploratory, pretend, and 
imaginary play (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). Such an account may conflict with 
current theories of pretend or imaginary play that involve quarantining a silo of 
pretend beliefs from normal beliefs (Leslie, 1987; Nichols & Stich, 2003) and this 
would be an interesting avenue of future (and possibly controversial) research. 
4.3.4 THE RISK OF INFINITE REGRESS 
In §2.4.1 I considered the Pyrrhonian argument that an infinite number of 
beliefs are needed to justify any belief. I argued that the regress of aptness and 
meta-aptness was not a threat to virtue epistemology, but rather an explanatory 
tool to describe different levels of competence and performance domains. In §3.5, 
§3.6, and §3.7, I elaborated on this argument by claiming that, in fact, a maximal 
fittedness is required for any set of beliefs for any particular goal of the agent in a 
particular situation70. Once a set of beliefs has met a minimal satisficing level of 
cohesion, a belief within the group would be sufficiently justified to count as 
knowledge for that agent, in that context, and the degree of justification required 
for knowledge ought to be limited by the subject’s computational, attentional, and 
inferential limits. 71  Knowledge is objectively evaluable, but the scope of 
knowledge must be established relative to the capabilities of the agent (or perhaps 
normal human capabilities). Consider what a butterfly knows as it approaches a 
flower. Butterflies and humans can detect red, blue, and green, but butterflies can 
                                                
70 While good in theory, I acknowledge that we still do not understand the mechanism by which the relevant set of beliefs 
is decided (see §1.73), only that some subset must suffice given the presence of knowledge in our day-to-day experience. 
71 Thanks to Ernest Sosa for highlighting this condition on justification (personal communication, September 3, 2013). 
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also see the ultraviolet spectrum. A human can know that the flower helianthus 
tuberosus is yellow, even though a butterfly would have a more nuanced color 
experience that included yellow and purple.  
4.3.5 LUCK 
In §2.4.2, I considered the case of double luck—i.e., Gettier style cases—
and I described a scenario in which a highly skilled archer’s arrow lands on the 
target due to a double gust of wind. The intuition is that no one would accord the 
archer credit for this shot, even though it was accurate and adroit. Sosa explains 
the archer’s failure to know by requiring aptness to be accurate due to the 
manifestation of competence—something a double luck case fails to exhibit—and 
I accepted Sosa’s requirement, though I questioned the analogy. Beliefs are part 
of integrated sets of beliefs that mitigate against the type of luck described during 
the archer’s performance. As such, I compared beliefs to a tomahawk missile with 
multiple levels of course correction and feedback. If a tomahawk fails in an 
environment it is designed to succeed in, then it is a failure of competence (a 
broken mechanism or maintenance error), rather than luck. The power of 
competencies to explain instances of knowledge is improved when they are in 
operation throughout the long sustained period of belief. 
A critic might object to my counterexample, arguing that competently 
formed beliefs do suffer the ravages of luck, without a feedback mechanism, due 
to the temporal distance between forming a belief and executing a belief. 
Consider the following scenario: 
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…not every case of knowledgeable belief requires a feedback mechanism, not even 
when the belief is a prediction, so that there is a time lapse between the formation of 
the belief and (in a relevant way) its hitting the mark of truth. You solemnly promise 
to meet me, and I believe you with high justification. And you do eventually show 
up at the appointed time and place. However, you had completely forgotten, and 
eventually showed up, not in order to meet me, but in order to buy some ice cream. 
Here my belief succeeds. It is correct. And it is competent. But it is not apt. Nor, in 
the circumstances, was there any feedback mechanism that could have corrected 
along the way.72 
For the sake of clarity, let us call the promiser Pinocchio, the promisee 
Geppetto and the place Ponte Vecchio—the oldest bridge in Florence. In this 
scenario, both Pinocchio and Geppetto’s beliefs must be justified by a set of 
beliefs that are relevant to the individual, and how those beliefs are coordinated 
over time—because a competent belief is never adrift from relevant cohering 
beliefs. Geppetto’s belief that Pinocchio will arrive at the appointed time and 
place is based on other beliefs about Pinocchio’s trustworthiness in this sort of 
situation, as well as beliefs about anything idiosyncratic that might make this 
situation different from previous experience. Pinocchio’s solemn promise to meet 
Geppetto is justified if he truly intends to fulfill his obligation, desires not to lie, 
has the volitional capacity to follow through on his promise and so forth. 
However, what justifies Gepetto and Pinocchio’s trust—long after the belief is 
formed—is also how the original belief is coordinated and connected with other 
beliefs and priorities over time.  
Pinocchio and Gepetto’s beliefs (formed at time t1) are justified by, amongst 
other things, the relevant belief that Pinocchio’s memory processes are 
sufficiently reliable to carry the belief ‘across the line’ to Ponte Vecchio at t2. 
Reflective knowledge regarding the reliability of Pinocchio’s memory processes 
                                                
72 Thanks to Ernest Sosa for his articulation of this scenario (personal communication, 12th August, 2013). 
  171 
 
is a central presupposition of the solemn promise to meet at time t2 and the 
justification of Gepetto’s trust in the promise at t1. Such a promise suggests that 
Pinocchio will prioritize this meeting over and above other considerations, and 
that the meeting constitutes a goal that trumps other competing agendas. After all, 
once memory processes fail and Pinocchio only accidently lives up to his prior 
commitment, his original belief and testimony are no longer justified—as 
evidenced by a loss of trust between Pinocchio and Gepetto. 
Gepetto is only lucky if the memory error is unpredictable—for example, 
Pinocchio may have suffered a stroke that gave him amnesia. In such a case, 
Gepetto was justified holding the belief and the belief succeeds, yet he does not 
have knowledge, and this is why Sosa is right that there has to be the right 
connection between accuracy and adroitness. Gepetto must meet Pinocchio 
because of his competent assessment that Pinocchio would meet him, not because 
of luck. If Pinocchio’s unpredictable stroke and hunger for ice cream was 
responsible for the meeting, it would not affect the trust relationship between 
himself and Gepetto73. 
However, what if the memory error is predictable? The purported 
equivalence of luck in this example is that Pinocchio had “completely forgotten” 
that he and Gepetto were supposed to meet, but forgetting is mostly a 
consequence of poor planning, rather than luck. Memory processes are a core part 
of the coordinating processes Pinocchio needs in order to arrive at the appointed 
time and place. If a craving for ice cream moves his muscles to Ponte Vecchio, 
                                                
73 Of course, the impact of the stroke may have additional complications for Pinocchio and Gepetto’s relationship as they 
both must navigate Pinocchio’s unfamiliar post-stroke cognitive capacities. Still, if both parties acknowledge their 
ignorance about Pinocchio’s reliability, then they can maintain a trusting relationship. 
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the causal connection (and the competence of the original belief) is lost. I refer 
here to Martin and Deutscher’s (1966) seminal work on the philosophy of 
memory to highlight the importance of the causal connection between a belief and 
its subsequent states. To remember, a person’s original belief must be “operative 
in producing a state or successive states in him finally operative in producing his 
[memory] representation” (p.173). In this example, the failure to remember 
indicates that there is no longer a causal connection between arriving at Ponte 
Vecchio and the now vacuous promise to meet up. 
Of course, Sosa (1997) is well aware that knowledge requires the right 
causal connection between the formation of a belief and the situation where that 
belief is operative. If memory systems fail to retain and utilize a belief established 
reliably and coherently, then it is a failure of knowledge due to a failure of 
coordination. If this analysis is right, then Pinocchio’s original solemn promise to 
meet Gepetto is not fully justified for either Pinocchio or Gepetto because 
justification requires: a) that the belief was reliably formed, b) appropriate 
coherence within a relevant subset of beliefs, and c) that this belief is coordinated 
with the other cognitive, motor, and affective systems that enable the agent to get 
to the location because of their desire to meet. Pinocchio and Gepetto ought to 
have known that that Pinocchio is unreliable, even when he solemnly promises to 
meet up. This failure to know means that their belief that Pinocchio would meet 
Gepetto at the Ponte Vecchio was not adequately justified. Coherence and 
coordination further explicate the importance of a causal connection between 
adroitness and accuracy in Sosa’s apt belief.  
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4.3.6 THE VALUE OF TESTIMONY 
A key difference between testimony in virtue epistemology and Bayesian 
epistemology is the reliance on authorities and experts. Due to the high value 
placed on the transmission of knowledge—rather than credences—virtue 
epistemology (and epistemology traditionally) do not tolerate dubious testimony. 
Sosa (2011, p. 72) argues that the transmission of relevant information is the most 
salient property that explains the success of expert testimony (p.128). As such, the 
glory for success goes to the provider of testimony, rather than the receiver, 
whose only virtue is that she trusted the provider. For testimony to count as 
knowledge, it must be accurate, and it must be accurate in virtue of expert 
competent processes. However, the most salient reason for the testimony being 
right may not be the fact that it arose from the expert. A belief’s correctness may 
stem instead from the cognitive accomplishments of others. This point is 
recognized by Bayesian approaches to testimony, which include a comprehensive 
calculus for weighing testimony according to various criteria, including the prior 
probability of each hypothesis and the varying reliability of witnesses. A useful 
epistemology will certainly value highly reliable, expert testimony more than less 
reliable testimony, but testimony given by unreliable witnesses can also be 
valuable, as long as there are more than one and their accounts are independently 
given (Bovens & Hartmann, 2004).  
One of the problems with demanding that testimony is knowledge is that 
both the believer and the expert may not have any capacity to determine whether 
the testimony is knowledge at the time it is trusted. The expert has a high degree 
of confidence in their belief, and the believer accepts this confidence when the 
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belief is transmitted. If the belief happens to be knowledge, then it benefits the 
believer; if the belief turns out to be a justified but untrue belief, then it is an 
unfortunate accident, rather than an indication that the expert ought not be trusted 
on some future occasion. The point is that the Bayesian contribution offers virtue 
epistemology an excellent way to manage the fallibility of reliable processes that 
still improves truth in the long term.  
An additional benefit of a Bayesian virtue epistemology is that it recognizes 
the value of multiple witnesses. In a traditional epistemology, testimony does not, 
in itself, transmit justification. This is because beliefs conveyed through testimony 
have warrant in virtue of how they arose in an individual (e.g. perception, 
memory and/or inference). In a Bayesian virtue epistemology, however, cohering 
testimony from multiple witnesses does increase the justification of a belief. 
Justification arises from the intersection of agreement between at least partially 
reliable witnesses. I have not yet examined precisely how homeostatic 
epistemology ought to consider testimony, but this is another area that has great 
scope for future research.  
4.4 CONCLUSION 
I started this project as an empirical and philosophical examination of Ernie 
Sosa’s virtue epistemology, particularly his division of knowledge into animal 
and reflective. I thought to myself: Is this right? Is this really what is really going 
on? Certainly, there were some good precedents for such a division in the memory 
and decision-making literature, particularly that learning mechanisms and 
decision-making can be split into implicit and explicit processes that drive belief 
  175 
 
acquisition and updating. If animal knowledge accords with implicit memory and 
decision-making processes and reflective knowledge accords with explicit 
memory and decision-making processes, then it has empirical ‘legs’ (as it were). 
So far, so good. 
However, Sosa claims, rather radically, that the same sorts of reliabilist 
justification that are relevant to animal knowledge also apply to reflective 
knowledge—an iterative reliabilism. I was intrigued by this idea of iterative 
reliabilism, but, like other philosophers, I was somewhat perplexed by how the 
high standard of reflective knowledge—incorporating traditional ideas about the 
intellect and higher order thinking—could be attained by reliabilist justification. It 
was not clear to me how one could attain reflective knowledge from simple 
reliabilist processes. In addition, reliabilist processes need an additional boost 
from coherence—an intuitively attractive, yet formally tricky, means of 
improving the veracity of belief. At the end of the journey, I feel that I have, at 
least to some degree, resolved this puzzle. 
The justification of ‘apt belief’ and ‘aptly apt’ belief ought to incorporate 
apparatus from Bayesian decision theory. Bayesian processes operate for both 
implicit and explicit justification and they are grounded in reliabilist principles 
(i.e. they yield accurate results in the long term). Bayesian epistemology—as an 
agent-centered, competence-based, reliabilist epistemology—really gives virtue 
epistemology a strong framework to defend higher order reliabilist thinking. 
Normative coherence (coherence as a source of justification) is best understood as 
a variety of reliabilism. Importantly, our beliefs do not become more coherent 
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simply because we have more of them. Instead there is an ideal level of coherence 
that must exist between any number of propositions for some goal in a particular 
context. Coherence must be balanced with disintegration. Coherence and 
disintegration both act on the agent in turn, like the catabolic and anabolic forces 
within a cell.  
Ideally, then, the agent’s epistemic structures operate like homeostasis—
self-regulating to maintain optimum health of the organism. Systems in dynamic 
equilibrium are under continual feedback control process to keep conditions 
relatively uniform. Reliability requires both skepticism and our trust in our 
faculties. We build up our capacities through our successes and failures as we 
interact with the world and it is epistemic homeostasis that ensures that the mind's 
belief-updating systems maintain equilibrium no matter the internal or external 
information environments. If homeostasis is the “wisdom of the body” (Cannon, 
1939; Starling, 1923), then epistemic homeostasis is the wisdom of the mind. 
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